SUMMARY:

EDITORIAL: The European Parliament resolution: a step in the right direction, but there is still a long way to go

1. News from Kivu

2. MESSAGE FROM THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE

3. The Civil Society’s proposal

4. ON THE EVE OF THE KAMPALA CONFERENCE

5. KAMPALA TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23

a. Report

b. Assessment

6. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION ON THE DR CONGO

 

EDITORIAL: The European Parliament resolution: a step in the right direction, but there is still a long way to go

 

A step in the right direction.

            On 13 December, the European Parliament unanimously voted to adopt an emergency resolution (2012/2907(RSP)) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo).

This was an important step because it is perhaps the first time that the European Parliament has mentioned Rwanda as being a country that, according to evidence brought to light by the UN expert group in its most recent report on the DR Congo, directly supports the armed group known as the March 23 Movement (M23) by providing it with military assistance: weapons, ammunition, logistics and troops.

 

… but with a certain ambiguity.

However, it is a tentative, uncertain and ambiguous move. Indeed, in the text below, the resolution observes that both Rwanda and Uganda have denied the information provided relating to this support. The ambiguity becomes even more apparent when, in paragraph 2, the resolution “strongly condemns the attacks by M23” and “opposes any external intervention in the conflict”, but immediately after, in paragraph 3, it simply “calls specifically on both the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to desist from supporting the rebel group M23”. The ambiguity lies in the fact that the resolution condemns the M23 firmly, but in no way condemns Rwanda and Uganda for being countries that provide it with military support. It merely calls upon them to put an end to this support and does not even consider the possibility of a condemnation.

 

… even a contradiction.

This ambiguity inevitably turns to hypocrisy, or at least a contradiction, when in paragraph 4 the resolution “reaffirms the DRC’s inalienable and imprescriptible right to respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity“. The resolution does not seem to take into account the fact that by providing the M23 with weapons and troops, Rwanda and Uganda are complicit in an aggressive and invasive war in the Congo and are also violating the DR Congo’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity in plain view, which ought to engender a series of sanctions from the UN, the European Union and the international community. But the resolution does not mention any of this.

 

… to the point of an imbroglio.

The ambiguity becomes an imbroglio when, in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, the resolution “welcomes the efforts of the member states of the ICGLR… calls on all parties concerned in the region to contribute in good faith to a peaceful resolution… calls, furthermore, for the immediate implementation of the crisis resolution plan adopted in Kampala on 24 November 2012 [and] stresses the importance of the effective functioning of the joint verification mechanism” set up by the ICGLR. It is hard to understand how the European Parliament can continue to believe in the “good faith” of Rwanda and Uganda if, in spite of numerous protestations, they still continue to send their troops into Congolese territory to support the M23, even as recently as in the last few days. As if by magic, the resolution suddenly made the problem into the solution. By not explicitly condemning Rwanda and Uganda’s interference in Congolese affairs, the resolution has transformed an aggressive war originating outside the country into a purely internal conflict. By accepting that Uganda, which is involved in the conflict along with its close ally Rwanda, can play the role of mediator between the Congolese government and the M23, the resolution is forcing the victim to accept the conditions imposed by its attackers. By accepting that Rwanda and Uganda are part of the joint verification mechanism established by the ICGLR, the resolution gives them access to all of the DR Congo’s military and strategic information and, therefore, is allowing them to win the war of aggression they are waging against the DR Congo under guise of the M23.

 

Alternatives.

The crisis in the region can be resolved if western powers dare to tackle the question of the region’s international trade in minerals. The war in the Congo is above all a war for the control of the minerals that abound in the eastern DR Congo subsoil. The resolution seems to be on the right lines when it “calls on the African Union and the Great Lakes countries to take further steps to fight illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources – one of the reasons for the proliferation and trafficking of arms” and calls for “transparent access to and control over the natural resources of the DRC” and “stronger legal measures to ensure better traceability of minerals from illegal mining“. But at the same time, more should be done by also looking at certain commercial contracts concluded bilaterally with states in the Great Lakes region and, above all, by ensuring that they are monitored. If necessary, certain contracts concluded by multinational companies whose headquarters are in certain western countries, particularly Canada, or in tax havens should be sanctioned.

