CONTENTS

EDITORIAL: Be serious!

1. THE TALKS IN KAMPALA

a. The agenda for the talks

b. The M23’s demands

c. The government’s response

2. POLITICS IN KAMPALA

 

EDITORIAL: BE SERIOUS!

 

The two delegations from the Congolese government and the armed group called March 23 Movement (M23), who met in Kampala following the war started in North Kivu by the M23, have agreed the agenda for their meetings. The M23 delegation then read a statement presenting a certain number of demands, to which the government delegation responded the following day.

 

The arrogance of the first two items

The first item on the agenda concerns the evaluation of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement between the then armed group called National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP in its French initials) and the Congolese government to “put an end” to the war started in 2008 by the same CNDP. In Article 1 of this agreement, the CNDP promised to abandon its armed struggle and to become a political party that would continue its fight through political means, in accordance with the constitution and the laws and institutions of the state. The government promised to integrate the CNDP’s troops and civilian representatives into the national army and the administrative and political life of the state respectively.

 

The M23 claims that it has taken up arms because the government has not respected the agreement.  The evidence seems to refute this accusation: CNDP troops have been integrated into the army and its political wing has been recognised as a political party, even accepted as a member of the presidential majority. It would have been reasonable if, as a result of the government not respecting the agreement, the CNDP had called for an evaluation of said agreement through political means, which the agreement itself provides for. However, it did not; it returned to war through the M23. What is surprising and contradictory is that some members of the CNDP (now a political party) are even included in the government delegation in Kampala.

 

It is significant that, in its statement, the M23 devotes only five lines, out of a total of 13 pages, to the first item on the agenda, entitled “Evaluation of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement”. It could not do otherwise, for two reasons: firstly, it is not a signatory to the agreement and secondly, by taking up arms, it has itself violated Article 1 of the agreement in question.

 

The M23 devotes only a page and a half to the second item concerning security issues, and moreover mixes national issues with its own demands already contained in the 23^rd March 2009 agreement.

 

Avoid the mistakes of the past

In this regard, the government must not, under any circumstances, repeat the mistakes made in 2009. The government delegation cannot, for example, agree to grant an amnesty to those who received one at that time. That would guarantee them impunity and encourage them to reoffend.

 

If comprehensive reform of the national army is necessary, as the M23 has rightly pointed out, the government cannot agree to integrate M23 troops, as it did with the CNDP in 2009. Doing so would once again place the army in the hands of “negative forces” (which is how the UN has described the M23) and subsequently endanger its command structure, since the M23 has demanded that the government integrate its military officers, for the umpteenth time, and recognise their current ranks, achieved during the last war.  No, we cannot reform the army by integrating militiamen, deserters, terrorists and criminals, many of whom are subject to sanctions by the United Nations Security Council or international arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court.

 

The government delegation in Kinshasa must put an end to the vicious circle of “uprisings – negotiations” which allows some warlords to accumulate, gradually and by force, ever-increasing military, economic and political power. This has been happening for the last 16 years, since 1996: the RCD succeeded the AFDL [Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo]; after the RCD came the CNDP; the CNDP was replaced by the M23; after the M23, if we do not stop this spiral of armed conflict, it will be the turn of the M24, etc.

 

The madness of the third item

The M23 devotes the majority of its statement to domestic political, social and economic issues. For that, it must be given credit for a high level of skill and trickery: lacking popular support, due to a war that plunged the population into despair, the M23 tried to take up the aspirations of the people and, above all, the political demands of the opposition. It therefore decided to attack the government’s weaknesses, including the lack of popular legitimacy following the rigged elections of November 2011; corruption; the economic crisis: and the lack of reform of the judiciary and army, the latter incapable of defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

 

These are national issues that cannot be addressed within the framework of “private negotiations” between the two delegations from the government and the M23.

 

Be serious!

The appropriate forum to find a solution to these problems is a national debate, with the participation of the government, parliament, the political opposition and civil society.  Whilst the government delegation is in Kampala with the M23, the government in Kinshasa should accelerate preparations for an inclusive dialogue between state institutions and powerful forces in the country to resolve the main issues in the crisis, thereby removing from the M23 any pretext for continuing to destabilise the country.  This inclusive dialogue should not permit any authoritarianism on the part of the majority, political revenge or a new redistribution of power between the different parties.  It should be an open and frank dialogue seeking appropriate solutions to the real problems preventing the country from establishing democracy, peace, justice and respect for human rights.

