CONTENTS:

EDITORIAL The price of dialogue

1.  THE PARTICIPATION OF THE RWANDAN ARMY IN THE FALL OF GOMA

2.  THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

3.  A REAL “FALSE RETREAT” OF THE M23 FROM GOMA

a.  Chronicle of a farce

b.  Beyond farce

4.  TOWARDS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23 IN KAMPALA

a.  For and against talks in Kampala

b.  The context of a difficult dialogue

5.  THE SUSPENSION OF GEN GABRIEL AMISI

6.  THE UN POWERLESS IN THE FACE OF THE M23 ADVANCE

 

EDITORIAL: The price of dialogue

 

The context of ….

A solution to the crisis caused by the arrival of the March 23 Movement (M23) in North Kivu Province (Democratic Republic of Congo, or DR Congo) requires strong national unity and the cooperation of all major political and social forces in the country. However, the country’s political class is clearly divided, with the presidential majority on one side and the political opposition on the other, especially after the fraudulent elections at the end of November 2011 that kept the current president, Joseph Kabila, in power. With a view to restoring national unity, in the period immediately following the elections, many people called for a dialogue between the majority and the opposition and even a national unity government with the participation of the opposition itself. The presidential majority has in all likelihood made an unforgivable mistake: not wanting to respect the “verdict of the ballot box” and wanting to continue governing without the support of the opposition.  Now that the majority needs the cooperation of the opposition to face up to the threat posed by the M23, the opposition refuses to give it, making the same mistake as its adversary.

 

… a dialogue ….

After arriving in Goma, the capital of North Kivu, the M23 officially withdrew, under international pressure, in order to attend talks with the Congolese government in Kampala, Uganda. We must start by addressing some preliminary issues, particularly concerning the participants and the agenda for the meeting. The ongoing conflict in the east of the country affects all of the Congolese people and it would therefore be desirable to avoid bipolarity between the government and the M23, thus preventing ambiguous compromises and more or less “secret” agreements. According to some observers, participants in this meeting included equal numbers of representatives from all of the different parties:  the government, parliament (majority and opposition), civil society and the M23. In this way, all participants were able to express themselves freely, even when making final conclusions.  This methodology ensured the full participation of parliamentarians and members of civil society who otherwise risked being reduced to mere observers or witnesses.

As for the agenda of the meeting, it was limited to an evaluation (”revitalisation”) of the March 23^rd 2009 agreement, as announced by the M23 at the start of hostilities. The M23’s subsequent demands regarding the political life of the country, the defence of human rights and social issues, expressed following its military successes, should be dealt with, as required by said agreement, in the framework of political debate within state institutions, and absolutely not as a result of the illegal and abhorrent use of weapons.  The conclusions and proposals of the meeting in Kampala must be communicated and debated in Parliament and finally presented to the government, which must immediately organise an inclusive national dialogue in Kinshasa to resolve, once and for all, amongst other things: the conflict in the east (the restoration of state authority and the fight against Rwandan and Ugandan interference); the political crisis (the crisis of legitimacy and the restoration of the electoral commission); the reform of the security services (the army, the police and the intelligence services); the reform of the justice system (the fight against impunity); the defence of human rights (the Chebeya process); the control of mining activity; and social and economic issues.

 

…. with a price to pay

The path of dialogue may shed light on errors, vested interests and hidden complicities. It will most likely lead to defections, resignations or dismissals and to the instigation of legal proceedings. If this is the price that must be paid for the good of the country, those at the heart of the Congolese tragedy, nationals and foreigners alike, must pay it.

 

 

1. THE PARTICIPATION OF THE RWANDAN ARMY IN THE FALL OF GOMA

 

According to a new document by the UN expert group, more than one thousand Rwandan soldiers facilitated the capture of Goma by the M23. According to the text, dated 26^th November and published online by the New York Times, several companies from the Rwandan Defence Forces (FDR) entered Congolese territory and took part in the Goma offensive. Rwandan government forces also took part in the fighting at the airport in the capital of North Kivu province. An entire battalion of the FDR, made up of between eight hundred and one thousand soldiers, was deployed from the end of October to rebel positions in Bukima and Tshengerero. Moreover, seven companies of the FDR also supported rebels during the second offensive on Kibumba on 17^th November.

