SUMMARY

EDITORIAL

1. THE POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD

a. The National Assembly of Deputees

b. The Electoral Commission

c. The Supreme Court of Justice

d. The current political deadlock and the weakness of the opposition

e. The positions of western governments

2. THE OPPOSITION

a. In search of strategies

b. Etienne Tshisekedi at the German Embassy

3. VERBAL ESCALATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

a. On the crackdown on Christian protesters

b. On the financing of the elections

4. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITIONS FROM THE CIVIL SOCIETY

a. The Carter Center

b. The African Association for the Defense of Human Rights (ASADHO)

c. The National Mission to Observe the Elections

EDITORIAL: DEMOCRACY, A LONG AND DIFFICULT ROAD

Despite the unrest that has characterized the immediate post-electoral period, the political situation in the DRC seems to be currently entering a phase that was perhaps unexpected, or at least not guaranteed. After the publication of the legislative elections results by the Electoral Commission, the National Assembly met in a special session. It proceeded to form its provisional committee and to confirm the mandates of its newly elected members. The Assembly is now in the process of drawing up its own internal rules of procedure, and the special session will end with the election of a permanent committee, in view of the ordinary session that is due to begin in mid-March. Elected to the Assembly, the former Prime Minister and twenty or so other cabinet members have resigned from their posts in order to accept their new roles as delegates, since the positions are constitutionally incompatible. The president has named the vice prime minister of the outgoing government as interim prime minister of the provisional government. For some time, rumors have been circulating about the future prime minister. Will it be a member of the presidential majority? Or the opposition? Will it be a technocrat? Whatever happens, we are moving towards the formation of two important institutions resulting from the legislative elections: the National Assembly and the new government.

It could be an entirely normal, ordinary process, if the presidential and legislative elections of November 2011 had been transparent, free and peaceful. But the many irregularities, electoral fraud and violence have spoiled the process. The election results published by the Electoral Commission do not reflect the will of the people and “are not in keeping with truth, or justice.” The risk is that the President of the Republic and his new government will establish themselves with force and violence and that the parliament will lose its power to monitor the executive branch. For some time, certain members of the opposition who were elected, according to the results published by the Electoral Commission, have been threatening to not participate in the National Assembly, stating as a motivation, among others, the fact that it will be difficult for them to achieve anything faced with such a dominant majority. But abstention will only further weaken an opposition that in itself is still a minority. If the opposition was not in the minority, it would be in power as the majority. Another reason cited is that the results of the elections were falsified in favor of the presidential majority and consequently, the elections are not valid. This is a very reasonable argument. In fact, there have been several propositions aiming to resolve this problem: the nullification of the elections of November 28th in preparation for new elections, or a recount of the ballots. But for logistical, economic and “legal” reasons, none of these propositions has come about.

With regard to the current situation, one possibility is to strike purposely right now, in light of recent negative events, but also with the angle of constructing a possible future with the participation of all the political and social forces. The electoral process is not finished and everyone must continue to engage to achieve a true democracy. Serious preparation must go into the provincial and local elections still to come. This could require a newly-composed central committee of the Electoral Commission, a new system of monitoring voter registration lists and polling stations, increased technical training for the Electoral Commission personnel, advance preparation of electoral materials (ballots, ballot-boxes, forms), effective prevention of electoral fraud by a more complete and coordinated deployment of electoral observers and political party witnesses throughout the process, from the polling to the counting of the ballots, until the final compilation of the results, and the adoption of suitable measures for preserving the ballot papers and the electoral results protocols. The road to democracy is very long. One opportunity has been lost, that of November 28th, but the next one cannot be allowed to be missed.

 

1. THE POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD

a. The National Assembly of Deputees

On February 27th, President of the Republic Joseph Kabila Kabange met with the provisional board of the National Assembly, led by the Honorable Timothée Nkombo Nkisi. During this first official meeting, emphasis was placed on the progress of the tasks of the new National Assembly, in particular those assigned to its provisional board, notably reviewing the documentation to validate the mandates of the new national delegates, drafting the internal rules of the National Assembly, and electing the permanent board of the National Assembly.