 

 

1. THE TALKS IN KAMPALA

 

On 14^th January, the planned plenary session between the government delegation and that of the M23 did not take place.  The official reason for this umpteenth cancellation has not been given.  But sources close to both parties imply that there are still differences of opinion on the items to be included in the agenda for the talks.  However, other sources close to the delegations, who have asked to remain anonymous, say that President Yoweri Museveni does not believe that all the problems in the DRC will be resolved at Kampala and that he has reduced the M23’s demands from twenty-one to nine. These nine items must be the subject of discussions. The facilitator has already communicated the Ugandan president’s demand to both parties.

 

According to the same sources, the M23 has sought a dispensation to study the issue in depth. Two recent points arouse some suspicion on the part of the M23. On the revision of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement, for example, the mediator suggested that Kinshasa could choose who would and would not be reintegrated into the army. Equally, on political issues, some in the M23 believe they are at risk of being relegated to the margins of the discussion.[1]

 

According to the M23 delegation, the facilitator has demonstrated bias by giving the Congolese government and the Chief of Staff of the FARDC [the Congolese Armed Forces] scope to choose which M23 fighters are integrated into the national army. According to M23 delegates, giving discretionary power to Congolese leaders over future integration would be highly detrimental to their officers and soldiers. They have therefore decided to take no further part in negotiations until they receive a guarantee that their fighters will be automatically integrated into the FARDC. They implied from their base that if their demand is not met, they have the necessary firepower to defeat the government in Kinshasa militarily. And if the disagreement persists, they will be forced to break the ceasefire they declared unilaterally last week.

 

Observers see in this new impasse not only the spectre of a return to war in North Kivu, but above all a strategy devised by the M23 to flood the FARDC with a new wave of Rwandan soldiers, as was the case with the integration of fighters from the RCD [Rally for Congolese Democracy] (2003) and the CNDP (2009) into the national army. One suspects that Rwanda and Uganda are putting pressure on the M23 to boycott the negotiations in Kampala because they are very worried about the bad situation their protégés find themselves in following UN Security Council sanctions and the decisions relating to the deployment of drones and a Neutral International Force under the umbrella of MONUSCO [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo] in the east.[2]

 

On 15th January, M23 spokesman Bertrand Bissimwa revealed that the two delegations had agreed that the mediator of the ongoing talks is Ugandan president Joweri Museveni, the facilitator is Ugandan defence minister Cryspus Kiyonga and the chosen location is the Ugandan capital, Kampala.  He is of the opinion that any changes must be made following an agreement between the two parties.[3]

 

a. The agenda for the talks

 

On 16th January, the DRC government and the M23 rebels adopted the agenda for the talks which will focus on four items:

 

I. A review of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement: its evaluation and implementation mechanisms as well as related issues.

 

II. Security issues: the problem of insecurity in the DRC; free movement of people and goods: issues relating to the functioning of the security and defence services and public order; the return of public and private property looted in the occupied territory controlled by the M23; and reparations for war damages.

 

II. Social, political and economic issues: breaches of the Constitution, particularly by the Supreme Court of Justice; human rights violations; the enforcement and practical implementation of the law on nationality; the economic, social and political management of the country; the geopolitical imbalance in development in the DRC; the liberation of political detainees and prisoners of war; and a general amnesty for acts of war and insurrection.  And finally, the elections of 28th November 2011 and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI in its French initials).

 

IV. The implementation plan proposes a monitoring mechanism and an evaluation of the agreement signed in Kampala.[4]

 

On 16th January, the North Kivu Civil Society criticised both the Congolese government delegation and the M23 rebel movement, in talks in Kampala (Uganda), for going beyond the set framework for negotiations. In a press release signed by its spokesman Omar Kavota, the Civil Society stated that “the parties have gone beyond what should have been discussed: an evaluation of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement”. The statement went on: “those in Kampala have no mandate from the Congolese people to discuss the socio-economic and political situation in our country”.