 

According to photos published in the appendix, the M23 received camouflage uniforms in similar colours to those worn by the FDR, making Rwandan soldiers less visible, particularly during the capture of Goma. The report also mentions artillery fire from Rwanda on Congolese army (FARDC) positions to aid the advance of the M23. According to the experts, Gen Bosco Ntaganda, hunted by the ICC for war crimes, led M23 troops stationed in Kibumba.  But leadership of the Goma offensive was above all a Rwandan affair. Rwandan general Emmanuel Ruvusha, already cited in a previous report, oversaw the execution of an attack planned by Rwandan Defence Minister James Kabarebe and Chief of Staff Charles Kayonga. The experts therefore believe that the information received over the last few weeks tends to confirm their theory that “the Rwandan government, along with Uganda, created the M23 and equipped, trained, advised, reinforced and commanded the M23 uprising”.[1]

 

An article entitled “Kinshasa: How Rwandan Defense Forces conquered Goma and M23 claimed victory”, which appeared in an American journal called “Afro America Network” on Sunday 25^th November 2012, shows how the FDR conquered Goma and allowed the M23 to claim victory. According to the text, on Tuesday 20^th November 2012, the FDR surrounded Goma on two fronts: the first group went to the airport in Goma, then to the headquarters of the RTNC broadcasting network, whilst the second group attacked from the centre. The FARDC, who were preparing to repel an attack by the M23 from the north of the town, were taken by surprise when attacked from Lake Kivu in the south-east.  They withdrew to Sake, leaving behind weapons and munitions. The Rwandan Defence Forces therefore captured Goma and the M23 rebels took the opportunity to enter. To hide the presence of thousands of Rwandan soldiers in Goma, M23 officers claimed that 2000 FARDC soldiers had voluntarily surrendered and returned barely 100 AK47s. The M23 is merely a front for the FDR.  They receive all their technical support, weapons, munitions and communication apparatus from the Rwandan army and government. They also receive their orders directly from Gen Kabarebe. The commander of military operations aimed at invading the DRC is Gen Ruvusha. The number of dead Rwandan soldiers identified in the Rwandan towns of Kanombe, Kigali, Gisenyi and the military camps in Mukamira is around 100 from the invasion of Goma alone.[2]

 

According to the BBC, Rwanda’s support for the M23 may be even more significant than we thought.  Two ex-rebel fighters told the BBC that they received money from Rwanda to set up another new front in the south. The former rebels, from the Tutsi ethnic minority, said that they had joined the rebel group “Congolese Movement for Change” in July, thinking that it was a local movement fighting for a better life for the population of the east.  “Then our chairman came with a delegation from the government of Rwanda, saying that the movement has been changed, that we had to follow the instructions of the Rwanda government”, Capt. Okra Rudahirwa told the BBC.  He also said that he and his men received monthly sums (sometimes as much as $20,000) with which they bought food, uniforms and medicines. His commander, Col Besftriend Ndozi, told the BBC that they had also been put in contact with a senior M23 commander, a Col Manzi, who invited them to coordinate their efforts. “Manzi told us that the Rwandan army had given him the authority to support us and to command us”, Col Ndozi said. The men said they decided to abandon the fight once they realised the scale of Rwandan involvement.[3]

 

 

2. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

 

On 28^th November, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on all leaders and governments in the region to “cease and prevent all support for the M23 from their territory”, whilst actively supporting the cooperation of regional states to bring about an end to the conflict. Emphasising that 285,000 people had been prevented from fleeing before their advance, Mrs Clinton called on the M23 to “put an end to their attacks, withdraw from Goma and return to the positions they held in July”.[4]

 

On 28^th November, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution extending until 2014 the ban on selling and delivering arms to groups active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly the M23, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Maï-Maï. The resolution proposed by France demands that the M23 and other armed groups, including the FDLR, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Maï-Maï militias, the National Liberation Forces (FNL) and the Alliance of Democratic Forces (FDA), immediately cease all forms of violence and other destabilising activities. These groups are called on to immediately release all child soldiers in their ranks.  The resolution also prohibits any kind of support for these groups and renews financial sanctions and travel restrictions on the political and military leaders of armed groups operating in the DRC.[5]

