CONTENTS:

EDITORIAL: Beyond the anomalies, collusion and contradictions

1. TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23 IN KAMPALA

2. THE POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT IN KIVU

3. THE REACTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

4. THE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

a. Towards a new, more robust strategy?

b. New sanctions

5. THE MANDATE OF MONUSCO

 

EDITORIAL: Beyond the anomalies, collusion and contradictions

 

Talks between the Congolese government and the armed group March 23 Movement (M23) have resumed in Kampala. Some of the information has been rather surprising.

 

A strange “ceasefire”

The M23, which had made the resumption of talks strongly conditional upon the signing of a bilateral ceasefire, said that it was prepared to pursue talks even if the government had not yet committed itself to signing a ceasefire agreement.  The group even announced a unilateral truce. Lots of observers question this change in attitude on the part of the M23.

 

Some of them believe that it may be the result of pressure exerted by the international community.  Indeed, on 31^st December, the United Nations (UN) Security Council added the names of two more M23 figures, including Jean-Marie Runiga, the movement’s political leader, to the sanctions list (freezing their assets and banning them from travelling abroad).  The UN and the African Union (AU) are also seeking to strengthen the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and to send a neutral international force to the east of the DR Congo, which could place the same M23 in difficulty.

 

Other observers believe that the M23 might have yielded in the face of government intransigence, having already received a promise of future concessions (important roles in the army, political institutions, administrative bodies and some state economic institutions).

 

According to another group of observers, it could be a well-orchestrated strategy. This “concession” by the M23 will come at a price. It will be the premise for getting a positive response from the government to all its demands in the near future. It will be a form of blackmail following the logic of giving to receive (quid pro quo). The government delegation will have to be very careful not to fall into this trap.

 

 

 

Collusion

In this second phase of negotiations, the M23 delegation included a well-known figure from the Congolese political opposition, MP Roger Lumbala.  In his statements, he denied having joined the movement. He said only that he agreed with the movement’s objectives and that his presence in the M23 delegation was justified by the simple fact that he was invited as a member of the opposition. It is difficult to see the line between a shared vision of objectives and joining the movement, especially since he was introduced as the vice-president of the M23 delegation. For months, the Congolese government has suspected him of cooperating with the M23 and having contact with Rwandan authorities accused by the UN of supporting the M23. According to his own statements, one of the aims of the M23 is to overthrow President Kabila because of his bad management.  This is certainly a legitimate demand, but it is sad that a politician – an MP, no less – has not understood that the only democratic way to bring about a change of government is not through violence and war, but free and transparent elections.  In accordance with the “par condicio” principle, gaining power through free and transparent elections also applies to those who currently hold power, following an electoral process tarnished by countless instances of fraud and irregularity.

 

President Kabila is often accused of high treason against the nation, since he is suspected of collusion with the Rwandan regime. By continuing to profit financially from the illegal exploitation of minerals, Rwanda is working to split the country up into small entities over which it can exert its political, military and economic influence. In this context, it is absurd to want the current Congolese regime, which is suspected of serving Rwandan interests, to be overthrown by an armed group which is also supported by Rwanda, as is clear from various local evidence and international reports. Following this logic, any potential new regime in the Congo would always be dominated by Rwanda. Only some names and acronyms would change; the real problem would not be resolved. Indeed, following successive military victories, with Rwandan and Ugandan support, the M23 has widened the scope of its demands to incorporate those of the opposition, including the verdict of the ballot box, human rights and improving social conditions. However, this is certainly not in the interests of the Congolese people, but to hide the group’s real identity, allowing it to present itself more credibly and to increase its prestige and strength.

 

 

Contradictions

Within the government delegation, the situation is no better. Indeed, it includes some members of the CNDP, signatory to the March 23^rd 2009 agreement. Several observers believe that the M23 is a dissident faction, if not the new military wing, of the CNDP. Thus, the M23 and the CNDP might be one and the same. Viewed from the outside, the Congolese government’s position appears ambiguous and contradictory, if not complicit.  It is hard to understand how the government can stand firm against the M23, an armed enemy, and at the same time collaborate with the CNDP, its political counterpart.  The Congolese government must clarify this matter.