After an absence that gave rise to rumors and all kinds of interpretations, Joseph Kabila appeared in public for the second time at the Palace of the People. The first time was on the occasion of the funeral of the Honorable Katumba Mwanke, who died in Bukavu following an airplane crash.

On February 28th, a plenary session of the National Assembly confirmed the mandates of 482 delegates elected during the legislative elections of November 28th, according to the provisional results published by the CENI.

The mandates of the delegates of the UDPS and other opposition parties were also confirmed, though they did not attend the debate in parliament.

In compliance with Article 108 of the constitution, the elected representatives have eight days to decide which functions they will fulfill and which ones are incompatible with their position in the parliament. According to Article 108, the position of representative or senator is incompatible in particular with the functions of a member of the executive government, a member of a democratic support institution, a career civil servant of the state, a member of a politico-administrative framework, a member of the president’s cabinet, the prime minister, the president of the National Assembly, the president of the senate, or any other political or administrative authority of the state.

In addition, the provisional board proposed and received permission from the plenary session to establish a Special Commission in charge of drafting the internal procedural rules of the National Assembly. The Commission will be constituted of 55 members, with five delegates from each province.

 

b. The Electoral Commission

On February 23rd, the vice president of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), Jacques Djoli, declared that the board of the CENI would set the date for the provincial elections of the DRC “after the mid-term evaluation of the electoral process.” This evaluation will focus on the entirety of the electoral process, from the review of the voter registration rolls to the publishing of the provisional results of the national legislative elections, and will be carried out with the MONUSCO, international partners, and with internal partners both institutional and not.

 

c. The Supreme Court of Justice

The Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), which acts as a Constitutional Court, is continuing to examine the records pertaining to the contentious legislative elections of November 2011.

The biggest problem facing the petitioners is having to hurry to prepare all their documents. As a result, they are criticized frequently for their lack of inventories, and above all for the lack of polling station returns and the records from the local centers where the results were compiled. It must be noted that some can supply only partial returns, and others none at all. The same problem exists for the political party witnesses, who were thrown out of several polling stations. In these cases, the petitioners are criticized for making allegations that they cannot support with any proof. The same situation exists with regard to the ballot box stuffing. The petitioners are required to provide the observation reports drawn up by the investigating police officers who were working in the electoral precincts. Sometimes, the issue is that either the candidature itself or the use of state funds during the electoral campaign is what is in contention, which it is too late to address. Other times, the petitioner does not say who was caught falsifying the results, or what the fraud consisted of. In each case, the public prosecutor requests that the judge “declare the claim inadmissable and unfounded for lack of sufficient quality evidence.”

 

d. The current political deadlock and the weakness of the opposition

The director of the International Crisis Group (ICG) for central Africa, Thierry Vircoulon analyses the current political deadlock and the weakness of the opposition and deplores the escalation of power through repression.

With less than a third of the seats in the National Assembly, the opposition is at risk of remaining a bit player as it was in the previous legislature, unable to stand against any of the initiatives of the Presidential Majority (MP). The announced boycott by the UDPS of the lower house of parliament could have enormous consequences for the very functioning of the opposition, which by this action is allowing an essential strategic element of the current legislature to be cut away. Reduced to forty or so members in the lower house of parliament, all members of the UDPS, their ability to express themselves and to effectively play the role of a counterweight to the MP is taken away.

According to certain information, the UDPS is very divided between the delegates who would like sit on the National Assembly on the one hand, and on the other hand those who are following the lead of Étienne Tshisekedi and boycotting it entirely. The strategy of the UDPS is not yet well-defined. Tshisekedi himself will not change his strategy. The UDPS is the leading opposition party. If it does not take part in the National Assembly, the other parties will be significantly weakened in the parliament. If they do take part, it could create a significant foothold for the opposition in the Assembly (about 100 delegates). The issue is therefore to determine if the opposition will operate within the parliament or outside of it. Hopefully there will be an opposition within the parliament.