On 30^th November,the United Kingdom, a traditional ally of Kigali and one of the main contributors to the Rwandan aid budget, announced that it would not pay the 21 million pounds (nearly 26 million euros) earmarked for December. Justine Greening, the British International Development Secretary, based this decision on “concerns over credible and compelling reports of Rwandan involvement in the M23 uprising in the DRC.(…) This evidence goes against the principles of our partnership […] and as a result, I have decided to withhold the next payment to the Rwandan aid budget”. At the same time, London decided to make an additional aid payment of 18 million pounds (22 million euros) “for the immediate humanitarian needs in the DR Congo”. Kigali believes that this payment freeze “harms Rwanda without helping the DRC at all”, and once again rejects the “false and politically motivated allegations” against him.[6]

 

 

3. A REAL “FALSE RETREAT” OF THE M23 FROM GOMA

 

Chronicle of a farce

 

On 28^th November,M23 military spokesman Col Vianney Kazarama confirmed that his troops would begin the withdrawal from Goma the following day, pointing out that the transport of military and medical equipment to the movement’s former bases in Rutshuru had begun the day before. He explained that the Chief of the General Staff of the movement would reside in Kibumba, 30 km (18 miles) north of Goma. Inhabitants reported seeing “several dozen lorries”, commandeered from local government by the rebels, “leaving Goma with food supplies, medicines and munitions”.   The vehicles were “heading towards Rutshuru and Rumangabo”, where the rebels have positions. However, so far, no large-scale withdrawal of troops has been observed.  According to the Congolese Red Cross, in the days following the capture of Goma by the M23, they found 62 bodies of both civilians and military personnel in the streets.[7]

 

On the same day,the Congolese government accused the M23 of acts of pillaging and vandalism following its arrival in Goma on 20^th November. During a press conference held in Kinshasa, spokesman Lambert Mende described “systematic raids”, saying that all the public and private property looted was taken to a neighbouring country which he did not name, but whose border is near Goma. “Several homes, public buildings, warehouses and official and private vehicles were systematically looted by M23 rebels before being taken to an unknown destination outside Congolese territory”, he said.  He claimed that trucks from the Road Agency and the Office of Road Maintenance and Drainage (OVD) were taken to the neighbouring country of Rwanda. “The rebels broke into the Ministry of Finance office and took three hundred vehicle number plates. The provincial assembly building was also ransacked; ores stored in the town were stolen and taken to Rwanda”, he added.[8]

 

Throughout the day of 29th November,M23 rebels looted several houses and buildings in Goma. Later that evening, they went door-to-door extorting goods, taking vehicles, money and mobile phones. The spoils were taken to Kibumba, the M23’s future headquarters, nearly 30 km (18 miles) from Goma. This looting caused panic amongst the population.

 

In a press release, the NGO Congo Peace Network denounced this looting, demanding that M23 rebels return these goods to the population before any negotiations with the government. For its part, the human rights observer committee issued a press release denouncing this “war of aggression against a backdrop of war crimes and high treason”.[9]

 

On the same day,Col Kazarama,who had announced the withdrawal from Goma on this date, said that, due to logistical problems and “organisational reasons”, the withdrawal would finally begin the following day (30^th November).[10]

 

That morning, nearly 270 policemen arrived in Goma to secure the town following the (still barely discernible) withdrawal of the M23 rebels. They came from Bukavu (South Kivu), where they had fled following the fall of Goma. Another 450 had to be deployed. The regular army, the FARDC, also prepared to return. There was a battalion in the town and a company at the airport, which is currently run by MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo). On a date not yet specified, a hundred Tanzanian soldiers, sent as part of an international AU force, and another hundred M23 soldiers, are also expected at the airport in Goma.[11]

 

On the same day,M23 troops began their withdrawal to Sake, 27 km (16 miles) west of Goma (North Kivu). Several hundred M23 rebels (nearly 500 men) from the surrounding hills have already arrived in Sake, the first stage of withdrawal to the M23’s original positions further to the north.  An M23 officer said that within three or four days, all rebels could arrive in Kibumba, 30 km (18 miles) from Goma, future headquarters of the uprising.[12]