 

M23 political leader Jean Marie Runiga stated that as long as the socio-economic issues proposed by his group are not dealt with, “the DRC will always be at war”. In his opinion, the North Kivu Civil Society is “out of touch with reality and manipulated by Kinshasa”. Whilst these distractions take place, the M23, which was supposed to be moving 20 kilometres (12 miles) from Goma, is still taking up positions just outside the town, raising fears of a new occupation despite the presence of United Nations forces.[5]

 

b. The M23’s demands

 

On 16th January, the M23 presented its demands.

 

Prepared to talk in a calm environment and as a partner in the restoration of peace, the M23 is demanding the following:

 

I. A review of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement

The M23 believes that the Government has not respected the 23^rd March 2009 agreement. It is therefore recommending the updated implementation of all the points of said agreement.

 

II. Security issues

According to the M23, the following items need to be addressed:

1. The problem of insecurity in the DRC;

2. Free movement of people and goods and the opening of the border at Bunagana;

3. A general amnesty for acts of war and insurrection;

4. The liberation of political detainees, prisoners of conscience and prisoners of war;

5. Issues related to the functioning of the security and defence services and public order;

6. Reparations for the damage caused to civilian populations during the war.

 

In view of the above, the M23’s recommendations are:

1. The creation of a special service to look after wounded soldiers, widows and orphans;

2. The destruction and repatriation of the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda], ADF-NALU [Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Rwanda] and FNL [National Liberation Forces] within the FARDC and those operating from Congolese territory;

3. The destruction of Congolese armed groups, most of which were created by the Congolese government in its conflict management strategy in the east of the DRC;

4. The creation of community policing;

5. The reform of specialist security and intelligence services (civilian and military);

6. Reform of the national army and formal recognition of the current ranks of M23 soldiers. To achieve this, there should be a loyalty programme to integrate troops from the Congolese Revolutionary Army (ARC in its French initials) into the national army;

7. Government management of all of the M23’s assets and liabilities;

8. The establishment of a joint commission of enquiry into the ill-gotten gains of military and police officers as well as politicians.

 

II. Political issues

According to the M23, these fall into two main categories, namely:

 

1. Breaches of the constitution

The M23 believes that the following constitute breaches of the constitution:

a. Failure to comply with the 40% withholding tax on profits to the provinces (Art. 175, Para. 2);

b. The lapse of the mandates of the Provincial Assemblies, Governors, Vice-Governors and Senate;

c. The deliberate decision of the regime in Kinshasa not to organise local and municipal elections during its two mandates;

d. Failing to split the Supreme Court of Justice into three types of court: the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Council of State;

e. The ineffectiveness of decentralisation;

f. The flagrant imbalance in the allocation of human resources in the management of the country;

g. Human rights violations;

h. Xenophobia and ethnic discrimination;

i. The geopolitical imbalances in development in the DRC and the marginalisation of certain provinces.

 

2. Massive fraud during the elections of 28^th November 2011

2.1. CENI

It has never been independent. It is an instrument of power created for the sake of the cause. This is demonstrated by its inability to organise free, democratic, transparent and credible elections. The elections were tainted by serious irregularities and massive fraud.

2.2. The Supreme Court of Justice

Corruption and cronyism have resulted in a miscarriage of justice in the publication of results and appeals in violation of electoral law.

 

Concerning items related to breaches of the constitution and the elections of 28^th November 2011, the M23 recommends:

1. Invalidating the results of the elections on 28^th November 2011 after verifying the verdict of the ballot box;

2. Dissolving the Senate;

3. Dissolving the Provincial Assemblies, leading ipso facto to the resignation of the Governors and Vice-Governors;

4. Establishing a Congolese National Transitional Council (CNTC) tasked with leading the country during the transition period. This would involve, in particular:

a) Revising the constitution; b) Forming a transition government; c) Establishing the other institutions of the Republic; d) Restructuring CENI; e) Organising general elections, starting with local elections and finishing with presidential elections;

5. Effectively implementing the new judiciary provided for by the constitution, namely: the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation and the Council of State;

6. Establishing a federal system.

 

IV. Economic and social management of the DRC

The following ought to be emphasised:

1. The government of Kinshasa signs unconscionable contracts in the mining, forestry and oil sectors, accompanied by bribes in the form of commission. This unscrupulous institutional practice at the most senior levels of government is at the root of the selling off of the country’s wealth and the unjust enrichment of the ruling elite and their political and/or biological families.