As for the majority, although a significant number of seats are contested, it is clearly defined. Alongside Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) are the People’s Party for Peace and Democracy (PPPD), Pierre Lumbi’s Social Movement for Renewal (MSR), and the Unified Lumumbist Party (PALU). Thus, the composition of the majority is established. It will be dominant in the parliament, and overwhelmingly dominant if the UDPS does not take part, but it will still be fragile on the streets.

What is worrying is that we are observing a situation of democratic regression characterized by a climate of repression and a lack of opposition. This repression affects protesters, but it also directly affects the political opposition parties. What happened on February 16th shows that the opposition’s capacity for mobilization is greatly surpassed by the resources of law enforcement. It is now impossible for the opposition to protest in Kinshasa.

 

e. The positions of western governments

On the question of the elections of November 28, 2011, the positions of western governments differ from one to the next. First, there are those that consider that establishing a government will alone be sufficient to end the crisis. The majority that supports the claimed president elect will begin the work of managing the country. The opposition will be obligated to regroup and plan to present itself as an alternative in 2016. It will be compelled to designate itself a spokesperson in accordance with the established legislation. It will make its voice know whenever possible.

The other tendency is to support building a minimum consensus to manage the post-electoral crisis in the DRC. For this group, the irregularities are such that it would be irresponsible to designate winners and losers.

Even though ultimately the system of “first come, first served” has not changed completely, the search for national cohesion will not be achieved through the exclusion and humiliation of one of the camps. Therefore, to pursue this path the Congolese must seek ways and means of reaching a minimum consensus, in order to achieve the peaceful solution that has been sought after all throughout the process. Especially considering that the latest report from the Carter Center could revive the debate about the legitimacy of the institutions, since it so strongly denounced the credibility of the elections.

But whatever the westerners might think, the main responsibility lies in the hands of the Congolese themselves. Clearly it is not enough to fight the fever; a shock therapy is needed to eradicate the sickness itself. Dialogue is the only way to resolve things, and it must come from the Congolese political players themselves, in particular Tshisekedi and Kabila.

 

2. THE OPPOSITION

a. In search of strategies

On February 18th, Raphaël Kapambu, the secretary general of the UDPS (Union for Democracy and Social Progress) and in charge of communication, announced the expulsion of representative Thimotée Kombo from the party, for participating in the inaugural session of the new National Assembly and for being named the president of the board, because he is the most senior member of that house of representatives. “The UDPS is not concerned with this illegitimate forum concocted in the laboratory of Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, the president of the CENI (National Independent Electoral Commission),” declared Raphaël Kapambu. But this strategy of empty-chair politics is not supported unanimously within the party. Others push for the attendance of the elected members of the UDPS in the parliament, wanting to bring the fight for democracy to the very heart of the institution. The two camps are waiting for Etienne Tshisekedi to make a decision. And even if they are exluded from their party, the law allows them to remain in the parliament as long as they do not join a different party.

On February 21st, Valentin Mubake, Etienne Tshisekedi’s political advisor, threatened with expulsion all of the delegates of the UDPS who sit in the National Assembly, stating that his party “cannot tolerate massive fraud and immorality.”

On February 25th, Eugène Diomi Ndongala, president of the Christian Democracy (DC), an opposition party, declared that the two elected delegates from his party would not attend the National Assembly. He justified this decision by citing the observed irregularities during the legislative elections of the previous November 28th. “There are candidates of the Christian Democracy who were in fact elected but were not confirmed by the CENI. Faced with such a situation, the Christian Democracy says: we will not accept this kind of injustice, so we will not attend,” declared Diomi Ndongala.