 

In the early afternoon, M23 military leader Sultani Makenga accused the UN mission in the DRC of blocking its withdrawal from the town of Goma by preventing it from salvaging logistics at the airport, stressing that if the dispute with MONUSCO was not resolved, withdrawal from Goma could be further delayed.  For its part, MONUSCO describes these accusations as a “pretext” for not leaving Goma. “The M23 tried to enter the airport this morning and MONUSCO stopped them”, said MONUSCO spokesman Manodje Mounoubai, explaining that the logistics at the airport belonged to the FARDC. “The airport was under the control of MONUSCO forces. Therefore, the M23 never had the chance to store its equipment there. The military equipment at the airport belonged to the FARDC”. He continued: “The airport has always been under our control and will remain so until its transfer to the tripartite forces – army, MONUSCO and M23 – who must take over soon, as decided by neighbouring states in the Great Lakes region”.[13]

 

On 1^st December,M23 troops withdrew from their positions in Goma. The various strategic posts controlled by the M23 have been officially returned to the heads of the Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) or to MONUSCO. These include, notably, the large and small barriers to the border separating Congo from Rwanda, the headquarters of the Central Bank and the provincial police station and administrative headquarters. All these places are now protected by members of the Congolese National Police, who have come from Bukavu in South Kivu. Before the withdrawal of M23 troops from the town, Gen Makenga said that “for him, the job is not yet complete”. He stressed that the M23 is steeping aside to allow politics and diplomacy to find a solution, as requested by the ICGLR. But if nothing is done, the M23 commander said that the group would finish what it started. He explained that the withdrawal of M23 troops from Masisi could take three or four days because of the distance from its new base in Kibumba. “We’re glad they’re leaving; they made us suffer”, said Parfait, 25. He added: “As you can see, they stole so many things: vehicles, munitions, food, money, phones, mattresses, everything”.[14]

 

On 2^nd December,the M23 threatened to seize Goma again if the Congolese government did not open negotiations within the next 24 hours. Bertrand Bisimwa, spokesman for the M23’s political wing, said: “If negotiations do not begin by 2 pm tomorrow, 48 hours after the withdrawal, and civilians in Goma are attacked, we will retake the town”.[15]

 

On the same day, North Kivu civil society spokesman Omar Kavota welcomed the withdrawal of the rebels. In his opinion, it represents “the first step to restoring state authority in North Kivu”.But he also wanted “an end to the uprising”. In addition, he called for sanctions against the rebels, who he believes have committed serious human rights violations. “The majority of public property has been looted. More than three hundred private vehicles have been stolen. We have recorded over twenty cases of rape against women and murder”,he said, adding that these acts must not go unpunished.[16]

 

On 3^rd December,Governor Julien Paluku, Vice-Governor Feller Lutaichirwa, Mayor Kubuya Ndoole, some members of the provincial government and assembly and several politicians travelled to Goma from Béni, where they had fled after the town was taken by the M23. An FARDC battalion entered the town in mid-afternoon. Life has gradually returned to normal. Schools, businesses and public services have reopened.  Only banks remain closed. But Goma is still within firing range of the uprising. Its outposts are in Munigi, 3500 metres (2 miles) from the airport and 6 kilometres (4 miles) from the town centre. The mayor accused some of the M23 of remaining in Goma, which he said they had “infiltrated” to destabilise the town and “show that the government is incapable of restoring security”. According to some rumours circulating in the town, several M23 rebels have given up their military dress and disguised themselves as national policemen or civilians.[17]

 

On 4^th December,in Goma, Congolese Interior Minister Richard Muyej guaranteed that the airport in Goma would remain under the exclusive control of MONUSCO peacekeepers “until the near future”. He confirmed that measures would be taken to ensure the consensual management of the airport by the forces of MONUSCO, the FARDC and the M23. “The most important thing is that the airport is completely secure and there is no uneasy coexistence that could arouse suspicion and lead to a new conflict”, he said. He also announced that the Congolese government had declared a “state of emergency” in Goma, following the “vast damage” caused during the 10-day occupation by the M23.[18]

