SUMMARY

EDITORIAL: Fair Elections, Still a Priority

1. RESOLVING THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS

2. THE PUBLICATION OF THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE RESULTS

3. THE STRATEGIES OF ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI AND THE UDPS

4. THE TRUTH OF THE BALLOTS STILL UNREVEALED

EDITORIAL: FAIR ELECTIONS, STILL A PRIORITY

The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) has published the provisional results of the legislative elections of November 28. Though the results have not yet been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), an outline of the next National Assembly of Deputees already seems to be taking shape. Based on these early results, predictions on the future Prime Minister, the new government and the next president of the Chamber of Deputees have already begun to be broadcast. On the surface, everything is proceeding as if the elections were perfectly normal and legitimate, despite the fact that there have been numerous errors, serious irregularities and several instances of electoral fraud observed over the course of both the legislative and presidential elections, which occurred concurrently on the same day and under the same circumstances.

If this situation persists, the new president and Parliament will find it impossible to govern because they will not be endorsed by the consensus of the people, who will continue to call for fair elections. This popular demand will be a massive stumbling block for any President of the Republic who is designated and declared as such by the CENI and the CSJ without transparency and credibility. The Congolese people are well aware that as long as the published results fail to match those of the ballot boxes, the president has no legitimacy. The same is true for the Deputees elected in similar circumstances. It is the duty of the CENI and the CSJ to re-establish truth in the election results, or they will be suspected of high treason.

The crisis of legitimacy, an obvious problem for the presidential majority candidate, hurts the opposition as well. After all, on what basis could they declare their candidate’s victory? On the extraordinary popular reception he received on his return from abroad, on the unanimous recognition of electoral irregularities and fraud, on the initial predictions made when the ballots began to be counted, on the projections based on partial results from some of the precincts? In reality, without a complete picture of the true results from all of the precincts, it is very difficult to know who won and who lost the presidential election. Probably only a recount of the votes, if possible, could reveal the truth. At the very least, an attempt could be made to verify the most controversial results, comparing reports recovered by election observers and by witnesses of different parties to the results issued by the CENI. The goal of such an operation would have to be to discover, to the extent possible, the true ballot results, and to determine the appropriate outcome that best respects the will of the people, whatever that may turn out to be.

The response given to the question of legitimacy will determine the credibility of the CENI and the CSJ, the effective functioning of the institutions of the state (president and Parliament), and the proper execution of the electoral process in the subsequent stages of senatorial, provincial and local elections. An alternative approach seeks to void the results of the legislative elections, but allow the presidential election results to stand, even though both elections were held on the same day and with the same irregularities. But, frankly, the prospect of a government without a parliament, ruling by decree until new legislative elections can be held, seems rather undemocratic. Instead, it would be advisable to hold an inclusive dialog, with the participation of the different political parties, interest groups, and the CENI, which would attempt to find the best solution for determining the true outcome of the election. The Congolese people both deserve this and have every right to it.

1. RESOLVING THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS

On January 20th, the Secretary-General of Francophonie, Abdou Diouf, released a statement encouraging reconciliation and the respect of democratic principles in the electoral process. In the statement, the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF) offers its services to the election oversight process, and specifies that it favours neither political party in the election. According to the Secretary-General, it is imperative that every measure by interested parties be taken such that the electoral process proceeds with the utmost rigor, transparency and fairness. Abdou Diouf adds that it is in the best interests of the country to prevent any resort to violence or provocation. He recommends in particular, a more responsible and impartial examination of the results of the legislative elections. In the case of controversy, the Secretary-General of the OIF advises recourse only to the lawfully submitted ballots. He also invites the Supreme Court of Justice to enforce the law more effectively during contentious elections.

On January 23rd, in reaction to the statement made by the Secretary-General of the OIF, the assistant executive secretary of political affairs for the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), Jean Lucien Bussa, endorsed the idea of an inclusive dialog to defuse the tension. Jean Lucien Bussa hopes that this dialog will result “in a recount of the votes of the presidential election.” For this representative of the opposition, “Politics is nothing but constant dialog. Now that the process has been distorted by large-scale fraud, we must devise a method of recounting all of the ballots.” The party of Jean-Pierre Bemba is opposed to a dialog “concerning the distribution of government positions, that does not first take into account the recorded irregularities during the elections of last November 28th.”