2. The ordinance-law forbidding artisanal mining and the exporting of minerals in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema carries the seeds of blatant segregation with a view to stifling the economic development of the population of the east of the Congo.

3. The precarious living conditions of soldiers, policemen, civil servants and teachers and the social decay of the Congolese people in general.

 

With regards to the above, the M23 recommends:

1. Updating and implementing the STAREC programme under the management of the government, the M23 and international partners;

2. Creating a joint commission to evaluate all contracts (mining, forestry and oil) and, where required, revising them;

3. Repealing the ordinance-law forbidding the exploitation and exporting of precious materials in the east of the DRC;

4. Regular, decent pay for soldiers, policemen and state officials;

5. Creating a special joint commission to rapidly complete the process of the DRC’s accession to the East African Community (EAC);

6. Accelerating the process of repatriating refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons;

7. Implementing the pact on peace, security, stability and development in the Great Lakes Region;

8. Reparations for damages caused to civilian populations during the war.

 

V. Implementing, monitoring and evaluating the Kampala agreement

The M23 believes that the agreement that will emerge from these negotiations will define a mechanism for its implementation, including:

1. A national joint commission to monitor the Kampala agreement and guarantee results;

2. A regional and international commission to monitor the Kampala agreement, under the auspices of the ICGLR and the international community.

 

Given the importance of the issues included on the agenda aimed at dealing in depth with the Congolese crisis, the M23 has again reiterated its ardent wish for all powerful forces in the country, particularly the political opposition, civil society and the Congolese diaspora, to participate in the dialogue in Kampala.[6]

 

 

 

 

 

c. The government’s response

 

On 17th January, in a response to the M23, the Congolese government delegation reaffirmed its determination to see this dialogue result in the definitive end of hostilities, the restoration of state authority and the re-establishment of territorial integrity.

 

That said, the statement covered the following points:

– Dialogue: framework, purpose and parties;

– The 23^rd March 2009 agreement;

– Security issues:

– Political, social and economic issues;

– Monitoring mechanism.

 

1. Dialogue: framework, purpose and parties.

The present dialogue falls within the framework of a global strategy adopted by the heads of state and government of the ICGLR during meetings on 21^st and 24^th November 2012. It was approved and supported by the African Union and the United Nations, with a view to putting a definitive end to the existence of negative forces, armed conflicts and instability in the Great Lakes region.

 

In their joint press release, the heads of state declared that, with regards to the deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation brought about by the war, “even if the rebel group known as the M23 has legitimate grievances, it cannot accept the geographical expansion of this war, nor tolerate the idea of overthrowing the legitimate government of the DRC or undermining its authority. It must therefore immediately cease its offensive and withdraw from Goma”.

 

As for the M23’s withdrawal from Goma, it has never respected the relevant decision of the heads of state at the summit on 24^th November, namely that it should move at least 20 km (12 miles) north of Goma; it still has not done this.

 

In accordance with the wishes of the heads of state, there are two parties in the dialogue: representatives of constitutional legality and popular legitimacy, known as the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, on one side, and on the other side, the armed rebellion known as the M23. For that reason, but also because this issue was widely debated and definitively resolved during the review of the rules and regulations of the dialogue, returning to it is a delaying tactic.

 

As for the purpose of the dialogue, the decisions of 24^th November state that: “the DRC government will listen to the M23 and assess and resolve its legitimate grievances, taking into account the work already done by the ICGLR”. This dialogue cannot, therefore, turn into a National Sovereign Conference or an Inter-Congolese Dialogue mark II. Neither can it aspire to become a forum to deal with and resolve all of the country’s problems, for which the appropriate management frameworks already exist or have been announced. Kampala is not and will not be Sun City! Our main concern during this dialogue should be to understand the reasons why the M23 took up arms, in flagrant breach of the constitution of the Republic, and the path to ending this uprising and establishing enduring peace in North Kivu.

 

That being so, and in light of the big decisions taken by the heads of state and government of the ICGLR, the current negotiations cannot, under any circumstances, lead to the establishment, as suggested by the M23, of a National Transitional Council, nor to any challenge to the constitutional and institutional order of the DRC.

