Summary

EDITORIAL: Daring in the name of the people

1.  THE MARCH 23 (M23) REBEL MOVEMENT

2.  RWANDAN SUPPORT OF THE M23 REBELS

a.  The Congolese government initiates its investigations

b.  The Human Rights Watch communiqué

c.  The Congolese government declaration

3.  MESSAGE ON THE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU FROM PRIESTS OF THE PROVINCIAL EPISCOPALIAN ASSEMBLY OF BUKAVU

4. THE HOLOCAUST CONTINUES

 

EDITORIAL: DARING IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE

 

Following the revelations of an internal MONUSCO document and a report from Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Congolese government must, now, recognise Rwandan support of Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga’s March 23 (M23) rebel movement. It is undeniable that youth, including minors, of Rwandan nationality have been recruited, militarized, and dispersed throughout the M23 troops in efforts to combat the Congolese army. Consistently in departing Rwandan territory, M23 has received logistical support in the form of arms, food, and money.

 

The situation may appear to be a new phenomenon, but this is not the case. Those closely following the drama of the DRCongo in general and that of Kivu in particular know well that the Rwandan occupation commenced in September 1996, on the occasion of a first war of aggression—misleadingly spoken of as a liberation from the Mobotu dictatorship—at the time of the AFDL. Since then, military and civilian figures of Rwandan nationality have infiltrated Congolese state institutions (the national army, the Parliament, the national and provincial government, the local administrations), with the complicity “Congolese Rwandophones.” Concurrently, the control of the mines and the illegal exploitation of Kivu’s minerals (gold, cassiterite, coltan, petroleum) has been aided and abetted by complicit multinationals and western powers, whose names are often cited in the different reports issued by the United Nations group of experts on DRCongo. The population has known all of this for some time, and numerous civil societies and national and international organisations have denounced the situation over the years. Unfortunately, following the many reports and complaints, no measure has been taken to sever the murderous link between the illegal exploitation of mineral resources and the financing of armed conflicts. Impunity has been left to reign freely and open the doors to the pursuit of violence.

 

What will the Congolese government do vis-à-vis Rwanda?

Now that the government has openly recognised, however timidly, the reality of the situation, what will it do? Will it limit itself to the simple observation of “the passivity of the Rwandan authorities, faced with the grave violations of peace and international security being committed in the DRCongo and originating in their territory”? Yet it is not a question only of passivity. In fact, according to the HRW reports, certain officers of the Rwandan army are directly implicated in this affair or, at least, have knowledge of it. Will the Congolese government limit itself to seeking solutions “in the synergy between the states of the Grand Lakes region,” to signing other “trap” accords with the Rwandan regime? The latter has shown that it is not sincere in its relations with the DRCongo, and when it signs bilateral accords with DRCongo, it does so only in order to protect its interests, to the bloody detriment of millions of Congolese innocents. Will the Congolese government dare to recall to Kinshasa, for consultations, its ambassador to Kigali? Will it dare to demand that the UN Security Council intervene and apply to the Rwandan regime the sanctions (freezing of bank accounts, bans on foreign travel) stipulated for violations of the embargo on arms provided to armed groups active in the DRCongo? Will it dare to demand an international investigation in order to identify the Rwandan military officers implicated, in one way or another, in the support proffered to Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga’s M23 and traceable to Rwandan territory? Will it dare to denounce alongside the UN Security Council and the international community (AU, EU, USA) the violation of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRCongo by a third country?

 

What will it do vis-à-vis M23?

On an internal level, the Congolese government has promised to fight militarily M23 and all its other armed groups, national and foreign, and to refuse any form of negotiation with them. Will it maintain its promise? Or will it resign itself to additional military accords (further integration into the FARDC, additional promotions to superior grades, new commanding posts, permanence in the eastern provinces) and political arrangements (new ministerial posts at the provincial and national levels) that will contribute absolutely nothing to the resolution of problems in the East of the country? Will it dare to pursue the reform of the army (nomination of officers of a nationalist spirit, restructuring of military units based on tribal heterogeneity, permutation of soldiers from one region to another, regular payment of wages, fighting the diversion of funds, etc.)? Will it dare to neutralise the band of politicians (parliamentary and ministerial, at the national and provincial levels) who, for reasons economic and regional, have cooperated (and, in several cases, continue to cooperate) in the creation of armed movements such as the AFDL, the RCD, the CNDP, the different branches of the Maï-Maï and, finally, M23? Will the government dare to apprehend Bosco Ntaganda in order to deliver him to the International Criminal Court, which has issued a warrant for his arrest? Will it dare to arrest and bring to justice the instigators of the M23 rebellion and the different warlords who are leading the numerous armed groups still active today?