– The crisis in the Great Lakes region can be resolved as long as the West ends its cooperation with the Great Lakes region countries that are aggravating the conflict. World powers are declaring an international war on terrorism. Officially it is for security reasons, but in reality it is to defend their interests in a particular region. But they are using other countries to fight it for them. We know, for example, that Rwandan and Ugandan troops form part of the UN’s so-called “peacekeeping operations” in Somalia, South Sudan and Darfur. The fact that the UN could accept troops from these two countries, known aggressors of the DR Congo, in their “peacekeeping operations” smacks of incoherence at the very least. The resolution would have sent a strong signal to Rwanda and Uganda if it had asked the Security Council to put an end to its military co-operation with these two countries that are involved in a conflict.

– The crisis in the Great Lakes region can be resolved as long as the West stops supporting the region’s expansionist dictatorial regimes and decides to impose severe sanctions on them. We know that the Rwandan regime wants to keep military, political and economic control over the two provinces of North and South Kivu and that Uganda is planning the same thing for the Orientale Province, in particular the Ituri district. The resolution is limited to only noting the fact that “the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the EU have all suspended some of their aid to Rwanda, in response to the UN report“, without noting that these tentative measures have no significant impact on Rwanda’s position. The resolution should have clearly condemned the Rwandan regime and imposed more severe sanctions, such as an arms embargo, the suspension of mineral trading and the instigation of legal proceedings against high-profile Rwandans who are involved in supporting the M23 and who interfere in the political, military and economic affairs of the DR Congo.

 

 

1. NEWS FROM KIVU

 

            On 8 December, the countries that form the South African Development Community (SADC) declared at the end of a special summit in Tanzania that they are prepared to send a support force into the DR Congo to contribute to a new international peace force in the country.

The SADC summit also “urged the United Nations to modify the mandate of the UN Mission in the DR Congo” (Monusco), so that it can actually fight rebel groups. According to the final official statement, Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete confirmed that the SADC support force (the Standby Force, a brigade of approximately 3,000 soldiers) would be “activated” by 14 December in preparation for its forthcoming deployment to the DRC, the duration of which has not yet been fixed. Moreover, Tanzania has agreed to put a battalion of 1,000 men at the International Force for the DRC’s disposal, while South Africa has promised to provide logistical support.[1]

 

            On 10 December, the Ugandan army spokesperson, Felix Kulayigye, announced the reopening of the M23-controlled Bunagana border post at the border between the DR Congo and Uganda, adding, without giving more details, that the reasons that had prompted its closure in mid-November no longer existed. The reopening was requested by the M23.

When questioned about the reopening of the border, the Congolese Interior Minister, Richard Muyej Mangez, expressed his surprise. “We have not been seized[p1] , so we are surprised that this unilateral decision has led to the reopening of this border, which for us constitutes a form of financing for the M23 rebellion”, the minister declared.

According to Omar Kavota, official representative of the North Kivu civil society, the M23 is based only 3 km (2 miles) [p2] from the city of Goma and is allegedly planning to infiltrate the north of the city, specifically around the airport, and cut off the Sake road in the west, which leads to nearby South Kivu. “The M23 is preparing for war and visibly refuses to engage in the talks going on in Kampala”, he declared in an official statement.[2]

 

            On 11 December, the spokesperson for the North Kivu civil society, Omar Kavota, stated that contrary to the resolution drawn up by the Heads of State of the ICGLR (who met at a summit on 24 November in Kampala) calling on the M23 to withdraw to over 20 km (12 miles) from Goma, the rebel movement has set up its nearest post in Munigi in the Nyirangongo territory, which is only 10 or so kilometres (6 miles) from the provincial capital of North Kivu. Omar Kavota states that the M23 has allegedly concentrated its troops in several Nyiragongo villages and that there may even be foreign troops among the rebels: “the M23 rebels stationed in Rutshuru have moved to concentrate on Kibumba (Nyirangongo territory). In the Beni territory, we know of a movement of armed men crossing the border via Kasindi. Rwanda and Uganda are apparently maintaining this situation”. A situation which, according to him, could drive the M23 “to create incidents at the Kampala summit to show that this summit is a failure and to therefore justify its attacks, which could spread as far as Bukavu and over the whole of the east of the DRC. We have to prevent the M23 from engaging in double-dealing”. The civil society calls on the Congolese government to avoid falling into the trap laid by the M23, who may try to ruin the Kampala talks in the hope of restarting the war.[3]

 