On January 25th, after a fruitless visit to the DRC from January 5th to 13th, 2012, the electoral experts of NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) and IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) issued a statement affirming that a general evaluation of the electoral process is necessary. This recommendation is directed at Congolese officials, particularly those in charge of administering the elections. To that end, “The joint mission concluded that the participation of all affected parties and access to all pertinent electoral materials (central server, electoral files, map of polling stations, etc.) are necessary for a general evaluation,” the statement emphasizes. IFES and NDI confirm their availability to support such an evaluation if their assistance is requested.

On January 26th, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, met with members of the Congolese opposition at the headquarters of MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in Kinshasa. They discussed the human rights situation in the DRC and the electoral process. Notably, the Congolese opposition members presented their concerns about the presidential and legislative elections of January 28th to the UN diplomat. At the end of the meeting, speaking of the presidential election, Vital Kamerhe, the president of the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC) and former presidential candidate, called for a recount of the votes in order to “re-establish fair elections”.

“On one hand is President Etienne Tshisekedi, legitimate because he was elected by the people. On the other hand is President Joseph Kabila, declared by the CENI and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice. To re-establish fair elections and justice for everyone, the ballots for the presidential election must be recounted, though not every province is necessary. A few test provinces such as Katanga, Kivu, Kwilu and Orientale would be sufficient,” asserted the president of the UNC.

On January 27th, Belgian senator Philippe Moureaux (Socialist Party) suggested a recount of the votes for the presidential and legislative elections. “Like those of the presidential polls, the partially released results of the legislative polls are already being disputed. Furthermore, the authorities are reluctant to release them,” observed Mr. Moureaux, who is also the Minister of State, in a statement.

“The condemnation of the elections arises from so many different sources that one can’t help but wonder about the reliability and credibility of the whole process,” added the former minister.

“Faced with such suspicion, the international community can no longer be satisfied with simply observing. It has a duty, in its wisdom, to draw the obvious conclusions and to act accordingly: it must insist on a recount of the votes in order to determine the true election results. If this proves to be impossible, new elections monitored from start to finish by a neutral agency will be necessary.”

On January 28th, taking its cue from the OIF and the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the platform AETA (Act for Peaceful and Transparent Elections) advocates an inclusive dialog to resolve the post-election crisis in the DRC.

The NGO members of AETA observe that the current electoral process is “tainted by attempts of fraud and acts of corruption, which casts a veil of suspicion and doubt on the credibility of the published results and the transparency of the electoral process. Consequently, the DRC is experiencing an acute political crisis, due chiefly to this lack of credibility of the published results.” Accordingly, the NGO members of AETA are appealing to the sense of responsibility of the Congolese political actors, the CENI and the national and international community concerning the necessity of immediate action towards finding a lasting solution to this crisis.

With regard to previous events, the NGO members of AETA recommend to the UN Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the OIF that they facilitate the initiation of a process aimed at achieving a truly fair election. They ask that these organizations quickly designate independent international experts as mediators in the crisis of legitimacy that plagues the current government, and exercise their own authority to push the current leaders of the DRC to accept the possibility of political change.

Regarding the Supreme Court of Justice, they recommend a deep examination of the records pertaining to the contentious elections and the nullification of the results affected by confirmed fraud or irregularities; and the strictest, most impartial enforcement of the laws concerning perpetrators of and accomplices to electoral fraud, regardless of their rank.

The Congolese people, the NGO members of AETA ask to show the same civic responsibility they showed in the original polls; to channel these civic and patriotic responsibilities towards strengthening their dearly-won democracy, specifically in preparing themselves to make every effort to re-establish fair elections and a credible electoral process; to refrain from acts of violence, to put pressure on political actors to engage in a dialog.

On January 30th, in Kinshasa, following a discussion with the Congolese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ignace Gata Mavita, the Great Lakes Regional Director of the European Union (EU), Mr. Koen Vervacke, affirmed that the EU is attentively following the ongoing electoral process. “We have taken note of the results and we encourage the CENI and other institutions with a role to play in this area to support transparency and to assure the credibility of the process,” stated Mr. Vervacke. The EU Great Lakes Regional Director encouraged the candidates challenging the legislative results to appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, who according to him must play its role impartially and transparently. He recommended that Congolese political actors learn from the current dysfunctional process with an eye to doing better in the provincial and local elections to come. On the subject of security, he mentioned that there had been allegations of human rights violations during the polling period throughout the country. “The authorities must carry out their investigations and justice must be served with complete transparency,” he concluded.