Within the rule of law, which is now established in the DR Congo and which the M23 claims to want, change, including to the constitution, is possible, subject to respect for the rules and procedures stipulated therein. This document is an expression par excellence of the will of the sovereign people, having been adopted by popular referendum. On this issue, there is thus no shortcut.

 

To close this chapter and understand the true nature of the parties present, it is of interest to note that the M23 is considered a negative force by the ICGLR, the AU and the UN. We can quote, for example, Navi Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who had the following to say at the end of her tour of the DRC: “the leaders of the M23 are amongst the worst authors of human rights violations in the DRC and in the world. Many of them have a disturbing past, including allegations of participating in gang rapes, being responsible for massacres and recruiting and using child soldiers”. This justifies the sanctions currently affecting the movement and some of its political and military leaders.

 

2. The 23^rd March 2009 agreement

As far as the government is concerned, this agreement has been implemented in a largely satisfactory way. Most of the government’s commitments have been met.  Those that require structural reforms or are, in accordance with conventional rules, subject to compliance with proceedings that involve binding steps and deadlines, are in the process of being implemented.

 

The M23’s accusation is bold and vexatious to say the least, since flagrant breaches of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement are in fact the work of some of its most influential ex-CNDP members. By way of an example, we can reveal breaches of the following provisions:

 

– The irreversible nature of the CNDP’s decision to end its existence as a political-military movement;

– The CNDP’s commitment to henceforth pursue solutions to its problems through strictly political means in accordance with the institutional order and the laws of the Republic (Art. 1 of the agreement);

– The maintenance of parallel administrations in the territory of Masisi and of parallel chains of command in the army.

 

3. Security issues

The security problems raised by the M23 are not new and have already been discussed in 2009. And it is cynical to say the least that, on this issue, the M23 is trying to play the prosecutor. In truth, its place should instead be in the dock.

 

Indeed, whilst the government was working to find enduring solutions to these various problems, the M23 uprising slowed its efforts, even wiping out the progress already made, in the following ways:

 

-By preventing the hunt for the FDLR, the FARDC having had to be redeployed to defend the country;

-By exploiting the demobilised and residual elements of former armed groups, who had practically ceased to exist, and reorganising them into militias in support of the M23;

-By exacerbating cross-border crime to pillage natural resources;

-By favouring indiscipline and mutiny within the army, particularly by politicising it and forming a large group of corrupt local soldiers;

-By hinting of a possible collaboration between the FARDC and the negative forces, deliberately spreading confusion for ulterior motives that everyone can easily figure out.

Everyone knows that in the Great Lakes Region, the DRC government, with the help of the United Nations, has put a lot of effort into hunting down and destroying the FDLR, even accepting joint operations with Rwanda. Equally, everyone knows that, once again, the war started by the M23 is slowing operations that had led to a noticeable reduction in the FDLR’s effectiveness and ability to cause trouble, as well as repatriating several thousand soldiers and their dependants.

 

However, documented information mentions the presence within the M23 of not only elements of the FDLR, who are demobilised and regularly repatriated to Rwanda, but also active fighters from the FDLR’s Mandefu wing, as was noticed in the territory of Rushuru when a group of foreign members of the M23 decided to surrender to MONUSCO.

 

As for the demand for a general amnesty, it is worth noting that, in essence, an amnesty is an exceptional gesture. It mission is to facilitate not impunity, but rather the reintegration of those whose transgressions in law society has decided to pardon, in return for their recognition of the wrongs done to society and their commitment not to reoffend.  One of the issues this raises is whether it would be appropriate to give an amnesty to repeat offenders, especially some within the M23, for whom this would be the second or third time they had been granted an amnesty. To do so would be to invite them to reoffend, the consequence of which would be a vicious circle of repeated anti-constitutional acts and crimes.

 

Moreover, if the government decided to positively consider this option, it would be very difficult to implement, given the M23’s proposals.

 

Indeed, amnesties are generally granted by virtue of a law voted by the National Assembly and the Senate and promulgated by the president. The procedure for granting an amnesty could not be followed if, as demanded by the M23, the president were overthrown and parliament dissolved.