Although he was elected by the electoral district of Funa, in the city of Kinshasa, he announced that he would not sit in the National Assembly resulting from the elections of November 28th, since according to him, the majority of the delegates were “appointed” by the CENI (National Independent Electoral Commission) based on the backroom proposals of the Presidential Majority.

Eugène Diomi said he was convinced that any change carried out by existing powers in the (according to him) illegitimate National Assembly would still be plagued by the same cheating that occurred during the elections of November 28th.

Drawing lessons from the outgoing legislature, Diomi considers that the Assembly in its current configuration, with 341 delegates from the Presidential Majority, will serve only as an echo chamber for the current regime and will be in no position to respond to the legitimate hopes and expectations of the Congolese people, who ask only for a government capable of properly managing their common heritage and of keeping the people happy.

He condemned the climate of terror that was observed in the country before, during and after the elections, caused in particular by arrests and intimidation of dissidents.

The political parties allied with the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) differ greatly on the subject of their elected delegates participating in the current special session of the National Assembly. The platform Support for Etienne Tshisekedi (SET) announced that it will participate in the current session of the second legislature. While reaffirming his support of Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the platform, Roger Lumbala, says that he is ready to take up his parliamentary mandate in the name of the population that elected him. Roger Lumbala also supports the participation in the National Assembly of the elected representatives of the UDPS, noting that “even without the recommendation of their party, they can participate without losing their mandates, which are imperative.” This position is antithetical to the one professed by Etienne Tshidekedi, which will severely test the strength of the political partnership between SET and the UDPS.

As for the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC), a representative of the party who requested anonymity stated that it is preparing to fight the Presidential Majority within the National Assembly. “We will actively participate in the public debates within the National Assembly and make our contributions in the interest of the people, we will not play the game of the Kabilists,” he affirmed. “The Tshisekedists will join us and together we will weaken the armor.”

For his part, Germain Kambinga, the spokesman for the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), thinks that the UDPS should pursue its political struggle within the arena of the National Assembly. According to him, the opposition should show a common front and benefit from the support of the UDPS, which is the leading institutional party of the opposition. “I am convinced that together with the UDPS, the MLC, the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC) and all the other [opposition] parties, we can effectively and little by little force this government into a decline. Maybe so far we have failed. They have stolen everything from us but we have a forum to denounce them, that of the Congolese people,” he concluded.

In theory, certain delegates of the UDPS and many others from the opposition have decided to sit in the National Assembly at the Palace of the People but their participation is dependent on four conditions. These four conditions were specified in a document given to the president of the provisional board of the National Assembly, Timothée Kombo of the UDPS, at the beginning of the week. They require the lifting of the blockade of Etienne Tshisekedi’s residence on Rue Pétunias in Limete, the dropping of charges against Jacquemain Shabani, the liberation of the fifty or so citizens detained in Katanga after being expelled from South Africa, and the release of Jacques Chalupa, accused of stealing a Congolese national identity and detained in Makala.

Upon receiving the memorandum from the opposition members at the Kinshasa Grand Hotel, Kombo promised to discuss it with the other two members of the provisional board, Patrick Muyaya of PALU and Diallo Coco Mutula of the MSR. According to reliable sources, during the discussions with Kombo the two most junior members of the National Assembly held to the position of the majority, which is that the provisional board does not have the jurisdiction to take those steps, and any preconditions should be considered by the plenary session. In fact, many of the opposition delegates have already registered at the Palace of the People and are taking an active part in the work of the commissions established to validate the mandates of the elected.