On January 31st, on the occasion of the 18th Summit of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, a delegation of members of the opposition, in conjunction with the office of the president of the summit and the AU Peace and Security Council, introduced a plan to resolve the post-electoral crisis, anticipating a recount of the votes. The plan was also presented privately to about fifteen African heads of state. The plan to resolve the crisis, signed by several opposition parties including Etienne Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UPADS) and Vital Kamerhe’s Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC), asks the African Union to designate a mediator to develop a consensus with all of the Congolese parties on a solution to the post-election situation.

The Congolese opposition members also suggest a comparison of the results reported by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) to those of the candidates and of international observers.

“If a recount of the votes proves to be too difficult, a new presidential election must be organized,” proposes the plan, which calls for the legislative electives to be redone only where the results are disputed.

For the Congolese opposition, resolving the crisis will require someone new and consensus-approved at the head of the CENI, which needs a review of its composition. “All of the political forces for change and special interest groups will each designate two people to represent them within the CENI, which will submit all of its administrative and financial activities to oversight by MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo),” specifies the document. The plan proposes furthermore to proceed with the clean-up of the electoral register and with the publication of voter registration lists that comply with the law, and to require the participation of African and international experts at every step of the process.

On February 2nd, the European Network for Central Africa (EurAc) released a statement expressing concern at the how the elections unfolded. The political crisis that has ensued threatens the stability of the country’s institutions and could lead to violence and give leverage to those who seek disorder. The elections have given rise to a weak president facing a serious crisis of legitimacy who is currently in no position to respond to the real challenges, both of maintaining order and security and of development, besetting the DRC.

Considering the current situation, the European Union and its member states, it should adopt a strong, coherent position in support of:

– Reinforcing the dialog between Congolese political actors, involving special interest groups, and encouraging them to find a well-informed, realistic solution to the post-election crisis;

– Applying pressure such that the electoral process, which is not over yet, is conducted in a manner that will allow evaluations to be made and lessons to be drawn from the process as it has been carried out up until now. It is essential to ensure that the DRC re-establish a credible and legitimate Independent National Electoral Commission and adopt electoral laws that will assure the respect of democratic fundamentals and the active participation of all political and social actors when the provincial and local elections are held;

– Applying pressure such that electoral cycle is fully completed with the successful execution of the provincial and local elections, and such that an effective method of decentralization is put into place, since it is the only way to guarantee that citizens will fully participate in the politics of the country and ensure an improvement in the democratic system;

– Committing to supporting civic education, the only way to enable the general population to take ownership of the democratic process and to protect them from the violent manipulations of the previous elections. The risk that a politico-military class will appropriate the process at the expense of the principles of democracy and justice, principles that Congolese interest groups have fought to uphold for many years, makes the issue all the more pressing;

– Taking a strong, coherent position with regard to the electoral process and the results of the presidential polls, devised in collaboration with all of the member states, and make use of the creation of a European Development Fund (EDF), anticipated in 2012, for establishing a collaborative political strategy, commensurate with the importance of the DRC in the region.

2. THE PUBLICATION OF THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE RESULTS

On January 26th, in the middle of the night, the Electoral Commission announced its partial provisional results for the legislative election. Out of 500, 432 representatives (87%) were declared elected; the rest would have to wait until the results were fully compiled.

President Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) secured 58 seats. The PPRD had occupied 111 seats after the previous legislative elections of 2006. In second place was Etienne Tshisekedi’s opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), with 34 seats. The UDPS had boycotted the 2006 elections. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) procured 20 seats. The MLC had been the major opposition party in 2006, winning 64 seats. Of the 432 announced delegates, 44 were women. There were still seats to be filled.

The CENI announced the remaining results sometime in the next days, probably January 30. This announcement addressed, specifically, the results of three precincts of Kinshasa as well as those of Popokabaka (Bandundu), Kongolo (Katanga), Rutshuru (Nord-Kivu) and Mbuji-Mayi (Kasai-Oriental). In addition, there were seven precincts “affected by violence” where the CENI intended to reconduct the polling: Kiri in Bandundu, Ikela in Equateur, Punia in Maniema, Masisi in Nord-Kivu, Kole and Lomela in Kasai-Oriental, and Demba in Kasai-Occidental. The president of the CENI suggested appealing to the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) to come to a decision regarding the irregularities.

The Electoral Commission stated that it asked the Supreme Court of Justice – which will announce the definitive results in two months after they examine plausible solutions – to nullify the ballots in 7 of the 169 precincts due to violence or other incidents during the polling, as well as to pursue legal action against fifteen or so candidates who have been accused of violence.