 

As for the integration of militias into the army with their current ranks, the limitations of this, as well as its immoral and destabilising nature, have been demonstrated.  This cannot be the recipe for a national, professional and republican army. In such an army, ranks are awarded within the framework of a general order for the benefit of all soldiers, following well-defined, objective criteria. It is the same for recruitment, which should also be done according to criteria defined by law. It is impossible to want one thing and its opposite, and the M23 cannot therefore call for reform of the army and at the same time demand the application of exceptional measures of dubious effectiveness.

 

As for community policing, the process is already under way with the support of international partners.

 

Within the framework of reform of the army and national police, significant progress has been made with the adoption by both chambers of parliament and the promulgation of the following laws:

 

– Organic Law 11/012, of 11^th August 2011, on the organisation and operation of the armed forces;

– Organic Law 11/013, of 11^th August 2011, on the organisation and operation of the national police;

– Organic law on the organisation and operation of the superior defence council.

 

In addition, both chambers have also adopted bills on the status of the military and national police staff respectively, which are in the process of promulgation.

 

 

4. Social, political and economic issues

– Electoral issues:

Since the election results were not annulled, no dissolution of national or provincial institutions can be envisaged.

 

Since the alleged corruption sparked calls for electoral reform, it is worth noting that the process of restructuring CENI is under way and will now be accelerated given that the law pertaining to it has been voted by parliament.

 

– Judicial reform:

The judicial reform under way is the result of constitutional demands to establish three types of court, namely judicial courts (including civil and military courts and tribunals) under the control of the Court of Cassation, administrative courts (including administrative courts and tribunals) under the control of the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court.

 

Dividing the Supreme Court of Justice into the three types of court mentioned above has led to the adoption by both chambers of parliament of the following legislative and organic law bills:

 

1) Organic law bill on the organisation, operation and jurisdiction of the different types of court;

2) Organic law bill on procedure in the Court of Cassation;

3) Organic law bill on the organisation and operation of the Constitutional Court.

 

Since these are organic laws, they cannot be promulgated by the President of the Republic until they have been declared in accordance with the constitution by the Supreme Court of Justice, acting as a Constitutional Court, as provided for in Article 124 of the constitution.

 

The National Assembly is currently considering an organic law bill on the organisation, operation and jurisdiction of the administrative courts, which involves establishing the Council of State. Finally, in December 2012, both chambers adopted the organic law bill modifying and completing the organic law on the status of magistrates with a view to rendering it consistent with the provisions of the constitution of 18^th February 2006, as revised by law 11/002 of 20^th January 2011.

 

– Exploitation of identity issues:

It is surprising to hear the M23 return to the issue of xenophobia and ethnic discrimination. In reality, its strategy consists of reawakening the old demons of inter-ethnic division and hatred that the Congolese people have with great effort buried, and subsequently using them for its own ends.

 

Here, we recall the 14 pilot projects put in place by the government, with the support of international partners, of local permanent conciliation committees in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru.

 

– The issue of refugees and internally displaced persons:

It is equally surprising that a political-military movement at the root of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with more than 400,000 internally displaced persons and around 25,000 new refugees, can proclaim that the fate of its compatriots is its main concern.

 

On the other hand, since the 23^rd March 2009 agreement, the Congolese government has signed tripartite agreements with the UNHCR and respectively with Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Republic of Congo. The UNHCR is working tirelessly with all affected countries to organise returns, which would have accelerated if the insecurity in North and South Kivu caused by the presence of negative forces such as the M23 had not prevented efforts to secure and develop the areas of return. On this subject, all shrewd people are aware of the manipulation and exploitation of refugees and internally displaced persons by the M23, their camps having become a recruiting ground, as is the case in some refugee camps in Rwanda and the camp for displaced persons in Kanyaruchinya

 

5. Monitoring mechanism

To avoid parties to the dialogue being both judge and judged in the implementation of the conclusions reached in Kampala, the DRC delegation proposes that an appropriate monitoring mechanism be put in place at the level of the ICGLR. Parties to the dialogue would, however, be invited to appoint representatives for each focal point to the ICGLR monitoring committee.[7]

 

 

2. POLITICS IN KAMPALA

 