 

Necessary national unity

In this situation, it is difficult to expect a positive result from the talks in Kampala. Saying no to the M23 and its accomplices, internal or external, means finding an alternative. This could arise out of national unity: not a state institution, since they are almost all experiencing a profound crisis of legitimacy following the rigged elections of November 2011, but the demand for peace, justice and respect for human rights expressed by the population as a whole and the safeguarding of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  These, not the M23’s war, are the fundamental values that will allow the Congolese people to advance on the path to democracy.

 

 

1. TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23 IN KAMPALA

 

On 21^st December, talks between the government and the M23 in Kampala were suspended, officially because of end-of-year festivities. The last stumbling block in the stalemate observed in these talks concerned the M23’s demand for a ceasefire as a major precondition to drawing up an order of business. Apart from that, the M23 rebels continue to demand the governorate of North Kivu, control of the headquarters of the eighth military region, a general debate on the governance of the country and recognition of the lack of legitimacy of institutions resulting from the 2011 elections. The M23’s political agenda, which clings obstinately to participation in the governance of the country via its representatives in institutions, is now an open secret in Kinshasa.  Everything is done in an underhand manner to block the talks and find an excuse to resume hostilities. The government, well aware of the M23’s tricks, has not so far yielded to its sordid demands, committing only to an evaluation of the March 23^rd 2009 agreement. The positions are so far apart that there is reason to question whether anything specific will come out of Kampala and whether the average Congolese citizen has given up on these talks, which would be a real waste.[1]

 

According to sources within the ICGLR, Uganda’s rotating presidency expires on 31^st December 2012 and the Congo/Brazzaville will succeed it from 1^st January 2013. Brazzaville should therefore, in all likelihood, hold the next stage of talks between Kinshasa and the M23. This option ipso facto excludes Kampla from facilitating dialogue between the two parties in the conflict in the east of the DRC. This will be greeted with relief by the Congolese, inasmuch as Uganda is explicitly cited amongst the main supporters of the M23 rebels, which has always posed a problem of neutrality in negotiations carried out within the framework of the ICGLR. However, heads of state could decide otherwise and allow Uganda to continue its facilitation efforts. The M23 could also oppose its proximity to Kinshasa, hostile to the movement created and supported by Kigali and Kampala.[2]

 

On 1^st January,Roger Lumbala, MP and president of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the opposition party that supports Etienne Tshisekedi as the elected president of the Republic, joined the M23. Rebel leaders formalised his membership on the fringes of a best wishes ceremony held in their stronghold of Bunagana.  “Comrade Roger Lumbala really is a member of the M23 and he is here with us”, said Amani Kabasha, deputy head of the M23’s Department of Media and Communications.

 

In an interview with the news magazine Jeune Afrique (Young Africa), he said: “In 2011, I campaigned for Étienne Tshisekedi.I do not believe that Joseph Kabila won the presidential election on 28^th November 2011. Since the M23 made the demands of the Congolese political opposition regarding the fraudulent results of this election their own, I feel close to the group. Moreover, the DRC constitution authorises all Congolese citizens to defeat those who seize power by force. The solution to the DRC‘s problems now lies with the M23, who brought down Joseph Kabila, forcing him to accept negotiations. That’s why I now support the M23, which is fighting an armed struggle against Kabila’s regime.  I am joining the M23 to force Kabila from power and rebuild good relations with our neighbours”. In September, Kinshasa was already accusing the MP from Miabi, in eastern Kasaï, of being in cahoots with the rebel movement active in North Kivu.[3]

 

On 3^rd January, in Bunagana (North Kivu), the M23 renewed its threat not to resume talks with the government in Kampala without the declaration of a ceasefire, which it made a precondition for the continuation of the talks. M23 political leader Jean-Marie Runiga said: “We continue to demand a ceasefire, as well as direct negotiations with the government in Kinshasa. If the latter refuses, we will use the language that Kabila understands. And this time we will go very far”. He explained that “the language Kabila understands is the language of arms”.[4]

 

On 4^th January, delegations from the government and the M23 arrived in Kampala, the Ugandan capital, after a two-week break to observe end-of-year festivities.