            On 12 December, the Deputy Coordinator of the joint verification mechanism, Colonel Léon Mahoungo, stated that the M23 rebels would retreat to 20 km (12 miles) from Goma in accordance with the resolutions set by the ICGLR Head of States summit. He stated, “the rebels are in the process of retreating and have not yet finished.” “There are technical elements that must be eliminated before this operation can be concluded“, he continued, indicating that there is still a demarcation problem: according to him it is necessary to determine the initial point from which this distance of 20 km should be calculated. According to Colonel Léon Mahoungo, the M23 rebels are awaiting the deployment of the International Neutral Force before withdrawing from the Munigi area as agreed at the Kampala talks.[4]

 

            According to local sources, Rwandan soldiers (the Rwanda Defence Force) apparently entered the DR Congo on 12 December via the Kasizi and Kanyanja border posts, north of Goma, in the Nyiragongo territory (North Kivu). M23 rebels currently occupy this territory. According to the same sources, the Rwandans were first seen on the morning of 11 December. They apparently arrived at the Kasizi border post in a dozen lorries loaded with ammunition and other war paraphernalia in the Kibumba area. On the morning of 12 December, five other vehicles loaded with RDF soldiers apparently arrived at Kibati, about 10 km (6 miles) north of Goma. Around 40 heavily armed men in military uniform allegedly besieged Mudja, before retreating towards an unknown destination, local sources in Kibati added. When questioned, one of the people in charge of the joint border verification mechanism stated that his organisation could only verify these allegations at the behest of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The North Kivu civil society confirms this information.[5]

 

            On 13 December, during a joint press conference between the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Kinshasa, the head of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Gert Weskereen, announced that some 914,000 people were registered as displaced in the North Kivu area, while not ruling out the possibility that some people could have been counted more than once. The number of displaced persons (DPs) has increased by around 500,000 since April, due to clashes between government and rebel forces around Goma (east), explained the UNHCR head. UNICEF representative Nona Zicherman specified that at the time of displacement, 751 children had been separated from their families. They have been brought together and entrusted to foster families or placed in special structures, and until now only 84 of them have found their parents. According to UNICEF, 80% of the DPs have been placed with foster families. 160,000 of them have benefited from food distribution, according to Fabienne Pompey from WFP. The DPs are spread across 19 sites around Goma, according to WFP. The authorities are managing only one of the camps; the other makeshift camps have been set up in various schools, churches, or in any other suitable places.[6]

 

 

2. MESSAGE FROM THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE

 

            On 5 December, the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) Standing Committee published a message entitled: “People of the Congo, rise up and save your country. Be faithful to the national unity and territorial integrity of the DR Congo“.

According to the bishops, today “a part of our territory is slipping away from our government and finds itself under the M23’s control, supported by foreign countries, notably Rwanda and Uganda. The United Nations experts’ report only confirmed this. At the root of this situation, there is clearly a balkanisation strategy under way. This has been following the same pattern for decades: claims over identity or land, rejection of the institutional order, illegal exploitation of natural resources, forced displacement of populations, and resorting to violence with a view to breaking up the DR Congo”.

In addition, they note “the population’s frustrations with a governance that no longer meets their expectations. Some compatriots deliberately exploit ethnicity for their own political ends. Certain ‘peace agreements’ passed with armed groups without prior consultation compromise the sovereignty and integrity of the DR Congo”.

For CENCO, “it is even more unacceptable that all this is the work of Congolese compatriots who are being slavishly manipulated in the name of foreign interests. They spurn the Republic’s legitimate institutions and are dissipating the national cohesion we aspire to after so many years of tribulations and uncertainty”. At the same time, it “objects to resorting to arms as a means of solving the problems facingour national community”.

The bishops “reaffirm the unity and sovereignty of the DR Congo and the inviolability of its borders, which date from colonisation and were recognised by the international community on 30 June 1960. The integrity of the DR Congo territory is not negotiable”. For CENCO, “if a solution to the nation’s problems is to be found, it must be with a view to unity, which is to be safeguarded and promoted amongst the whole population, without privileging any one group to the detriment of others. This is the price of national reconciliation.”

 

Here are some of the recommendations:

 

– To the Congolese.

Respecting national unity and safeguarding the DR Congo’s territorial integrity constitute sacred duties for all Congolese people. Ethnic diversity is an asset. We must be vigilant that nobody, not even elected officials within each ethnic group, can use the identity of their fellow citizens to set them against each other in the pursuit of a hidden agenda.

 

-To the government and politicians.