 

The Congolese people expect of the government a clear and definitive response that affirms their inalienable right to peace, truth, justice, and liberty.

 

1. THE MARCH 23 (M23) REBEL MOVEMENT

 

The reasons provided by M23 in order to justify its rebellion are entirely inconsistent. First, in claiming to be alone in their ability to protect the Congolese Tutsi, these purported rebels would lead one to believe that the Tutsi constitute a unique community that should be awarded special status. Moreover, in demanding recognition of their military ranks, these rebels of Rwandan origin continue to infiltrate the security services, notably the FARDC and the National Police, and to occupy sovereign functions, relegating Congolese to subordinate positions. The danger is that they may take control of important systems and proceed to assume real power, thus reducing Congolese to a condition of enslavement within their own country. To fail to put an end to this Kigali-supported rebellion is to persist in error.

 

June 3, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) announced that it had quit the Presidential Majority (MP). Following this decision, the provincial Minister of Justice and rehabilitation of North Kivu, François Ruchogoza, resigned his post. This CNDP minister left the provincial government of North Kivu accompanied by all the members of his cabinet.

While denying the claim according to which the CNDP is departing the Presidential Majority (MP) in order to join the March 23 (M23) movement, François Ruchogoza and his party demands that the Congolese government respect the March 23 accords, which, notably, provided for the integration of the police of the formerly armed CNDP group, the political integration of its civil staff, and the return of Congolese refugees living in Rwanda and Uganda.

However, the national president of the CNDP, Senator Mwangachuchu, says that he is unaware of this decision. The governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, indicates that, for his part, he has still not been officially apprised of this resignation

 

The rebels who escaped or defected told Human Rights Watch that the two rebellions (of the military deserters loyal to Bosco Ntaganda and of the March 23 [M23] movement) were not separate and that Ntaganda and Makenga acted together in the Runyoni region. These witnesses explained to Human Rights Watch that Ntaganda remained in general command of these forces.

 

May 30, in Uvira, two rebel officers were condemned, by default, to death, eleven were given prison terms running from two years of principal penal servitude to life imprisonment, and five were acquitted by the military court of South Kivu. These officers of the armed forces of the DRC were declared guilty of desertion and of participation in a movement of insurrection, infractions committed in Uvira and Fizi at the start of last April. Life imprisonment was imposed on the eight leaders of the movement, among them Colonels Bernard Byamungu and Samuel Sahimana. Colonels Eric Ngabo, referred to as “Zaïrois,” and Saddam Ringo did not appear at trial and were sentenced in absentia to death and discharged from the army.

 

According to military justice, they were guilty of having participated in a plan directed by the rebel general Bosco Ntaganda. They were to have reunited with him in Goma in March. The plan that they enacted consisted of delaying payment of troops in order to foster discontent and encourage rebellion. The rebellion is today known by the name of M23.

 

2. rwandan support of the M23 rebels

 

a. The Congolese government initiates its investigations

 

May 29, Rwandan and Congolese information services initiated, in Goma (North Kivu), examinations of the identities of eleven Rwandan citizens who surrendered themselves last week to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DRCongo (MONUSCO).

 

These combatants had been identified as Rwandan nationals recruited by force into the ranks of the March 23 (M23) movement. They claim to have been recruited in the village of Mundende in Rwanda and left their identity documents in the hands of their recruiters. These individuals describe themselves as eager to re-join their native country. They told the investigators that they would like official protection against reprisals that may be carried out against them by their recruiters, who, they maintain, compelled them by force to leave Rwanda. The Congolese government is awaiting the results of this investigation in order to confirm (or not) Rwandan support of M23.

 

According to an investigation currently being led by the Congolese authorities and the United Nations, the present rebellion of one part of the national army has been actively supported, particularly in men, by Rwanda. To date, at least fifty-one combatants of Rwandan nationality have surrendered to the DRC authorities. Twenty-four are being sheltered by the United Nations peace force, MONUSCO, in a camp in Goma, the principal town of North Kivu; thirty others are in the hands of the regular army (FARDC), and forty who had arrived at the MONUSCO camp on May 17 have disappeared, likely returned, with utmost discretion, to Rwanda.