 

Until 6^th January, the Ugandan defence minister and mediator Crispus Kiyonga met the leaders of the two delegations separately. As for the composition of the two delegations, negotiators for the government are the same as two weeks ago. Raymond Tshibanda, the Congolese foreign affairs minister, continues to head the Congolese delegation. On the contrary, the number of negotiators for the rebels increased from 25 to 30 with new figures such as Roger Lumbala, former opposition MP who recently joined the M23. According to M23 spokesman Amani Kabasha, he will take on the role of vice-president of the delegation.[5]

 

On 8^th January, the M23 agreed to resume the talks in Kampala, despite the absence of a ceasefire agreement with the Congolese government, and announced a unilateral ceasefire. The movement’s executive secretary and leader of the delegation, François Ruchogoza, said: “We will resume negotiations even if the government refuses to sign a ceasefire agreement”. But the rebels, through Ugandan mediation, are seeking the intervention of the joint verification mechanism of the ICGLR to verify allegations of “preparations for war by the government of Kinshasa”.[6]

 

Why this change on the part of the M23? There are two plausible theories. Either the M23 has been unable to withstand for very long the strong pressure exerted on it by the international community (cf. the latest UN Security Council sanctions against some of its leaders), or Kinshasa has quietly caved in to the M23’s demands. Some sources have implied that the big concession that the government might have made to the M23 might have been the promise of very shortly running the Central Bank of Congo (BCC).

 

If this information is confirmed, the government will have given in to the enemy. The M23’s sponsors, namely Rwanda and Uganda, could have influence over the DRC’s last jewel of sovereignty: its central bank. Aware that the plundering of natural resources is becoming hypothetical owing to the involvement of the international community, the aggressors of the Congo have only managed to take root inside the country.

 

If they had control of the BCC, they could strangle the functioning of the state and compel the government to always yield to their demands.  In that particular case, they could comfortably transfer liquid currencies from the BCC to banks in Kigali or Kampala.  Thus, what they failed to plunder, they would recover from the Congolese Treasury – in the most official way possible! Some Great Lakes experts believe it could even be one of the last distractions before the renewed implementation of the project to break up the DR Congo.[7]

 

On 11^th January, four items were added to the agenda for the dialogue.  These are: an evaluation of the March 23^rd 2009 peace agreement signed by the government and the former CNDP rebellion; security issues; social, political and economic issues; and the mechanism for implementing, monitoring and evaluating the Kampala agreement.[8]

 

 

2. THE POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT IN KIVU

 

On 31^st December, during his goodwill message to the nation, President Joseph Kabila called for national unity to put an end to the war being fought in the east of the country. “In the ordeal of war, national unity has been and remains the condition for our survival, the mightiest shield against any inclinations of balkanisation and destruction”, he said.

 

“The war that we are caught up in should be an opportunity to make us more united. Whatever our ambitions as a nation, no positive result is possible if we are divided”, he said, adding that “the diversity of our tribes, our religious and philosophical beliefs and our political opinions is an invaluable source of wealth for our country”. The president asked all Congolese citizens to “work to make the new year truly a year of national unity”.  With that in mind, he confirmed “the organisation from the beginning of 2013 of a framework for exchange between all powerful forces in the country”.[9]

 

The opposition is not convinced by President Kabila’s call to dialogue and has rejected his proposal. For the parliamentary opposition, the contours of the framework for consultation and exchange alluded to by the president in his goodwill message are still vague. Members of the parliamentary opposition recall their demands presented during the first appeal for national unity, launched on 15^th December by the president in front of both chambers of Parliament: an inclusive dialogue with an international facilitator to discuss everything that divides the Congolese people. The opposition believes that this would allow for genuine reconciliation and enduring solutions. This inclusive dialogue has for them been a prerequisite for any new discussions since the results of the last presidential election.