 

Beyond farce

 

In the face of international pressure to withdraw from Goma, M23 political and military leaders, Runiga and Gen Makenga, agreed to adopt the techniques of double-talk, camouflage and hidden agendas. Whilst pretending to station its troops more than 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the administrative centre of North Kivu, the M23 is sending soldiers posing as civilians into the public administration and public services. Those insurgents calling for the demilitarisation of Goma are the first to militarise it, with thousands of soldiers removed from the withdrawal process posing as civilians. These are the dynamics of true-false withdrawal – withdrawal without withdrawal.[19]

According to some observers the M23, accused not so long ago of being “a negative force” and a “terrorist group”, has achieved the status of official discussion partner of the government in Kinshasa, thanks to the resolutions of the last summit in Kampala. Having been ordered to simply withdraw from Goma and go about twenty kilometres (12 miles) north of the town, the M23 now controls territory hitherto officially recognised by participants of said summit. A new Republic was therefore born in the east of the DR Congo, with Goma as its capital. In the meantime, Kagame and Museveni are henceforth exonerated in a crisis that has once again become Congo-Congolese.[20]

 

Despite its participation in the ICGLR, Rwanda has never abandoned its hegemonic ambitions in the east of the Congo. By supporting the M23 in the latest invasion of Goma, Kigali revealed its true intentions. Rwanda’s support for the ICGLR’s decisions is merely a façade; more than that, it is a way of buying time. In Kigali, everything has been set up to pressure Kinshasa to publicly recognise the M23 as the Congolese government’s key discussion partner in resolving the conflict in the east of the DR Congo. During this time, the country’s two aggressors, Rwanda and Uganda, have gradually been completely cleared of blame for the tragedy raging once more in the east. The capture of Goma by the M23, supported by Rwandan troops, was a strategy put together by Kigali and Kampala with a view to circumventing the sanctions set out in the UN expert group’s report.[21]

 

 

4. TOWARDS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE M23 IN KAMPALA

 

For and against talks in Kampala

 

In the end, direct talks between the authorities in Kinshasa and M23 rebels will be held in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. If, for the M23, these talks are synonymous with negotiations, people in Kinshasa think the opposite. As Kinshasa understands it, the talks must be limited to an assessment of the March 23^rd 2009 Goma agreement, on which the M23 bases its actions.[22]

 

On 5^th December,Runiga confirmed from Bunagana that if “Kinshasa only talks about the March 23^rd 2009 agreement, we envisage discussing (…)  other political and legal issues, related to defence and security, the economy and finance and social and developmental aspects”. The rebel leader intends to talk about violations of the Constitution, mandates from provincial assemblies that should have ended “a long time ago”, and even “human rights violations” against opponents and journalists.[23]

 

Questioned about the participation of MPs in the talks in Kampala, majority leader Clément Nzau claimed to be in favour of the presence of parliamentarians.  For his part, opposition leader Franck Diongo believes that the presence of representatives from the opposition, civil society, the government and all groups operating in the DR Congo is necessary. In his opinion, all these stakeholders must actively participate in the talks and not merely play the role of observers or witnesses. But he is opposed to the discussions taking place in Uganda, “given that the country is accused of collaborating with those who are fighting in the Congo”. He suggests that the dialogue should take place in Congo-Brazzaville.[24]

 

The four parliamentary opposition groups, namely the UDPS-FAC (Union for Democracy and Social Progress-Forces for Change), the UNC (Union for the Congolese Nation) and its allies, the liberal social democrats, and other actors of the extra-parliamentary opposition, claim to be uninterested in the negotiations in Kampala.

 

MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) MP Jean-Lucien Bussa said: “We agree with the dialogue. We have always called for it. However, it must be frank and responsible. We think what is happening in Kampala or outside of the Ugandan capital involves all actors: the government, the opposition, the M23 and civil society. The opposition can only go there as one of the important participants in the dialogue with the right to speak, and not as an observer or witness. That’s why the four leaders of the parliamentary groups have not left yet”. However, the opposition does not rule out participating in talks at a later date if it is allowed to speak.