The current state of the Congolese nation raises questions for the country’s leaders and politicians. It falls to them first to guarantee the population’s safety and the integrity of the national territory. There is an urgent need to promote good governance and to form a republican army, to act as a deterrent and defend the security of the Congolese people and the integrity of their territory in the face of threats and inclinations of armed groups. The nation is in danger and the political class does not have the right to spend time quarrelling about selfish interests. It is utterly deplorable that some, by putting their own interests first, are complicit in the disintegration of national unity. Defending national unity and territorial integrity necessitates mobilisation and rallying all efforts in order to ensure the failure of any plans to balkanise the country. The ideals held dear by the pioneers of the DR Congo’s independence, namely independence[p3] , unity, prosperity, peace and the greatness of the Nation, must be respected and promoted by all. Now is the time to stand together against the danger that our country will be broken up and enslaved, putting its very existence, and that of our nation, in peril.

 

– To those participating in the next round of negotiations.

Claims made by Congolese people from any group who feel that they have been wronged should be treated according to the law and respecting the DR Congo’s constitution. Questions need to be asked about the legal validity of the agreements of 23 March 2009 and on the appropriateness of holding the meeting in Kampala.

Also, it is necessary to draw the attention of all those who are going to Kampala to the possible pitfalls of the next negotiations. They must not jeopardise the unity of the Congolese nation, nor endorse agreements that would sanction the balkanisation of the DR Congo. An agreement that would jeopardise national sovereignty would be unacceptable.

 

– To the international community.

While they recognise the efforts undertaken by the international community for peace and stability in the DR Congo, the Congolese people continue to ask themselves: how, despite the firm promises of MONUSCO, have the Rutshuru territory and the town of Goma not been effectively defended or the civilian population entirely protected?Should MONUSCO’s mandate not therefore be adapted to the situation currently prevailing in the DR Congo? The Congolese people are waiting eagerly for the principles of international law and solidarity, which are the basis of world peace, to triumph.[7]

 

 

3. THE CIVIL SOCIETY’S PROPOSAL

 

On 30 November, the organisation Kataliko Actions for Africa (KAF) issued an official statement declaring its consternation regarding the M23’s seizure, on 20 November 2012, of the town of Goma and other places in the Masisi territory, supposedly to demand the implementation of the 23 March 2009 agreements between the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the government.

Without broaching the subject of the M23’s demands or the attitude of Joseph Kabila’s government, KAF condemns this practice of solving the country’s problems through armed conflicts and war crimes that often go unpunished.

KAF also condemns the Congolese political authorities and the FARDC soldiers who are collaborating with the M23 and other armed movements.

KAF reiterates that no individual or group of individuals can use any part of the Congolese territory as a home base for subversive or terrorist activities against the Congolese state (art. 52 Cst. – DRC). Belonging to a Congolese ethnicity that expresses itself in Kinyarwanda does not constitute an exception to these constitutional provisions.

KAF also reiterates that all Congolese people have the right and the sacred duty to defend the country and its territorial integrity in the face of a threat or attack from outside the country. Compulsory military service can be instigated under the conditions fixed by the law (art. 63 Cst-DRC).

 

Finally, KAF recommends the following to the Congolese people:

A national Congolese-only conference should be convened as soon as possible in Kinshasa, to discuss all the problems that are dividing the Congolese people, including the demands of Congolese members of the M23.

Compulsory military service could be instigated over the whole national territory to equip the country with permanent reserve troops to defend the country, its population, its territorial integrity and it goods in the face of a permanent external threat.

All war crimes committed during this umpteenth military venture should be brought before the International Criminal Court.

 

The National Network of NGOs Defending Human Rights in the Congo (Renadhoc) is opposed to direct negotiations between Kinshasa and the M23, which it deems farcical. For Fernandhez Murhola, National Executive Secretary for this DRC ONGDH (Human Rights NGOs) platform, such a meeting should not take place in Uganda[p4] , an aggressive country cited in the UN report as supporting the rebels. His network wants a national forum to be held, bringing together representatives from the nation’s active forces to discuss the security situation in North Kivu without the M23. For Renadhoc, the M23 is just a negative force profiting from the support of Rwanda and Uganda, whose leaders will have to one day answer for their acts in front of an international court. Instead of negotiating with the M23, Kinshasa is called upon by Renadhoc to engage in talks with Kigali and Kampala so that they may put an end to their support for the M23.[8]

 

In a press release dated 5 December, the South Kivu civil society expresses regret that various meetings in Kampala only served to legitimise the M23, while at the interdepartmental ICGLR summit held in July 2012 in Addis-Ababa, this armed group were considered to be a negative force in the same vein as the FDLR, the FNL and the ADF NALU. This situation puts the Republic’s institutions in the position of negotiating with the alleged perpetrators of serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations.