 

The president of the Congolese Movement for the Republic, Jean-Claude Vuemba, said:

“Firstly, resolve the dispute over the 28^th November 2011 elections. Then we can reach an agreement so that the Congolese people can have a permanent framework for consultation”. For its part, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) claims not to be interested in thisappeal, which it describes as a distraction.[10]

 

On 4^th January, during a press conference in Kinshasa, MP Jean-Pierre Lisanga Bonganga, spokesman for the opposition Forces for Change (FAC), said that his political platform categorically rejected the dialogue proposed by the president, since it consists of “informal meetings described as a framework for consultation and exchange, vague in structure and content, whose recommendations are not binding on anybody”. He explained that “the FAC/opposition is denying President Kabila the ability to organise national dialogue, because he is the problem.He cannot be both the problem and the solution to the problem. He is one of the protagonists of the crisis. He cannot be a mediator to resolve the crisis at the risk of being both judge and judged. The opposition platform believes that the dialogue should be organised “by the international community and mediated by an African elder, the president of a non-aggressor country of the DRC”.[11]

 

On 8^th January, after a vote by the National Assembly, opposition MP Roger Lumbala lost his parliamentary immunity for having recently joined the M23. The Attorney-General of the Republic who requested this waiver of immunity can therefore pursue him for high treason.  MPs voted 216 in favour and 80 against the waiver of immunity for Lumbala. As well as the loss of immunity, he also lost his status as an MP, the Assembly having decided to invalidate his mandate. The Attorney-General of the Republic had asked the National Assembly to waive his immunity because he suspected him of collusion with the M23. When questioned by the security services in Burundi last September, Lumbala denied having any link to the M23 before going to Paris and officially joining the rebel movement at the beginning of January.

 

The Interior Minister Richard Muyej suspended the activities of the Rally of Congolese Democrats and Nationalists (RCD/N) throughout the DR Congo, claiming to have taken steps to obtain the dissolution of the party. He said that its president, Lumbala, had allied himself with the M23 rebels and prominent RCD/N politicians had not denounced this move.  For their part, the latter have promised to go to court to overturn the minister’s decision.[12]

 

 

3. THE REACTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

 

A member of the Congolese diaspora in Belgium, Roger Manangu, does not understand “why the Congolese government is engaging in talks with a political-military-terrorist movement”. In his opinion, “the M23 does not have the political and military force to advance on Bukavu or Kinshasa without military and logistical support and strategic and political advice from Rwanda and Uganda”. Therefore, he thinks that “Kinshasa should leave the talks in Kampala and go to the United Nations Security Council to denounce the numerous attacks suffered by the DR Congo at the hands of Rwanda and Uganda”. He also accuses the UN of “complicity” in the Congolese-Rwandan-Ugandan conflict, which has been fuelled by multinationals “in order to bring about the balkanisation of the DRC”. He calls on the international community to force Kigali and Kampala into dialogue with their respective rebel groups (the FDLR, the LRA and the ADF-Nalu) to make them leave the Congo and return to their countries of origin: Rwanda and Uganda. In his opinion, “if real negotiations are to take place, they must be between Rwanda, the DRC and the international community to arrange the return of the FDLR and the LRA to their countries and finally rediscover peace in the region”.[13]

 

According to the North Kivu Civil Society, the population of the province does not want the talks in Kampala to become a power-sharing framework between the government and the rebels.  They claim to have been told this by several inhabitants of Beni, Butembo, Lubero and Goma during public dialogue sessions held from 28^th December 2012 to 3^rd January 2013.