To boycott the National Assembly or not? This is the dilemma of Etienne Tshidekedi’s UDPS. The party’s leadership are at odds over two different strategies: to not participate in an Assembly whose election has raised controversy, or to participate anyway to make one’s voice heard. For Valentin Mubake, Etienne Tshisekedi’s political advisor, the choice is clear: “It is inconceivable that a party member would accept a place in an institution deriving from a legislative election whose results were declared null by his own party.” Valentin Mubake goes even further in promising to expell from the party anyone who goes against this philosophy. But within Tshisekedi’s party, some voices have been raised to denounce a boycott as “useless” since it would deprive the opposition of a public platform at the Assembly. Certain members of the party wish to participate in the debates in the National Assembly . . . “at least to be heard.” They conclude: “anyway, boycotts have never been effective.” In the latest news, the supporters of the boycott have “watered down their message,” in particular regarding the exclusion of Timothée Kombo from the party, saying that they will “reexamine” the evidence.

 

b. Etienne Tshisekedi at the German Embassy

On February 24th, Etienne Tshisekedi, prevented several times by the police from leaving his residence in Kinshasa, was able to travel with his wife and his chief of staff to the residence of German ambassador Peter Blomeyer, who hosted them for lunch. “It is the first official outside visit by President Tshisekedi. He did not leave freely, it was negotiated with police and government authorities. It was at the invitation of the German ambassador,” stated a close associate of Tshisekedi. “The ambassador has regular contact with the government and all the other [political] groups. It was in that context that Mr. Tshisekedi was visiting,” the German embassy confirmed.

According to certain observers, the meeting was a bit surreal. From the outset, Etienne Tshisekedi was asked to present his plan for resolving the crisis that has engulfed the DRC since the results of the presidential and legislative elections were published.

First, Etienne Tshisekedi confirmed that he still considers himself the true president of the DRC, as the true winner of the presidential election of November 28, 2011, and he reaffirmed his decision in favor of the nullification of the national legislative election.

He then underlined the only solution that he sees as valid: that power be restored to the Congolese people, who will delegate it to the president they elected to lead the nation into the future. Etienne Tshisekedi continues to maintain, despite the massive irregularities that marred the Movember elections, that he was the clear winner. Since the Congolese people have put their faith in him, he has only to take control of the army and the police in order to obtain public authority, which he will need to be effectively in power.

This reading of the facts does not seem to be shared by the Europeans, based on statements by the German ambassadeur. Evidence of this conclusion can be found in the fact that Etienne Tshisekedi was invited to orient himself toward the future, in this case toward the provincial elections, since they will decide the makeup of the senate and the governors of the provinces. In other words, for the Europeans, Kabila and his representatives possess the necessary political legitimacy, despite the massive fraud that marred the electoral process. The elections still to come provide the only chance for resolution.

 

3. VERBAL ESCALATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

a. On the crackdown on Christian protesters

On February 16th, human rights-focused non-governmental organisations (HR NGOs) denounced attacks against parishes of the Catholic Church and police brutality. The HR NGOs strongly condemned all acts of violence, brutality, and arbitrary arrests committed by the PNC (National Congolese Police). These organizations maintain that members of the PNC should protect the population in compliance with the constitution, which guarantees fundamental liberties, such as the right to express an opinion about the management of public affairs, the right to protest publicly and the right to demand that one’s opinion be heard. The HR NGOs have taken on the claims of the Catholics and have demanded that their opinions be heard, in particular that the leaders of the CENI be dismissed and fair elections be reestablished. Finally, the HR NGOs have advised that all the people who were arrested be freed immediately and unconditionally.

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) also expressed its concern with the crackdown on the protests throughout the electoral process in the DRC. On this point, it urges the Congolese authorities to respect fundamental liberties, including the responsibly exercised right to protest and right to expression.

On February 16th, the European Union (EU) published a declaration reaffirming the importance it attaches to respecting civil liberties, including the responsibly exercised right to protest and right to expression.

The European Union regrets the prohibition of the peaceful march that was scheduled for February 16th, and the decision by the Minister of Communication and the Media to shut down five television channels and radio stations.

The European Union deplores the incidents that occurred during the interventions by law enforcement, particularly surrounding Kinshasa’s places of worship.

The European Union calls for the authorities of the DRC to take the necessary measures to guarantee freedom of expression to all the citizens in this crucial period in the democratic evolution of the nation, and to create the necessary conditions to support an open political debate.