 

According to MP Martin Fayulu, leader of the FAC, “the March 23^rd 2009 agreement is a private agreement which has never been ratified or approved by the Congolese parliament, pursuant to article 214 of the Constitution, and has never been published in the official journal of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to be binding on all”.

 

MP and FAC moderator Lisanga Bonganga, for his part, said that “the meeting arranged in Kampala between the M23 and the Congolese government is not binding on the Congolese opposition”.He believes the FAC’s position is justified by the fact that the March 23^rd 2009 agreement, and the agreement reached at the Kampala summit on 24^th November 2012, have never been ratified by the Congolese parliament. He explains that those two texts are therefore only binding on their signatories, adding that they have “no legality and no legitimacy and cannot be binding on all”. The FAC also raises doubts about the impartiality of Uganda in the mediation process: “Having been accused by the United Nations experts of being one of the aggressor countries of the DRC, Uganda is therefore disqualified from hosting any summit concerning the security crisis in the east of the DR Congo”, concluded Mr Bonganga.[25]

 

The UDPS has stated loudly and clearly that it will not take part in what it considers a “black mass” against the DR Congo. The UDPS believes that some of the country’s senior officials wanted and supported the crisis in the east of the country, which they have managed as if it were “a fair” where everybody could come and go as they pleased. According to some sources, the UDPS was not invited by the organisers of this dialogue, including the ICGLR.[26]

 

On 7^th December,Ugandan government spokesman Fred Opolot told the press that discussions would firstly centre on the technical arrangements (dates, agendas, etc.) of the forthcoming talks and whether or not observers would be present. The start of talks between the Congolese government and the M23, scheduled for Friday 7^th December in Kampala (Uganda), may take place on Sunday 9^th December, since the M23 delegation may still be on its way on the 7^th.

 

The delegation from Kinshasa, made up of 26 people, is led by Foreign Affairs Minister Raymond Tshibanda Tunga Mulongo, who has been in Kampala since Wednesday.

 

It also includes the vice-president of the National Assembly, Charles Muando Nsimba, and the two civil society presidents of North and South Kivu provinces. The opposition did not want to take part, with the exception of some individuals such as François Mwamba, of the Alliance for Development and the Republic (ADR), the former secretary-general of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), and UDPS MP Christian Badibangi. Father Apollinaire Malu Malu is also part of the delegation, but he leads the expert group. Philippe Gafishi, president of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), is also included.

 

As for the role of the opposition in evaluating agreements to which it is not a signatory, Badibangi justified his presence in Uganda on the grounds that the Congolese political opposition would play the role of “observer”, adding that “we are going to control things to make sure they do not drift towards negotiations”.  He stressed that:“Although we are not signatories to the March 23^rd 2009 agreement, I have always believed that behind this war there were perhaps hidden causes such as the Lemera agreement”.

 

The Lemera agreement was signed on 23^rd October 1996 between the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the DRC (AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and his allies. Some provisions of the agreement included particularly the following:

-As soon as the Alliance had secured victory, special compensation would be paid to the allies. The amount would be determined by the Alliance’s ruling body.

-Congolese nationality would be given collectively to the “camarades Banyamulenge and other populations of Rwandan origin” living in the country before independence (30th June 1960).[27]

 

Late on 7^th December,the M23 delegation arrived in Kampala (Uganda), having left Bunagana (North Kivu) that morning. In Runiga’s absence, the delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Minister René Abandi. The talks will begin without President Kabila and Runiga. “There is no official provision to say that President Kabila himself has to be present. This affair has become too personalised. It was the government who signed the March 23^rd 2009 agreement”, said a source close to the Congolese president, according to RFI (Radio France International). On behalf of the M23, Runiga had made his participation in negotiations conditional on that of the Congolese president. [28]

 

b. the context of a difficult dialogue

 

Under the terms of the exchange of 3^rd December between the Senate Plenary and the National Defence, Foreign Affairs and Deputy Interior Ministers, the M23 is defined as an uprising created from start to finish by Rwanda and Uganda, with numerous civilians and soldiers from those two countries.