The South Kivu civil society expresses a number of concerns regarding the position of the current mediator, the President of the Republic of Uganda, whose own senior officials are indicted by the most recent experts’ report on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Given the seriousness and complicity of this situation, and considering FARDC’s organised defeats against the enemy, the South Kivu civil society firmly believes that a dialogue is needed, but a dialogue with whom, where, and on what subject? This is why it will publicise its peace plan in the next few days, as it did in 1998. In the meantime, the South Kivu civil society will strongly denounce any possible negotiation that would address the following questions:

1.         The established institutional order.

2.         A revision of the Constitution.

3.         Territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

4.         An amnesty for perpetrators of international crimes.[9]

 

Women from the North Kivu province, brought together under the association Femmes partisanes de la paix (Women for Peace) demand to be “properly represented at the Kampala talks”, as they consider themselves to be better placed to express the suffering inflicted on the women of North Kivu. Nana Balume, a member of the association, has stated, “We would have liked to be with our brothers in Kinshasa, but every time they think about the war in the east, they think that they are there to speak on our behalf. That’s fine, but we must not forget the involvement of the people of North Kivu. Not only those living in Kinshasa, but the real victims living here in Goma. And that is us. Our children and our husbands have been killed”.[10]

 

 

4. ON THE EVE OF THE KAMPALA MEETING

 

            On 5 December, around twenty North Kivu politicians expressed their scepticism about the chances of success for these meetings.

In a declaration made at the Palais du Peuple, seat of the Congolese parliament, these members of parliament stated that the two North Kivu politicians who have gone to Kampala are not carrying a message from North Kivu officials. While reaffirming their compassion for this province’s populations, who have been the victims of the armed confrontations of these last few weeks between governmental forces and rebels, these politicians consider the M23 to be engaged in a process of secession from the provinces of North and South Kivu. “Discussions reveal that, among other things, the M23 clearly has keeping ex-CNDP forces in the whole North and South Kivu territory on its agenda, as well as putting in place an administration under its allegiance dedicated to balkanisation. In view of this statement, the nationally elected members of parliament from North Kivu announce serious reservations about finding a happy outcome for the crisis through the Kampala meetings, the ins and outs of which they do not know“, confirmed Grégoire Kiro who read out the declaration on the group’s behalf.[11]

 

            On 8 December, the presidents of the opposition parliamentary groups (MLC and its allies, UNC and its allies, UDPS and FAC as well as the Liberal Social Democrats) made a plea, in a statement, for a “republican, inclusive dialogue” to resolve the crisis in the east of the DRC, rejecting discussions between the government and the M23 in Kampala. This “inclusive dialogue” would bring together representatives from the majority, the opposition, the M23 rebellion and the civil society under the direction of the international community. These members of parliament claim that the Kampala dialogue “does not have any legal grounding and goes against the constitution”, which is why they refuse to take part. They also justify their refusal to take part in the Kampala dialogue with the fact that “the parliamentary delegation (the National Assembly and the Senate) is obliged to take part in the negotiations as a simple observer or witness”. “Nonsense”, according to them. They also reproach the governmental delegation for having refused to place “the repeatedly raised political demands of the opposition” on the agenda of these talks.

Two members of the opposition, Christian Badibangi and François Mwamba, are nonetheless present in Kampala to attend the talks. The former justifies his presence in Uganda by his status as a member of the national parliament, and he plans onplaying the role of “observer”. The latter states: “the situation in the DRC is similar to that of an invalid who is losing blood: first we need to stop the haemorrhaging. It is a question of responsibility, whatever our differences may be. When the country is on the way out, I believe that every Congolese person has a sacred duty to rise up to defend it”.

For their part, the representatives of the North and South Kivu civil society also taking part in the Kampala dialogue use the desire to “defend the endangered territorial integrity” to justify their presence. The president of the North Kivu civil society, Thomas d’Aquin Muiti states: “Our role is to present the population’s point of view, so that the government cannot present a point of view that blindly goes along with obeying the demands of the aggressors”.[12]

 

            On 8 December, the M23’s spokesperson, Bertrand Bisimwa, stated that he is participating in the Kampala negotiations with the intention of calling into question the legitimacy of Kinshasa’s power and calling for a way to move towards new elections. He deems it necessary for different members of the opposition to be present to discuss this. Finally, he foresees some difficult days ahead if Kinshasa refuses to put everything on the table: “If we do not discuss all these questions, there will be no possibility of bringing back peace“.