On February 18th, in response, the Congolese Minister of Communication and the Media, Lambert Mende Omalanga, accused the EU of interfering in the interior affairs of the DRC. “The Congolese government does not tolerate the interference of friendly nations in the interior affairs of the DRC. We have been independent since 1960 and we have no need of lessons from them,” he stated. This prompted, in return, a reaction from the French ambassador in Kinshasa, Luc Hallade. “When it comes to respecting freedom of expression and the right to protest of the Congolese people, it is important for us to be involved. We are partners and friends and when you are friends and partners, you have to be able to discuss things, even things that sometimes cause friction but help the country to advance in the right direction.”

 

b. On the financing of the elections

On February 21st, in a press conference in Kinshasa, the Minister of Communication and spokesperson for the government, Lambert Mende, affirmed that the provincial elections will only take place this year if international partners agree to produce the funding in time. He added that “the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) will be obliged to readapt its electoral calendar if the outside partners do not honor their commitments, as was the case for the legislative and presidential elections.” Lambert Mende maintains that the Congolese government was on its own in financing the presidential and legislative elections of November 28th.

On February 22nd, during a press conference, the spokesperson for MONUSCO, Madnodje Mounoubaï, reacted to the declaration by Lambert Mende with an effort to reestablish the truth: “The international community contributed much to the 2011 elections.” He continued, “I take issue with that. Donors played a large role. Belgium, Canada, France, the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands… all these countries contributed financially through the PACE and the PNUD to the national legislative and presidential elections of November 28th, 2011. MONUSCO also provided the CENI with access to 27 helicopters and 5 planes for transporting and dispatching the different electoral materials throughout the entire area of the country. We contributed 8,000,000 liters of fuel. We spent 30,000,000 US dollars to pay all of the CENI agents in the country.

Overall, MONUSCO contributed more than 280,000,000 US dollars to the unfolding electoral process. And when it is said that the international community did nothing for these elections, that surprises us a little. That is not true.” Contrary to the allegations made by the Congolese Minister of Communication and the Media, the government of the DRC only financed 69% of the election organization, while the remaining 31% came from the international community, more specifically 16% from international partners and 15% from MONUSCO. The spokesperson Madnodje Mounoubai made it known that the organization of the 2012 provincial elections depends on the Congolese government. “It is the government who organizes the elections. When the government is ready and when it makes the request, that is when we will see how the international community, international organizations, and partners states will react.”

The Minister of Communication and the Media has strongly criticized the European Union as well as certain western chancelleries and NGOs, judged guilty of having denounced the disproportionate use of force by the National Congolese Police and the “services” in the crackdown on the Christian protesters of Thursday, February 16, 2012. He has insisted on respect for the sovereignty of the state and of the Congolese people, who have nothing to learn from outsiders about maintaining public order and respecting human rights.

It is curious to note that the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which holds tightly to its sovereignty, is exposing itself to outside interference by accepting foreign funds in matters so tightly linked to its independence as the elections. Logically, the imperative of sovereignty should prohibit the Congolese government from turning toward outsiders for the financing of the provincial legislative elections. The Congolese policymakers should not simultaneously demand one thing and its opposite. Sovereignty has a cost… and so does begging.

 

4. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITIONS FROM THE CIVIL SOCIETY

a. The Carter Center

On February 24, the Carter Center released a statement saying that the legislative election results that were announced (at the beginning of February by the Electoral Commission) lacked credibility, like the presidential results for the November elections. The compilation of the results for the legislative elections was affected by the same problems of management and disorganization as the presidential elections, according to the Carter Center. The American NGO denounced “the loss of the electoral returns from more than 3,500 polling stations during the compiling of the results” throughout the country that affected the results of both elections that took place that day.