 

The first eleven to have surrendered to MONUSCO were interrogated last May 29 and 30 by Congolese and Rwandan officers within the UN camp in Goma and in the presence of UN member witnesses.

 

The results of these inquiries preclude any lingering doubt as to the systematic character of the recruitment of Rwandan nationals and of their deployment to the DRC, where they fight the regular army alongside the rebels.

 

The Rwandans are not professional soldiers. They are young, hardly twenty years of age, from rural, disadvantaged backgrounds, and recruited primarily from the hills of Mudende, several kilometres from Congolese border.

 

A number of these young Rwandans refer to a character—for instance, a herdsman—who plays the role of recruiting agent in the Mudende region.

 

This individual approaches the unemployed youth of the villages and tells them “that there is work in the Rwandan army.”  When he recruits a sufficient number of volunteers, he organizes their transport by bus, and they are assembled in Kinigi.

 

Their personal effects, identity cards, cell phones, and cash are confiscated. Thus deprived of all identification, they depart on foot, in columns, toward the Runyoni forest in Congolese territory, an area dense with M23 rebels. En route, they undergo summary military training.

 

One of the survivors of the flight recounted: “In the beginning, they asked us to look for water and wood, to carry cases of munitions, and to install the bivouac sheeting, but when the bombardments started, we had to go under fire to retrieve the wounded in the firing holes.” Interrogated by Congolese and United Nations investigators on the reasons for this war, the recruited youth knew little.  “They told us that we needed to defend those who spoke our language, that the Congolese government fought the Rwandan language, and that we had to fight to protect it.”

 

All had heard that their “great leader” was the general Bosco Ntaganda, and that he would visit them at the end of their training, but they declare that they have never seen him.

 

What is to become of these scores of young recruits, forcibly enlisted in a war that does not concern them? Logic would seem to suggest that they be repatriated, and this is indeed their wish. “But we are afraid,” they tell investigators. “Those who recruited us and confiscated our papers might take revenge, after all that we revealed to MONUSCO.”

 

The recruiter-herdsman of Mudende will have enrolled some one hundred youth. According to received testimonies, the owner of the herd would seem to be an officer of the Rwandan army.

 

Another element troubles the Congolese and United Nations investigators: the first defections among Bosco Ntaganda’s allies within the FARDC date to last April 9. Yet several of the Rwandan recruits testify to having been sent into Congolese territory as early as February. “It is proof of a meticulously prepared plan of long date, infiltration in service of premeditated aggression,” says one official, who wishes to remain anonymous.

 

Still more troubling: the FARDC affirms that they have detained, in Goma, nine former militants of the FDLR, who would have sought to re-join M23 after having been disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda by MONUSCO.

 

Will the Congolese government be brought to elevate its ton vis-à-vis its neighbour? “It is very difficult,” concedes a ministerial advisor. “To do this would require that we be well-supported by the international community.” He adds: “The Rwandan regime benefits from a great deal of support, far more than we.” Will MONUSCO take the initiative to end the interference that imperils peace? The Congolese seem doubtful.

 

May 30, the question of MONUSCO’s confidential report affirming Rwandan complicity in the M23 rebellion was at the centre of the weekly United Nations press conference, held at MONUSCO headquarters.

 

The interim MONUSCO spokesperson, Touré Penangnini, declared that he had not yet seen the report. To his knowledge, “MONUSCO has only acted to report the declarations of the 11 elements that fled combat and surrendered to MONUSCO, in the context of the DDRR Programme. These 11 elements stated that they were recruited in Rwanda, and that after their training, they expected to re-join the Rwandan army but found themselves on the other side of the border.” Touré Penangnini is formal: “MONUSCO has only acted to report information from those who have confided in their base.” The spokesperson, Touré Penangnini, summarises this question as a problem of interpretation. “We do not have proof that Rwanda has a role in what is happening in the East of the DRCongo. How can one say that MONUSCO accuses Rwanda, when it has only acted to report information?” Thus he declared in response to a question.