The presence of two other Congolese personalities is reported in Kampala. They are the members of the national parliament Roger Lumbala and Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi. The governmental delegation does not admit having invited them. “They have perhaps come on behalf of the M23”, confided a member of this Kinshasa delegation.[13]

 

 

5. TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23 IN KAMPALA

 

a. Report

 

            On 9 December, the government and the M23 met in the Ugandan capital Kampala to try and negotiate a return to peace in the east of the DR Congo.

“Peace, safety, national cohesion and the wellbeing of the Congolese people do not have a price”, declared the Foreign Minister of the DRC, Raymond Tshibanda, who is heading the Kinshasa delegation. We need to work towards Kivu, an unstable region rich in minerals, being “free from the prospect of a repeat conflict”, added Mr Tshibanda.

For his part, the head of the M23 rebels’ delegation, Francois Rucugoza, Executive Secretary of the M23 and former North Kivu Provincial Minister for Justice, confirmed, “the M23 will do everything in their power to participate in the resolution of the conflicts”. But the movement wants solutions for “the entire country” and not just for the east of the country, it underlined.

The discussions nearly fell through almost immediately, Mr Rucugoza having launched into an extensive criticism of Kinshasa, declaring in particular that the conflict in the east was due to “bad governance and, especially, a lack of visionary leadership”. François Rucokoza engaged in an indictment against the president Joseph Kabila and his camp, accused of “inciting violence, exclusion and xenophobia against Rwandan-speaking Congolese people”. He denounced “the corruption and bad governance”. The M23 delegate declared that the Congolese government maintains armed groups so as to destabilise its neighbours, citing in particular Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. “Our country protects the FNL [National Liberation Front] against the government of Burundi, the FDLR [Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda] against the government of Rwanda and the ADF Nalu and the LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army] against the peace and prosperity of Uganda”, he declared. François Rucogoza estimates that these foreign armed groups constitute permanent threats against the east DR Congo population. “When it comes to foreign groups, the Kinshasa government never considers that national sovereignty is in danger. But when the country’s sons and daughters criticise this situation as the M23 does, we are very quick to call it an attack and to resort to using ethnic hatred as a weapon“, he objected. François Rucogoza also accused the FARDC of having massacred 46 former soldiers from the now defunct National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in Dungu in the Orientale province.

For its part, the governmental party judged these remarks “not very civil and tainted by numerous untruths”. The next day, Raymond Tshibanda, visibly angered, sought a riposte from the facilitator “to expose the M23 regarding the crimes committed in North Kivu” before continuing any discussion. The delegations went their separate ways in an icy atmosphere.[14]

 

            On 10 December, the M23 delegation boycotted their session of talks with the Congolese government. However, the M23 had promised to be at the meeting, confirmed the Ugandan Minister of Defence, deputy facilitator of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The meeting was to be specifically devoted to the retort, solicited the day before by the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Raymond Tshibanda, as to what was meant by the rebel movement’s “untruths”. The M23 delegates did not present themselves in the conference room, preferring to remain in their hotel. “We are here to negotiate, not to listen to the government’s anger,” said Rene Abandi, head of the M23’s external relations. He refused to say whether the rebels would take part in the negotiations on Tuesday.

The leader of the governmental delegation in Kampala, Raymond Tshibanda, said he was disappointed by their attitude: “I think that it is important that the M23 listens to and hears what we have to say. They did not come. Funny kind of democrats! They are not prepared to debate. They are not prepared to be contradicted. But whether they are there or not, the truth will out”.[15]

 

            On 11 December, the M23 rebel delegates returned to the negotiation table. Raymond Tshibanda, the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs who led the governmental delegation, spent 40 minutes answering the M23 rebels’ accusations.

First he reminded the M23 that in the first article of the 23 March 2009 agreement, the CNDP committed itself, solemnly and irrevocably, to ending its existence as a political-military movement and to only ever turn to political means to find solutions to its problems, in the strict respect of the institutional order and the laws of the Republic.

He declared that, contrary to what the M23 stated, the government had upheld its commitments, notably by promulgating the amnesty law; by liberating political prisoners; by integrating more that 4,500 ex-CNDP units into the army and others into the police; by recognising the ranks and positions of its leaders; and by organising tripartitions between the DR Congo and the three neighbouring countries to return refugees to their homes.

However, the CNDP maintained a parallel administration for a long time. Almost until the end, a parallel leadership within the FARDC was maintained. There was opposition to the fact that armed units integrated into the FARDC were redeployed in other regions of the republic, which is contrary to the provision which states that the army is national, apolitical and republican. This implies that those who are called up by the army should answer to the service, wherever they are in the DRC.