The former Alliance of the Presidential Majority (PPRD, Palu, MSR, ARC, Cofedec, Unadef, Unadec et CCU) already counts 128 delegates among its members. The new parties who have signed the Charter of the Presidential Majority have 74 seats, bringing to 202 the number of representatives who support Kabila’s platform. To this number, one to four more seats snatched up by delegates provided by the parties must be added. Considering this situation, the old majority is likely to maintain control, especially since the delegates from the major opposition parties (UDPS, MLC, UNC, RCD-KML, UFC) barely hold 80 seats.

On February 1st, late in the evening the CENI released the latest provisional results of the legislative elections. Included were the results for Mbuji-Mayi (Kasai-Oriental), Kongolo (Katanga), Popokabaka (Bandundu), Rutshuru (Nord-Kivu) as well as those of Tshangu, Lukunga and Mont-Amba (Kinshasa).

According to the CENI’s provisional results, the president’s supporters now held about 260 seats out of 500 in the National Assembly, and the opposition about 110. The CENI did not provide the election turnout rates. Still missing were the results for the seven precincts, constituting 17 seats, that the CENI was requesting be nullified because of violence during polling.

The People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) of President Kabila was in the lead with 63 seats. The PPRD lost about 40% of the votes that it had received in 2006. In second place was the opposition party of Etienne Tshisekedi, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UPADS), with 41 seats. The UDPS had boycotted the 2006 elections but have become the primary opposition party.

Among the member parties of the Presidential Majority, about ten obtained between 10 and 30 seats, with the People’s Party for Peace and Democracy (PPPD, 30 seats) and the Social Movement for Renewal (MSR, 28) in the lead. Another ten or so attained around five seats each.

On the opposition side, only two parties broke away from the pack alongside the UDPS: Jean Pierre Bemba’s Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC, 22 seats) and the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC, 17 seats), created in 2010 by Vital Kamerhe. About a hundred parties will be represented in the Assembly, with the majority holding only one or two seats.

Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, the president of the CENI, issued a warning to witnesses who, according to him, had reported false results to their candidates. “Witnesses gave false reports to the candidates, disorienting them. Some witnesses even created their own documents with false results,” he explained.

As a result of the criticisms, the CENI indicated that an evaluation of the electoral process would be conducted at the end of February, before the announcement of a new schedule for the next stages in the election cycle (provincial, senatorial, local).

3. THE STRATEGIES OF ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI AND THE UDPS

On January 20th, Etienne Tshisekedi, having proclaimed himself the “elected president” of the Republic, held a press conference at his residence in Limete-Kinshasa, though several journalists were unable to gain entry because police had cordoned off the area. Some 150 members of the UDPS were also unable to enter. For Serge Mayamba, national secretary of the UDPS (Union for Democracy and Social Progress), “this atmosphere confirms a situation we have always denounced: President Tshisekedi is being kept in his residence under surveillance.”

The “strong points” of Etienne Tshisekedi’s declaration were reported on websites for “the Congolese political opposition.”

Mr. Tshisekedis announced:

– that he was “officially taking on the functions of head of state elected by the people,”

– that he considered the legislative elections “null”,

– that he would form a government “next week”, based on necessity and urgency,

– that he would govern by decree until elected bodies could be put in place based on an accurate census of the population and the organization of elections at all levels,

– that he was planning “a general census of the population whose administration would be entrusted to ‘a Swiss organization’, to take place before the local elections and new national legislative elections.”

In addition, Mr. Tshisekedi rejected “any possibility of a round table or other compromise,” as proposed by three other opposition candidates fighting for the presidency, including the President of the Senate Leon Kengo.

After indicating that he needed the support of the public, he asked for their allegiance, because “the army and the police support change.”

Finally, he decided to establish himself at the Palace of the Nation, “the symbol and seat of power”.

On January 27th, in an attempt to make the currently established powers give in, Etienne Tshisekedi made an appeal for a general strike throughout the nation starting January 30th and lasting “until the arrival of the new order.” Mr. Tshisekedi also instructed the delegates of the UDPS “appointed” by the CENI to not take their seats in the future National Assembly. The leader of the UDPS once more asked both military and civilian institutions to arrest Mr. Kabila wherever he may be found and to hand him over, alive and shackled, to be judged for the crimes that he has committed on Congolese soil. He also threatened to consider any diplomat who “comes to wish a happy new year” to President Kabila as though they were “coming from a country hostile to the Congolese people.”

On January 30th, the call for a general strike by the leader of the opposition Etienne Tshisekedi was realized in various ways in the major cities of the country.