 

According to spokesman Omar Kavotha, those questioned also opposed “any signing of a ceasefire” between the national army and the M23 and any M23 soldiers joining the army or the police. They believed that the talks in Kampala must “stick to evaluating the March 23^rd agreement in strict accordance with the constitution”.  The population also recommends that the talks be relocated from Uganda, “especially as, from 1^st January 2013, that country will no longer have the presidency of the ICGLR and its allegiance with the M23 has been confirmed”. From January 2013, the rotating presidency of the ICGLR must pass to the president of Congo-Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso.[14]

 

Reacting to the statement made by the M23 on 8^th January, the Provincial Coordination for Civil Society in North Kivu makes the following observations:

– Firstly, on the subject of the unilateral ceasefire: instead of obeying orders from ICGLR heads of state to put a stop to all military and anti-constitutional activity, the M23 is continuing recruitment (mostly by force and, moreover, of children), training, supplying men, weapons and munitions and appointing administrative authorities in its territory.  For the M23 and its allies, talking about a ceasefire is merely a subterfuge to mislead local, national and international opinion.

 

– On the subject of the aggressive intentions attributed to the Congolese government, the civil society said there was never any suggestion, in any presidential or governmental recommendation or decision, of disrupting the normal functioning of state institutions and services, including the FARDC.

 

– On the contrary, the M23 has never obeyed the order of ICGLR heads of state to, on the one hand, return to its positions before 30^th June 2012, and on the other, to set up 20 km (12 miles) from Goma. “We were not surprised to learn that the M23 claimed that it would move 60 km (37 miles) from Goma, counting from the long border between the DRC and Rwanda. What a blatant lie from these phoney democrats”, said the North Kivu Civil Society, whose interim president and rapporteur-general, Mr Negura Barry Bonaventure, signed the statement.

 

– The M23 continues to encroach on Goma and sustain crime and terrorism there; engage in repeated attacks on refugee camps in Mugunga; reinforce its positions on all its frontlines; and work closely with Colonel Mandevu, one of the most notorious FDLR commanders.

 

Everything points to this unilateral ceasefire declaration being an attempt by the M23 to mount a charm offensive in the face of sanctions by the international community, including the United Nations, which have weakened it.[15]

 

 

4. THE PROPOSALS AND DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

 

a. Towards a new, more robust strategy?

 

When, at the end of December, the Congolese M23 rebels made some “erratic but worrying” moves around Goma, inside the “neutral” zone less than 20 km (12 miles) from the town, the UN talked about drawing up a new, “stronger” strategy. This entailed, on a political level, involving neighbouring countries, and on a military level, creating a kind of rapid intervention brigade which would be integrated into MONUSCO.

 

According to a source close to the dossier, on a political level, the idea would be to bring together the ICGLR countries (the DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and South Africa) at a summit in Kinshasa, with the UN “as a witness and guarantor” to make them sign a “framework agreement” setting out broad principles such as respect for national sovereignty, a ban on supporting militias and an end to impunity for war criminals.  Rwandan president Paul Kagamé, whose country is, alongside Uganda, accused of supporting the M23 rebels, has given his agreement, as have his seven counterparts. Regular meetings are planned with all those concerned, especially at the UN General Assembly and during the annual AU summit.

 

On a military level, in his recommendations to the Security Council, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is expected shortly to propose the creation of a highly mobile rapid intervention unit of 2000 African soldiers, which would be able to “put out fires at every possible attack”.

Tanzania and South Africa would be willing to contribute to this. These future “Rambos” of MONUSCO will be clearly differentiated from the peacekeepers, but will be under the same command and will be funded by the UN. The Secretary-General’s other proposal, pioneered by the head of peacekeeping operations Hervé Ladsous, is to use drones to monitor the borders and the movements of armed groups. [16]

 

On 8^th January, the Security Council looked at the possibility of supplying drones to MONUSCO to make it better able to monitor the east of the country.  “It’s about making MONUSCO more able to do its work. We therefore need more helicopters, maybe some with night vision, greater fluvial capacity and aerial surveillance equipment – drones”, Hervé Ladsous explained to the press. The UN also plans to increase the size of MOUNUSCO, currently 17,500 men, to 19,500, and to redeploy it.