 

In the March 23^rd 2009 agreement, the Congolese executive fell into several traps, notably dividing national territory to satisfy the whims of an ethnic group with separatist ambitions; setting up a special police force and security administration; privatising the chains of command of the army and national police for its sole benefit; offering a general amnesty for the crimes of its members since 2003; placing its “unemployed” in the Republic’s institutions, public bodies and civil service; dealing with the ambiguous issue of refugees, etc. The March 23^rd agreement gave the rebel movement’s sponsors every opportunity to place their Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan men in all Congolese national bodies.

 

It is important to stress that, in light of repeated alliances between the Congolese rebels and their masters in Kampala and Kigali, the Congolese defence and information systems are no longer secret from the latter. From Kampala or Kigali, Rwandan or Ugandan officers and soldiers know exactly where to strike to bring the Congolese army to its knees.  The chains of command of the army and national police were found to be full of Rwandans and Ugandans.

In the current context, if the political, military, administrative, economic and social aspects of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement are badly evaluated, it will help Congolese, Rwandans and Ugandans to once again infiltrate the FARDC, the Congolese national police and the country’s decision-making centres, being half in and half out. The scene set by the agreement poses the threat to the DRC of seeing North Kivu falling into Rwanda’s clutches, and the eastern province into Uganda’s.[29]

 

CNDP president Philippe Gafishi will also take part in the talks in Kampala. Previously, in 2010, he denounced the government’s non-respect of the Goma peace agreement, due to the “absence” of his representatives in Prime Minister Muzito’s second government, formed on 19^th February 2010. During a press conference in Goma on 22^nd February, he said: “This absence constitutes a violation of the peace agreement signed in Goma in 2009. We note that the expected political integration of the CNDP has not occurred. Our non-participation in the new government that has just been formed is therefore disappointing for us”. He continued: “The CNDP believes that its involvement in the country’s institutions is part of this agreement and must be implemented in its entirety.We are determined to continue participating in the peace process. As a political party, we have another battlefield: the political battle. As such, there is no question of a return to arms”.[30]

 

 

5. THE SUSPENSION OF GEN GABRIEL AMISI

 

On 22^nd November,President Kabila, Supreme Commander of the DRC Armed Forces, suspended Major-General Gabriel Amisi Kumba from his role as Chief of the Congolese Army to pave the way for an inquiry.  The latter is accused, in a UN expert report published on 21^st November, of selling arms to groups operating in the east of the DR Congo. The report states that “Gen Amisi is in change of a network distributing hunting weapons to poachers and armed groups, including Raïa Mutomboki”. The report also says that Gen Amisi, code-named Tango Four, ordered 300 AK-47 assault rifles to be given to another armed group operating in the east of the Congo, known by the name Nyatura, another local militia. According to the UN, the network stretches as far as Congo-Brazzaville, where the weapons are bought. They are then smuggled to Kinshasa and transported to the east by several collaborators, some of whom are members of Gen Amisi’s family.[31]

 

On 23^rd November,following the suspension of Gen Amisi to allow an inquiry to take place into the accusations against him, President Kabila appointed Lt-Gen Olenga Tete to take over as acting Chief of Staff of the Army.[32]

 

On 25^th November,acting Secretary-General of the Innovative Forces for Union and Solidarity (Fonus) Emery Ukundji called on the president to arrest Gen Amisi and bring him to justice.[33]

 

On 26^th November,a senior judge, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained that the military justice system does not have any judges with the rank of Major-General, like the army chief suspended from his post, to allow a judicial inquiry to take place. The military prosecutor’s office is therefore unable to take charge of “Tango Four”’s case to interview him.  He added that at this stage, only the president has the power to indict him, but there would still be the problem of jurisdiction of the military judges hearing his case. Sources in the military justice system say that if it does not have jurisdiction to try Gen Amisi, his case must be heard by the Disciplinary Board, made up of generals of his own rank or higher. [34]

 