In Kinshasa, this rallying cry had no noticeable echo: businesses, schools, and government offices remained open. Traffic on the roads was just as heavy as usual. “If we go on strike, what will we eat? The Congolese eat on a day to day basis, to go on strike would be suicide,” explained Marie, an onion seller in a Kinshasa neighbourhood. Meanwhile Robert, a civil servant, like many other Kinshasans, had not heard about the call for a strike. He learned about it when he arrived at work and noticed that “certain offices were closed.” It was the same situation in Mbandaka, in the northwest, and in the port city of Mataki in the east.

On the other hand, the major cities of the two central provinces of Kasai were paralyzed. In Mbuji-Mayi, in Kasai-Oriental, markets, stores, businesses and schools were all closed. Many people stayed home, even though the police encouraged the population to go about their business normally. In Kananga, capital of neighbouring Kasai-Occidental, several schools and public establishments stayed closed, but “in the afternoon, storeowners started to emerge and try to sell something in order to provide for their families,” remarked the Civil Society of the Congo (Socico). In Mbuji-Mayi the opposition received more than 97% of the vote and in Kananga close to 96%, according to the official results of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI).

Concerning the presidential election, the UDPS as well as several other opposition parties continued to challenge the results compiled by the CENI. The UDPS and its “allies” maintained their belief that the will of the Congolese people, as expressed in the voting booths, was not respected. As a result, the UDPS launched the “dead cities” operation throughout the nation, which consisted of demonstrations demanding respect for fair elections and the recognition by the CENI of Etienne Tshisekedi’s victory in the presidential election of November 28, 2011. According to Etienne Tshisekedi’s political staff, the “dead cities” operations, to be set in motion starting Friday, February 3rd, would continue until the Congolese people prevailed, that is, until the candidate voted in by the people entered into office.

The start of the “dead cities” operations announced by the UDPS for Friday, February 3, 2012, was postponed. To explain the change of schedule, the UDPS cited the need to further reflect, with its political and social partners, on the most effective strategies for achieving their common goals, namely the categorical refusal to sanction the electoral hold-up.

A First Evaluation

Will the elected representatives of the opposition, in accordance with instructions from Tshisekedi, follow his logic and discount the legislative election results? Will they renounce the mandates they have been given? Will the opposition candidates for the National Assembly, most of them backers of Tshesekedi, be true to their principles and consider these mandates unjustly acquired because they are the result of a legislative election “marred by serious irregularities that put into question the credibility of the published results”? The national political crisis could strike its first blows within the pro-Tshisekedi opposition.

On December 23, 2011, on the occasion of the inauguration ceremony of Etienne Tshisekedi as President of the Republic, the opposition considered the Limete residence as the new seat of the Congolese head of state. Almost a month later, it acknowledged the fact that the seat of the institution “President of the Republic” had never been in Limete, but rather in Gombe, at the Palace of the Nation.

Taking the oath of office not before the Supreme Court of Justice but rather before his partisans and allies, Etienne Tshisekedi committed himself “solemnly” to respect the Constitution and the law of the land. Then he unilaterally, and on his own authority, nullified the legislative elections while keeping the results of the presidential election, even though the two were organized the same way and both experienced the same irregularities. He also informed the public that he would form his own government. After the nullification of the legislative elections, the president of the UDPS did not consider the absence of a National Assembly an obstacle to the creation of his government. To get around what would appear to be a legal void, Etienne Tshisekedi stated that he would govern by way of ordinances and decrees. This state of affaires would last until new, credible, transparent and democratic elections could be organized, which would give rise to a new National Assembly. In other words, he would dissolve the parliament and seize control of the reins of government.

Without a parliament, he too would take the risk of ruling “in defiance”, prolonging a dictatorship and delaying the democratic process of the nation.

The potential boycott of the assembly hall by the UDPS revives the question of “empty chair politics” which frequently fails to serve either the people or the opposition. It amounts to suppressing the only truly satisfying, democratic result to come out of these messy elections: re-establishing the UDPS into the institutional political landscape as a major opposition party, instead of being confined to the marginal role of an opposition party not represented in the parliament.

By asking the UDPS delegates to not sit on the parliament, Tshisekedi has taken a risk that some of his party members will repudiate him and take their positions in the parliament regardless. In provoking the defection of some of its members, the UDPS risks bringing on a period of turbulence in the near future that will destabilize it further. In any case, Tshisekedi’s position on this issue has caused unease among some of the UDPS delegates, who judge that in politics, it is impossible to win everything right away; one must seek gradual change. This new position of Tshisekedi’s also further distances the DRC from the type of negotiated solution to the crisis that the international community has suggested.