 

Rwandaopposes the UN plan to use drones (pilotless surveillance planes) in the east of the DR Congo. Kigali does not want Africa to become a laboratory of equipment for foreign intelligence services. Rwanda, which must defend itself against accusations by the UN experts of supporting the M23 rebels, clearly believed Hervé Ladsous’s request to be premature. “It is unwise to use equipment about which we have insufficient information”, the second-in-charge of the Rwandan delegation at the UN, Olivier Nduhungirehe, told Reuters. He explained that it was vital to shed light on the implications of such air assets on the territorial sovereignty of states in the region. A diplomatic source said that the Rwandans have warned the Security Council that MONUSCO peacekeepers would be considered “warmongers” if they deployed drones in the east of the Congo.

 

According to some UN diplomats, France, the United States and the United Kingdom are in favour of using drones. These Western diplomats also believe that Rwanda’s opposition is the first demonstration of the difficulties expected for the dossier on the DRC while Rwanda sits on the Security Council over the next two years.

 

The UN has been calling for surveillance drones since 2008. This request has never been granted, but was reissued in recent weeks with the advance of the M23 rebels in North Kivu province, which peacekeepers from the UN stabilization mission in the Congo have been unable to halt.[17]

 

On 8th January, a high-level ministerial meeting was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa regarding the future Neutral International Force (FIN) of 4000 men to be deployed in the DR Congo. The FIN will be integrated into MONUSCO, which is already present on the ground, although the technical details still need to be clarified. “The general tendency is towards one force”, explained Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Peace and Security Commissioner.  This would allow for stability in relation to financing and resources, and unity in terms of leadership and objectives”. A new United Nations resolution is expected to be announced which would give MONUSCO a stronger, robust mandate, allowing it to resort to “legitimate violence” to impose peace. Lamamra explained that, “in the language of the United Nations, it is now a mandate to impose peace and not just to keep the peace, meaning that if there are a certain number of very clearly defined objectives that cannot be accomplished peacefully, we will resort to legitimate violence”. It remains to be discussed whether the Congolese army will be supported by this new force or whether only the latter will operate on the ground. At the meeting were, amongst others, the Congolese and Rwandan foreign affairs ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of regional countries and the military adviser to the UN Secretary-General. [18]

On 10^th January, during a press conference in Kinshasa, government spokesman Lambert Mende said that the Congolese government welcomed the forthcoming deployment of the neutral international force and the “three United Nations drones”.  In his opinion, these AU and UN engagements reflect the will of the international community to bring security to North Kivu and stop the humanitarian crisis.  Mende considered as common sense the proposal to deploy pilotless planes in the east of the DRC, “insofar as the border is a source of problems, for the DRC as well as for Rwanda”.

 

In his opinion, the drones “will give this neutral international force, as well as MONUSCO, which will also be involved in this plan, a clearer idea of everything that is happening in this troubled area and allow targeted, more effective interventions to re-establish enduring peace in this long-suffering region”.[19]

 

On 11^th January, Crispus Kiyonga, the Ugandan defence minister and mediator between the government and the M23 in the talks at Kampala, said that his country is not opposed to the envisaged use of drones by MONUSCO to monitor the east of the DR Congo.  He acknowledged that pilotless planes would help the region to improve information gathering in the east of the DRC where there are mountains and forests and said that “if the planes are used for intelligence purposes and adhere to the principle of sovereignty, that would be acceptable”, but that “there must be appropriate prior consultation, especially to ensure that the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries of the DR Congo is respected”.[20]

 

b. New sanctions

 

On 31^st December, the UN Security Council imposed new sanctions on the leaders of the M23 and the FDLR, two rebel groups active in the east of the DRC. Being placed on this blacklist notably imposes an assets freeze and a travel ban on the bodies or individuals concerned.  The Council added two M23 leaders to the list: Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, described as the “civilian leader of the movement”, and Eric Badege, presented as “an M23 leader suspected of abusing women and children”.

 

This decision came some hours before Rwanda joined the Council, as a non-permanent member, from the 1^st January for a period of two years.