Concerning the representation of Rwandan-speaking Congolese people, Raymond Tshibanda said that members of this community have an active role in the country’s leading authorities, at every level. They can be found in the Senate, at the National Assembly, in the central government, in provincial governments, etc. Even the head of the M23 delegation was, until he left, in the North Kivu government.

Finally, Raymond Tshibanda described the rebel movement, its leaders and its mode of governance.

He declared, “the most highly-ranking commanders of this group, the M23, have committed serious violations of human rights towards civilian populations and very often on their own brothers and sisters who they claim to want to serve. Last June, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights designated five M23 leaders as being among ‘the worst perpetrators of human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or even in the world’”. Among these leaders, he continued, is General Bosco Ntaganda, for whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued two warrants for arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the district of Ituri and who “is the initiator of the rebellion”. The second M23 leader he cited is Colonel Sultani Makenga who is also “known for massive human rights violations, in particular the assassinations and forced recruitment of children, and who is today proposed on the list of United Nations sanctions”. “Like all the other armed groups, M23 is a negative force which must be neutralized and eradicated”, Raymond Tshibanda concluded.

The Ugandan Defence Minister, Crispus Kiyonga, called on the two parties to move onto real negotiations, to “concentrate on the goal of these meetings – to resolve this conflict through dialogue and peaceful means”.[16]

 

            On 12 December, the M23 and government delegations did not meet; the talks are due to resume on 13 December. “We did not meet; the two parties are preparing for the negotiations”, explained the spokesperson for the M23 delegation, Bertrand Bisimwa.[17]

 

            On 14 December, formal discussions had not yet started in Kampala, but each party was in preparation. At this point there were leaks from the M23, revealing the major issues they were preparing, such as their plan to demand that Kinshasa surrender to them full control of the town of Goma. Clearly, it is not only about Goma, but the whole of North Kivu. The M23 is going to provide a governor and a provincial governor, as well as a provincial assembly. Without taking into account the provincial directors of revenue-generating services. A Republic within a Republic. Given that the seizure of Goma by force provoked an outcry of universal indignation from the international community, the M23 wants to obtain the town through the subtler means of negotiation. This question is poised to transform itself into a casus belli in the event of the government refusing. But the governmental delegation will on no account be able to agree to the handover. Firstly, it does not figure anywhere in the Goma agreements concluded with the ex CNDP. Secondly, it has nothing to do with the State’s alleged legitimacy crisis, evoked by the M23 under the pretext of re-establishing accurate elections. Thirdly, the constitution does not allow it. The M23 demands control of Kivu, undoubtedly so that Rwanda can annex it. The truth has just been revealed in the light of day. Rwanda’s hegemonic designs on Kivu are out in the open.[18]

 

b. Assessment

 

The rebels want it all. Bolstered by their military success, the members of the M23 delegation intend to put the country’s whole political situation on the table. They are working on the assumption that the elections of 28 November 2011 were fixed. For them, President Joseph Kabila is not legitimate. They consider it necessary to reassess the whole power structure; their aim is to form a transition government including national forces – and themselves – as a move towards new elections. When the M23 was formed, in April 2012, we were still very far from achieving these vast demands. At the time it was a matter of demanding that an agreement signed on 23 March 2009 between the government of Kinshasa and another rebel movement, the CNDP, be implemented. Hence the creation of the M23, which means the March 23 Movement.

Today, Kinshasa agrees only to verify the implementation of this agreement. One of the main negotiators on behalf of the Congolese government, Father[p5]  Apollinaire Malu Malu, wants above all to avoid widening the debate: “This is not the place to discuss the constitutional and institutional order of the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Father Malu Malu adds, “nor is it the place to violate the inalienable nature of national sovereignty and territorial integrity“. If Father Malu Malu, former president of the 2006 Electoral Commission, insists this much on sovereignty and borders, it is because the Congo is especially fearful of losing its eastern provinces in this affair: North and South Kivu, two areas abundant in mineral and agricultural resources. For years Kivu has been subject to Rwanda’s greed. Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of being behind the successive rebellions in Kivu over more than ten years.[19]

 

A number of observers think that the M23’s arrogance stems above all from the fact that it is recognised by the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Congolese government as a rebellion that has a legal existence and a firm base: North Kivu. In other words, after seizing Goma, this rebel movement has been authorised to stay on Congolese territory; that is to say, to cohabit with the incumbent power and run the territories it still occupies after its retreat from the town.