The electoral observers of the Carter Center also state that about 3.2 million voters (out of 18 million registered) “voted by derogation (that is, voted at a different polling station than the one they were registered for).” This is a “significant” number which “indicates numerous problems with the CENI’s management of the voter rolls.” For the Carter Center, “votes by derogation allow more voters to cast a ballot,” but “also provides multiple opportunities for abuse, such as allowing people onto the voter rolls who are unregistered, or allowing multiple votes from the same person.”

The NGO has also observed anomalies in the numbers of voters in a precinct for the two different polls. For example, in Walikale (in the east), there were 28,110 more voters in the presidential election as in the legislative election. In a precinct of Kinshasa, the number of invalid ballots was 10% for the legislative elections but only 3.6% for the presidential elections. In addition, according to the Carter Center, although the presidential results were published by polling station, that was not the case for the legislative results, which made the announcements less transparent and prevented the candidates and the voters from verifying the credibility of the results. The NGO observed that “the demand for the nullification of the results from 7 precincts is proof of serious (undisclosed) problems during the voting and/or compiling of results.” Considering the circumstances (many ballots have disappeared and many of the polling station protocols are incomplete) and the time that has passed (since the elections and the announcement of the results), it is difficult, no doubt impossible, for the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) or any other organization to completely recreate the results in the hope of producing a more faithful representation of the will of the people, the Carter Center feels. It also remarks that the CSJ has still not published a ruling confirming the victory of Joseph Kabila.

According to the Carter Center, the results announced by the CENI for the two elections lack not only credibility, but raise a more serious problem, that of legitimacy. An authority cannot claim legitimacy when the process that reinforces its victory has been branded with large-scale fraud, manipulation of the numbers, the inclusion of fake voters, the presence of unenrolled voters in polling stations, the inexplicable disappearance of several thousand ballot envelopes with votes inside, etc. All of these facts undermine the credibility of the results and the integrity of the entire compilation process.

After comparing the statistics for the legislative and presidential elections that happened at the same time, the Carter Center came to a clear conclusion: the elections must be redone, in part or entirely, if the train of the DRC is to be put back on the rails. The goal to achieve, for the Carter Center, is to reestablish a legitimate power either due to election results that are accepted by all or due to a national consensus resulting from an inclusive dialog.

Lacking a corrective for the presidential and legislative election results, resolution of the crisis will require agreement between the various national players. The Carter Center recommends a profound investigation and evaluation of the entire electoral process (…) in particular a transparent investigation of the results by polling station, as well as other key information. Such an investigation is essential in planning future elections, whether provincial, senatorial, municipal or local.

 

b. The African Association for the Defense of Human Rights (ASADHO)

On February 27th, the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights (ASADHO) suggested that the National Assembly evaluate the work of the CENI before the provincial elections that are scheduled for this year. The national president of ASADHO, Jean-Claude Katende, proposed that this issue be the order of the day for the March 2012 session, despite the internal evaluation that the CENI has offered to do. He declared that “the CENI is planning to do an internal evaluation, but we think that is not enough, because an external evaluation is necessary to fairly review its work and plan the organization of the next provincial, municipal and local elections within a sound framework.” The president of ASADHO feels that the CENI cannot evaluate itself because it will be standing in for both the judge and the defendant. “We think that since the CENI itself was involved in the organization of the elections, it will not be able to auto-evaluate objectively,” concluded Jean-Claude Katende.

 

c. National Mission to Observe the Elections

On February 28th, the National Mission to Observe the Elections of November 28th, composed of four organizations: RENOSEC, ROC, CNJ and CAFCO, made public its final report. The mission enumerated several irregularities observed during the two elections. It noted overall that the electoral process was characterized by a lack of consensus that provided a breeding ground for controversy at every stage, new competing political forces, and lack of respect for electoral law. The National Mission also noted the fact that the CENI failed to guarantee several things, namely: 1) transparency in bringing the electoral rolls and voting procedures up to date, 2) ensuring the integrity of the elections by taking appropriate measures to prevent double or multiple votes and electoral fraud, 3) the integrity of the vote-counting process, and 4) publication of the true election results, both presidential and legislative.