According to several observers, there were many people involved in the treachery, the deals and the misappropriation of military funds, as well as the sale of weapons to armed groups. Cases such as that of Tango Four are legion. There are many people within various institutions who flirt with aggressors and negative forces, for multiple reasons. These murky relationships are built up to the extent that the best interests of the country end up on the bottom of the pile. Other “Tango Fours” are lurking in the shadows in various institutions.  Under these conditions, eradicating corruption has become a national emergency. Cleaning up the Aegean stables within the institutions of the Republic is essential. We must get rid of these corrupt and shady characters.[35]

 

 

6. THE UN POWERLESS IN THE FACE OF THE M23 ADVANCE

 

More and more people are calling for an investigation into the role of MONUSCO following the capture of Goma by the M23 rebels. On 21^st November, French Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius said that “MONUSCO’s mandate must be reviewed.MONUSCO was unable to prevent what happened in Goma. Deploying 17,000 men and developing a mandate that is unable to intervene is absurd”. This came a day after Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Didier Reynders said: “It’s the biggest United Nations operation in the world!How can it be that it was unable to stop an uprising?”

 

Established in 1999 by the Security Council, as of 30^th September 2012, MONUSCO had 19,109 uniformed personnel on the ground (16,996 soldiers, 721 military observers and 1392 policemen), 965 international civilian staff, 2886 local civilian staff and 577 United Nations volunteers. That’s a total of 23,537 people. The budget for the current period from 1^st July 2012 to 30^th June 2013 is 1.4 billion dollars (1.1 billion euros). MONUSCO’s mandate is clear (Resolution 2025): the peacekeepers are authorised to use whatever means necessary to, in particular, “ensure the protection of civilians, humanitarian workers and human rights workers who face an imminent threat of physical violence and to support the DRC government in its efforts to stabilise and consolidate peace”. In Goma, the UN has a detachment of 1600 peacekeepers. Why was the M23 able to take the town?

 

According to civilian spokesman Mounoubai Madnodje, “measures to protect Goma were put in place with the FARDC. MONUSCO also made its air and land resources available to the Congolese army in its work. But when the FARDC gave up and withdrew, we could not support people who were no longer there”.He added: “The army is tasked with defending the country. That’s its primary task:defending the territorial integrity of the country. That’s not MONUSCO’s  job. If national defence is inadequate, MONUSCO is not the only one responsible for what happened”. In other words, since the government army deserted Goma, MONUSCO could not support absent soldiers.

 

Military spokesman Col Félix Basse said: “MONUSCO did not let the M23 enter Goma.Rather, it fought alongside the FARDC from Kibumba until they withdrew from Goma”. He understands MONUSCO’s mandate to be limited to supporting the FARDC in its various operations. He also said that MONUSCO forces did not fight in Goma to avoid atrocities in the middle of the town. According to Hervé Ladsous, head of UN peacekeeping operations, “MONUSCO is a United Nations peacekeeping mission.When we say “peacekeeping mission”, that implies that there is at least minimal willingness to stop the violence, which is not the case in the DR Congo! Again, our mission is not to engage in direct conflict with this or that armed group. It is to support the Congolese armed forces and to prevent the alleged abuse of civilians”.[36]

 

On 21^st November,France’s ambassador to the UN Gérard Araud called for a review of MONUSCO’s mandate, calling it “absurd” that it was not allowed to intervene. He also said that one option currently being studied would be to give MONUSCO a “border control mandate”. The leaders of the peacekeeping operation asked the three countries involved in the crisis to authorise the use of surveillance drones. The Congo supports this idea, but Rwanda and Uganda have yet to give their approval. “In the Congo, drones could detect all movement of troops, weapons and ore across the border, which would be a good thing. But lots of countries have something to hide”, explained a diplomat from one of the Council’s member states.[37]

 

On the same day, in the face of the M23 rebel advance, Belgian foreign affairs minister Didier Reynders admitted that it was a real failure for MONUSCO, which had not been given sufficient resources to take part in “offensive missions, in the context of uprisings and armed groups”. Indeed, MONUSCO’s mandate is limited to protecting civilians – and not those in the towns, who are the responsibility of national authorities. “We must strengthen this mandate”,said Reynders, also raising the possibility of “increasing the number of men” to 2000, as the mandate allows. But, in his opinion, these reinforcements should be provided by regional countries because “Europe does not want to send troops into combat at this time”.[38]