On 12th January, in Kinshasa, the president of the parliamentary group Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and its allies, Jean Lucien Busa, said that the four parliamentary opposition groups demanded to participate in the talks in Kampala, alongside civil society and the Congolese diaspora, as well as a neutral international mediator appointed by the United Nations and the African Union. The parliamentary groups also demanded that the agenda for negotiations in Kampala be extended beyond the evaluation of the agreements of 23^rd March 2009. They believe that the talks do not take into account all the problems of insecurity in the east of the DRC and issues linked to governance of the country, democracy and human rights. Jean-Lucien Busa thinks that “the M23 and the government share responsibility for what is happening in the east. They have a deal. Hence the interest in having a political opposition with alternative proposals that can bring them face to face so that, in the interests of the Congolese people, they leave these talks with responses which reflect these deep-seated aspirations”. There are four parliamentary opposition groups: the MLC; the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS in its French initials) with the Forces for Change (Fac); the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC in its French initials) with its allies; and the liberal democrats.[8]

 

On 13th January, government minister and spokesman Lambert Mende said that the participation of the opposition in the talks in Kampala risked absolving the M23 of its crimes. He said that talks between the government and the M23 must not be confused with the exchanges that the president has decided to initiate with a view to strengthening national unity in the DRC.

 

“In Kampala, we have a meeting implicating the institutions of the Republic with a criminal group called the M23. And on the other hand, we have the President of the Republic, who has decided to initiate exchanges to strengthen national unity in the face of criminal groups who support aggression inside the country”, he explained. According to the government spokesman, considering that the M23 has appropriated several of the opposition’s demands, the integral participation of the latter would only strengthen the positions of the same M23.[9]

 

The Congolese opposition cannot go to Kampala by invitation of the Ugandan mediators. Uganda strictly respects the roadmap drawn up by the conference of Great Lakes countries: a discussion between the Kinshasa government and the M23. Therefore, if the opposition wants to participate, its only choice is to join the government delegation or indeed that of the M23. It would be difficult for it to stand side-by-side with the government. It has already refused a previous invitation and contests the legitimacy of power. But standing side-by-side with the M23 would also be very complicated. It is an armed movement, which has been described as a negative force and is accused of serving Rwanda. But if the opposition does not participate, it will be left on the sidelines of a perhaps important process. So that’s the dilemma. President Joseph Kabila has proposed another solution: the opening in the near future of a great national debate in Kinshasa.[10]

 

On 13th January, in a press release signed in Paris, the Rally for Development and Peace in the Congo (RDPC) approved the decision of the leaders of the four parliamentary opposition groups, since patriotism obliges every Congolese citizen to ensure that the project of destabilisation in the Kivu region fails. However, the RDPC believes that the Congolese people should participate in the talks in Kampala in unity, with all political and civilian elements forming an integral part of the official delegation represented by foreign affairs minister Raymond Tshibanda. In its opinion, the talks in Kampala affect all Congolese people concerned with saving their homeland above all else, ensuring that the project of the aggressors, using the M23 as their armed wing, fails. It is therefore about territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The Ugandan capital must not, under any circumstances, act as a place for the Congolese to settle scores, at the risk of benefiting the M23. Consequently, the RDPC warns of the need to air its dirty laundry in private within the framework of an inclusive republican dialogue which should be held in Kinshasa, in the presence of international observers, not in Kampala.[11]

 

A new political platform is bringing together for the first time the extra-parliamentary opposition and civil society. Action for another Way (AV) brings together around twenty political parties and human rights groups such as l’Asadho, les Toges Noires, la Ligue des Electeurs [League of Electors], le Codhod et l’Acaj.  It aims to bring politicians and civil society together around “national unity and a return to political dialogue”. The coordinator of the platform, Auguste Mampuya, recalls that “since the elections (tainted with numerous irregularities, ed.), there has been unquestionable evidence that our country and state are experiencing a sort of political impasse (…) exacerbated by the insecurity and war imposed on us by Rwanda and Uganda and their accomplices”. He laments “the political and security climate that leads to genuine political impasse: failure of debate, failure of initiatives, failure of governance, failure of institutions, etc.” The objective: “get the state out of the current impasse” in a non-partisan spirit of citizenship. The AV suggests that President Kabila convene “a frank and open political dialogue between everyone: government, parliamentary opposition, extra-parliamentary opposition, armed groups, civil society and diaspora, etc.” so that we can “agree on an inalienable vision of our common homeland, the Congo”.[12]