 

“We believe that these decisions will facilitate progress towards enduring peace in the east of the DRC”, said the United States ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, in a press release, urging members of the M23 and the FDLR to “defect and demobilise in order to disassociate themselves from the sanctioned groups”. The American diplomat mentioned the possibility of “additional action by the Council against those who persist in providing external support to the M23 or act in violation of the arms embargo” imposed on groups active in the DRC. UN experts, several organisations and the Congolese government accuse Rwanda and Uganda of supporting the M23, which the two countries deny. In several statements, the Council denounced all “external support” to the M23 without naming Rwanda or Uganda.

 

Last November, the UN imposed sanctions on two other M23 leaders, Baudouin Ngaruye and Innocent Kaina. The former is accused, amongst other things, of executing and torturing M23 deserters, as well as gross violations of human rights and international law. He is believed to have murdered, mutilated and abducted women. The latter is accused of having supervised the recruitment and training of over 150 children for the M23 uprising. He is also thought to have killed rebels who tried to flee. M23 military leader Sultani Makenga has also been under the UN Security Council sanctions regime since 13^th November 2012.[21]

 

Now that the United Nations Security Council has just imposed wholesale sanctions on the M23 as well as its leaders, who will the Congolese government evaluate the 23^rd March 2009 agreement with? Will it negotiate with those who are banned from travelling and whose assets have been frozen? The government must not negotiate with war criminals accused of gross human rights violations who are currently sanctioned by the Security Council. Agreeing to negotiate with them would be telling them that the Security Council was mistaken. Agreeing to hold a dialogue with them would be to fall into a trap which the Congolese delegation must avoid.

 

According to some observers, the sanctions against Jean-Marie Runiga and Eric Badege will have no effect as long as Rwanda is not sanctioned, the country being accused by the United Nations expert group of supporting the M23. In the end, the sanctions imposed on the M23 rebels are ineffective and will have no repercussions on military operations. On the contrary, used to operating clandestinely underground, the latter laugh in the face of sanctions and act as if nothing has happened. For how much longer will this American and British double dealing continue?[22]

 

On 11^th January, Crispus Kiyonga, Ugandan defence minister and mediator between the government and the M23 in the talks at Kampala, said he did not agree with the United Nations decision regarding the sanctions imposed on some M23 leaders. “Uganda has emphasised four points in order of importance, namely:peace, reconciliation, democracy and justice. There are people within the international community who reverse the equation and emphasise justice above all. That is worrying when we are still talking about sanctions”, said Crispus Walter Kiyonga.[23]

 

According to the Kinshasa daily Le Potentiel, by openly defending the M23, the Ugandan defence minister and facilitator of the talks between the government delegation and the M23 has shown clear bias.  Accused by the UN of supporting the M23 rebels, Uganda has just shown its true colours. By opposing the latest UN sanctions against some M23 leaders, Kampala has undermined its role in resolving the crisis in the east of the DRC. Unfortunately, the Congolese side continues to adopt an approach that is at best naïve and at worst complicit in this strategy that goes against the country’s interests.[24]

 

According to some observers, the attitude of the Ugandan facilitator could be the perfect opportunity for the Congolese government to reject the Ugandan mediation linked to the rotating presidency of the CIRGL, which expired on 15^th December 2012, in favour of new mediation by the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville, which will assume the presidency in 2013.

 

 

5. THE MANDATE OF MONUSCO

 

On 25^th December, Christmas Day, in an opinion piece in the French newspaper Le Monde, a group of political and cultural figures denounced the lack of real implementation of MONUSCO’s mandate. According to the group, without the power to intervene directly, the seventeen thousand peacekeepers of the mission “observe and record” the deteriorating situation.  The group appealed for a UN resolution allowing MONUSCO peacekeepers to properly implement a mandate in line with the expectations of the Congolese civilian population. In other words, they expect to see the UN mission using force to neutralise the armed groups that are raping, terrorising and massacring hundreds of Congolese people every day.