4. THE TRUTH OF THE BALLOTS STILL UNREVEALED

The Congolese elections have had nearly the worst results imaginable: real results unknown, official results that no one believes, a Supreme Court without the courage to nullify the results that everyone knows are fraudulent, and two different men who consider themselves “elected” to the presidency, each with their own version of the “truth of the ballots”.

In a dialogue with the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senator Dallemagne summarized the situation as it stood at the end of December, 2011: “Concerning the presidential election, all reports suggest that fraud has been widespread at all levels, including in the compilation of the results. All of this demonstrates that in reality … it is impossible to say which of the two candidates, Joseph Kabila or Etienne Tshisekedi, has really won the presidential election, and anyone who claims to be in good faith must admit that we truly do not know the poll results, and therefore the will, of the Congolese people. Without more information at our disposal, we cannot currently guarantee that the results have not been altered by the fraud observed during the presidential election.”

As is well known, the presidential elections have been addressed by a provisional announcement of the results by the CENI, and then by an official announcement by the CSJ, on whose authority Joseph Kabila was sworn in. For his part, Tshisekedi declared himself the victor on the basis of his own version of the numbers and was also sworn in. As for the legislative elections, the votes were counted and the results compiled in an atmosphere of even greater dissent than for the presidential election.

These facts alone are striking. The truth is, the results of the two elections are seemingly being treated as if they were distinct, as if they had taken place on two different planets, when in reality they occurred on the same day, in the same polling stations, with the same voters and the same staff. That the credibility of one will reflect on the other is inevitable. We cannot acknowledge the presidential election to be “acceptable” and, at the same time, dismiss the legislative election as “messy”.

We cannot really know the “truth of the ballots”. The official position is that “the errors do not seem to be of a serious enough nature the doubt the legitimacy of the results,” but that conclusion is not supported anywhere else, either in the EU report, or the Carter Foundation report, even though the latter has frequently been cited inaccurately to that effect. As it stands now, this position has only been advanced by the Congolese government, the AU (African Union) observers, and the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Didier Reynders – not by the Belgian government, which has spoken of the “renewal” of Kabila, rather than his “re-election”.

The position of the UDPS of Tshisekedi’s “obvious” victory is just as unconfirmed. All the other opinions (the National Conference of Bishops, European Union Election Observation Commission, Carter Center, etc.) have limited themselves to noting that the results from such overwhelming chaos are highly suspect, remaining vague about the observed differences between the official results and those of the reports from the polling stations, which are the only documents still available since the actual ballots have all been lost or destroyed.

What should be obvious to everyone is that the criticisms apply to the entire electoral process. The two elections cannot be disassociated and treated differently. The presidential election has, however, raised more questions than the legislative election. Nevertheless, the two “possible victors” want to completely separate themselves from the elections and maintain their own versions of the results. True, the effect is different for Kabila than for Tshisekedi, but the fact remains: the message from both camps amounts to “change whatever you want, as long as I am the president.” Therefore, everything must be nullified.

However, nullifying an election is extremely difficult. In a small minority of cases, a partial nullification is achieved – for example, in one community out of all of the voting districts. In the case of national elections, there is only one precedent: in Ukraine in 2004, suspicions of electoral fraud led to large demonstrations in the streets, the Orange Revolution. Under the pressure, a second presidential election was organized and conducted on December 26, 2004. Tshisikedi was no doubt depending on pressure from protesters as leverage, but the protesters have not materialized…

This is not a signal to give up on demanding a fair election.

Without a fair election to decide between the two candidates, and without the power to organize new elections in the short term that will not be subject to the same errors (because of the preliminary necessity of performing a time-consuming census of the population), extravagant suggestions of “reconciliation” and “sharing” are to be expected, but such discussions could easily result in nothing but a sort of “redistribution of power within the framework of the pro-Kabila establishment,” without bothering too much with the actual opinion of voters.

The party of Jean-Pierre Bemba is opposed to a dialogue “concerning the distribution of government positions, that does not first take into account the recorded irregularities during the elections of last November 28th.” For Jean Lucien Busa, Secretary General of Political Affairs of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, only a dialogue that leads to a recount of the votes of the presidential election could resolve the political crisis in the DRC.

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This English translation has been possible thanks to the project Mondo Lingua: Free translation of websites for NGOs and non-profit-making organisations. A project managed by Mondo Services. Translator: Laura Sard – www.mondo-lingua.org