Secondly, the international community and the Congolese authorities justify the M23 as being the bailee of the 23 March 2009 agreement, which it seems imperative to revise. As soon as the notion of a dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23 is established, the M23 believes it has the right to broaden the base of its demands.

Thirdly, the M23 thinks it holds a position of power over the Congolese government, given its military victory over the FARDC. In the event of a definitive deadlock in the talks, the M23’s leaders are not afraid of a military solution, especially as Rwanda is keeping a close eye on things just a stone’s throw away from Goma.

Fourthly, the negotiations are happening in Uganda, the home country of one of its sponsors, Yoweri Museveni. The M23 is sure that no harm can come to it in the home of one of its sponsors.[20]

 

 

6. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION ON THE DR CONGO

 

On 13 December, the European Parliament unanimously voted to adopt an emergency resolution (2012/2907(RSP)) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo). The European Parliament:

1.         Expresses its strong concern at the deterioration in the general situation in the east of the DRC;

2.          Strongly condemns the attacks by M23 and all other negative forces in the east of the DRC in recent months; opposes any external intervention in the conflict and stresses the need to put an end to the activity of foreign-armed groups in the east of the DRC;

3.         Calls specifically on both the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to desist from supporting the rebel group M23 as this is having a destabilising impact on the GreatLake region;

4.         Reaffirms the DRC’s inalienable and imprescriptible right to respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity;

5.         Calls on all parties concerned in the region to contribute in good faith to a peaceful resolution; calls, furthermore, for the immediate implementation of the crisis resolution plan adopted in Kampala on 24 November 2012;

6.         Welcomes the efforts of the member states of the ICGRL, the African Union (AU) and the UN in their efforts and initiatives seeking a lasting and peaceful political solution to the crisis; insists that a military solution will not resolve the crisis; calls, therefore, for a political peace process that will tackle the disarmament of rebel forces and the root causes of the conflict;

7.         Stresses the importance of the effective functioning of the joint verification mechanism and the establishment and effective deployment of the envisaged neutral international force;

8.         Calls for an EU position vis-à-vis all individuals who have violated the UN arms embargo on the Congo;

9.         Calls on the governments of the DRC and neighbouring countries to take the necessary measures to arrive at a structural solution which will bring about lasting peace, security, stability, economic development and respect for human rights in the region through cooperation, permanent dialogue, the establishment of confidence and reconciliation; affirms its commitment to cooperating with the DRC and the Great Lakes region to this end;

10.       Condemns all acts of violence and all human rights violations in the east of the DRC and in the Great Lakes region, and expresses its solidarity with the people of the DRC afflicted by the war;

11.       Strongly condemns the acts of sexual violence which have been committed on a massive scale in the DRC, particularly the rape of women and girls, and the recruitment of children;

14.       Calls, in particular, for the perpetrators of human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual violence against women and the conscription of child soldiers to be reported, identified, prosecuted and punished in accordance with national and international criminal law; stresses that impunity cannot be tolerated regardless of who the perpetrators may be;

16.       Calls on the DRC to introduce an effective national security sector reform, with strong independent institutions that are accountable to the state and its people and that are able to fight and prosecute crimes and corruption cases;

19.       Calls on the AU and the Great lakes countries to take further steps to fight illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources – one of the reasons for the proliferation and trafficking of arms;

20.       Considers that transparent access to and control over the natural resources of the DRC are indispensable for the sustainable development of the country;

21.       Calls for stronger legal measures to ensure better traceability of minerals from illegal mining, with an international market control instrument on natural resources, inspired by the Dodd-Frank Act, adopted by the US Congress;

24.       Calls for efforts to be made at both national and international level to increase the authority of the state and the rule of law in the DRC, particularly in the fields of governance and security;

25.       Calls on the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region to work to bring about the actual implementation of existing regional peace and development instruments and calls on all states which are signatories to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes region to implement it fully in order to establish and consolidate the necessary basis for peace and security in the region;

26.       Calls on all countries in the region and all international bodies to cooperate actively with the DRC authorities in order to dismantle and demobilise all armed groups and establish lasting peace in the east of the DRC;

27.       Urges the MONUSCO stabilisation mission in the DRC to implement its mandate with greater effectiveness in order to guarantee the security and safety of Congolese civilians;

28.       Encourages the DRC’s leaders to take all the necessary initiatives to consolidate democracy and ensure the participation of all active forces among the people of the Congo in the governance of the country on the basis of constitutional and legal rules.[21]