 

The group laments the fact that the tragedy currently occurring in Kivu, in the east of the DRC, has already claimed millions of lives and devastated millions more. A tragedy that the international community could stop this instant, in their opinion, by ordering the seventeen thousand MONUSCO soldiers to do their job and properly implement their mandate, their job as soldiers and their mission being to secure peace and dignity for mankind. They believe that this requires a Security Council resolution to allow the peacekeepers to act.

 

The signatories place the M23 among the several armed groups active in the east of the DR Congo and describe it as a “squadron wearing nice uniforms and brandishing new weapons, encroaching on Goma, spreading terror in their wake, ravaging and killing“. They said: “they rape hundreds of thousands of women and children to terrorise the population.They rape to destroy. They rape to take away their identities forever. And the children they do not kill, they enrol by force”.

 

Amongst the twenty signatories to this opinion piece are former French president Jacques Chirac; the ambassador for the Danielle Mitterrand foundation; Valérie Trierweiler, the partner of the current French president; the French Minister for Francophonie Yamina Benguigui; the former Senegalese president and Secretary-General for Francophonie Abdou Diouf; and the Congolese gynaecologist Denis Mukwege.[25]

 

On 7^th January, Camille Dugrand reacted to the appeal with an article entitled: “The situation in Kivu is rather more complex than an appeal to intervene”.

 

The signatories to the appeal believe that the tragedy which has been unfolding in the Kivu provinces for twenty years could disappear “this instant”: MONUSCO would only need to amend its mandate to “secure peace” and allow everyone to finally “live happily”.

 

The mellifluous and simplistic tone of the appeal contrasts with the extreme complexity of the situation with which the UN is confronted in the Kivu provinces.  If MONUSCO is not above reproach, it would be good to grasp the high stakes of the situation in the Kivu provinces to ponder the nature of the action required.

 

The resources of the conflict and its exactions are not limited to the predation of mineral resources.  The property, demographic, political and military stakes are some of the motivations pushing several groups, fuelled by the trafficking of natural resources, to take up arms. Around MONUSCO’s bases, there are dozens of militias and armed groups who take in turns to rape, pillage and execute the civilian population. The opportunism of those involved, and the support and agendas of Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala, make the interplay of alliances particularly volatile.

 

Rapes, pillages and massacres are not only carried out by elements of the M23. The national army, militias, armed groups and lone individuals are also frequently guilty of abuse, rape and violence.

Faced with this situation, the appeal tells us that MONUSCO soldiers must “do their job”. What does that mean? Should we ask them, “in our name”, to use more force? If so, against who? The Rwandan Hutus of the FDLR? The Congolese Hutus of the Maï-Maï Nyatura? The Congolese Tutsis and Hutus of the M23, supported by Kigali? The Hunde of the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo? The Maï-Maï Tcheka? The Raïa Mutomboki? The PARECO? Even the dilapidated Congolese army, when its under-equipped and underpaid (when they receive their salary) soldiers in turn commit abuses against civilians?

 

MONUSCO currently has 17,049 soldiers. The redaction of the rules of engagement and chains of command of contributing nations and the complexities of the mandate under Chapter 7 of the UN charter undoubtedly constrain the “soldier’s job”. Can a peacekeeping operation have an offensive mandate? Calling for an intelligent and necessary strengthening of MONUSCO’s mandate is one thing. Implying that soldiers could “this instant” put an end to the rapes, murders and abuses committed from North Katanga through Maniema to Ituri is a gross error of analysis and political posturing.

 

Pointing the finger solely at those accused of “letting it happen” ignores those responsible for twenty years of war with tragic human consequences.

 

No need for Kinshasa to set up a genuine army, police force and justice system; no obligation for the Congo to finally ensure the security of its own people.  Kigali and Kampala are absolved of their support for the M23 uprising and their acts of predation in the east of the DR Congo. Yes, the impotence of MONUSCO is intolerable and its mandate must be improved.  But shouldn’t the “international community” finally draw up a common position to put pressure on those primarily responsible for the conflict in the Kivu provinces, sparing none of those involved (including major powers and Western multinationals  – ed.)?[26]