With regard to the irregularitites, the National Mission to Observe the Elections has formulated recommendations for each.

Regarding the situation following the elections, these observers recommend that the involved parties begin a constructive dialog as soon as possible.

To the government of the republic, the mission recommends organizing a general census of the population and providing Congolese citizens with a secure identity card; working to pass essential laws in this area; promptly putting this information at the disposal of the CENI and the CSJ to allow them to properly carry out their constitutional responsibilities and to work independently; and making every reasonable effort to ensure the protection of human rights at all times and particularly during the electoral period.

To the National Assembly, the mission requests that every reasonable measure be taken to quickly vote on laws that will help the organization of elections; that arrangements be made towards filling the gaps observed in the current electoral legislation; that a procedural code be put into place to deal with the contentious elections that will require public prosecutors to take an active role in seeking evidence; and that criminal records be included in the application for candidature in order to minimize controversy over the designation of the candidates.

To the CENI, these civil society organizations recommend always devoting the time needed for an effective, efficient and unhurried organization of elections; recruiting the electoral personnel based on competence and giving them adequate training in an appropriate amount of time to learn the laws, procedures, and technology.

To the courts and tribunals, the mission requests that the contentious elections be settled entirely independently and without recourse to any type of violence.

To the parties and political players, the mission recommends educating their partisans on civic and electoral subjects.

To the civil society, these observers request that civic and electoral education be strengthened in order to promote a peaceful, united population.

On February 29th, in a statement made in Kinshasa, the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights, ASADHO, expressed concern over the non-participation of certain opposition parties in the political institutions that are being put into place following the November 28th elections.

ASADHO recognizes that the November 28th elections were neither peaceful, transparent nor democratic. They were organized in such a general climate of fraud, corruption and distrust that they were ineffective in consolidating democracy.

Despite this disappointing situation, ASADHO believes that the task of building a progressive democracy requires all the opposition parties with national delegates to take an active part in political institutions, particularly in the work of the National Assembly.

In a country where:

– Opposition parties and civil society organizations have difficulty organizing peaceful protests;

– The public media is controlled by the political majority in power;

– Media aligned with the opposition is illegally suspended or shut off;

– Peaceful protests are regularly suppressed by the National Police;

– Members of the opposition are often arrested and detained at random;

– Human rights activists and journalists are often intimidated, threatened, arrested, tortured and illegally detained by the governments and/or its services;

– Civil liberties and fundamental rights are regularly violated;

The National Assembly remains an excellent forum for the opposition parties to put to public debate the questions concerning the way the nation is being run and the human rights situation. It offers the opposition an avenue for free expression, ensured by parliamentary immunity.

The participation of all the opposition delegates in the National Assembly will allow them a say in monitoring other institutions, like the National Government and the National Independent Electoral Commission.

ASADHO is aware that the participation of the opposition delegates in the National Assembly will not resolve all the political and human rights problems created by the November 28th elections, which is why it is calling for a dialog between all of the active forces (political parties, civil society organizations, and religious faiths) where they can discuss the terms of participation in the new institutions and the organization of the provincial, municipal and local elections to come. In the face of the current situation, it recommends:

To the opposition parties

– Encouraging their national delegates to take part in the special session of the National Assembly;

– Coming together as a large parliamentary opposition group, capable of bringing up the real problems that people face every day;

– Consulting about the agenda to bring to the dialog that will discuss the details of managing the new political institutions

To the parties of the Presidential Majority

Trusting that a dialog between the active forces (political parties, civil society and religious faiths) remains an effective mechanism towards the peaceful and enduring management of the new political institutions.

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This English translation has been possible thanks to the project Mondo Lingua: Free translation of websites for NGOs and non-profit-making organisations. A project managed by Mondo Services. Translator: Laura Sard – www.mondo-lingua.org