 

May 30, the Congolese ministers of defence and of the interior were challenged at the National Assembly to respond to two oral questions with debate. The vice prime minister and the minister of defence were invited to respond to an oral question with debate, formulated by the deputy Martin Fayulu Madidi, on the new accord signed by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda and relating to the security situation in the east of the country. Another oral question with debate was addressed by the deputy, Jemis Mulengwa, to the minister of the interior, security, and decentralisation.

 

This second question concerned the prevailing insecurity in the east of the country.

The president of the National Assembly decided that the plenary session would unfold behind closed doors, which evoked the delicacy of the question and a provision of the institution’s rules of procedure. Furious, several opposition deputies left the room in a demonstration of their disapproval.

b. The Human Rights Watch Communiqué

 

June 4, Human Rights Watch declared that Rwandan military officers have armed and supported the rebellion in the east of the DRCongo led by the general Bosco Ntaganda, who is being pursued for war crimes by the International Criminal Court. Rwandan military officers have authorized Bosco Ntaganda to enter Rwanda and provided him with new recruits, arms, and munitions.

 

Ground investigations in the region, led throughout May by Human Rights Watch, revealed that Rwandan military officers provided arms, munitions, as well as some 200-300 recruits in support of Ntaganda’s rebellion in the Rutsburu territory in the east of the DRCongo. The recruits include civilians forcibly enlisted in the Rwandan districts of Musanze and Rubavu, and among them are children of less than 18 years of age. Witnesses reported that certain recruits, while trying to escape, were summarily executed on the orders of Ntaganda’s men. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the arms provided to Ntaganda’s forces by Rwandan military officers included Kalachnikov assault rifles, grenades, machine guns, and anti-aircraft artillery. The new recruits carried these arms to Runyoni, principal base of the rebellion, situated in the east of the DRCongo.

 

Human Rights Watch declared that the recruits, arms, and munitions coming from Rwanda have constituted an important asset for Ntaganda and his forces. The support has enabled them to hold their military positions in the hills of Runyoni, Tshanzu, and Mbuzi, and in the surrounding villages, against the military assaults of the Congolese army.

 

The Rwandan officers have also authorized Ntaganda and members of his forces to enter Rwanda on several recent occasions in order to escape arrest, avoid attacks by Congolese armed forces, or obtain military support for their rebellion. On May 26, witnesses spotted Ntaganda in Kinigi, in Rwanda, meeting with a Rwandan military officer in the Bushokoro bar. Kinigi is Ntaganda’s birthplace, and he maintains familial ties with the town.

 

In addition to being the subject of an ICC arrest warrant, Ntaganda figures on a list of sanctions issued by the United Nations Security Council, which forbids him from travelling outside the DRCongo. By virtue of the United Nations sanctions, Rwanda, like other countries, is obligated to “take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or passage in transit through [its] territory by any persons” appearing on the list of sanctions.

 

Beyond the visit of Ntaganda to Rwanda on May 26, described above, other former officers of the Congolese army who joined the rebellion, like Colonel Makenga, have visited Rwanda since the start of the rebellion.  This, according to witnesses questioned by Human Rights Watch, who report seeing the Congolese officers crossing the border and meeting and talking with Rwandan military officers.

 

Recruitment in Rwanda

Human Rights Watch has interviewed 23 people who escaped and left the ranks of the Ntaganda rebels after arriving in Rutshuru territory at the start of May. Among these witnesses, nine were recruited in Rwanda, seven in DRCongo, and one in Uganda, all by Rwandan civilians; two were Congolese children recruited in DRCongo; and four were Congolese who had defected after having joined the rebellion upon its departure then changed their minds. Interrogated separately, the witnesses declared that hundreds of people recruited in Rwanda were members of Ntaganda’s forces.

 

The recruits of Rwandan origin were enlisted through force or under the false pretexts that they would earn money or become members of the Rwandan army. Some were former combatants demobilised by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group composed primarily of Rwandan Hutus and operating in DRCongo. Others were civilians without prior military training. According to certain accounts, a number of those recruited by force were children under the age of 18.

 

Several of those recruited in Rwanda described having been forcibly kidnapped alongside roads and marketplaces near the towns of Musanze (formerly called Ruhengeri) and Kinigi in the Musanze district, in the northwest of Rwanda, and brought to the Kinigi military camp. Others were recruited in the Mudende sector in the district of Rubavu.

 

Two Rwandan civilians, ages 19 and 22 years, from the Musanze district told Human Rights Watch that Rwandan soldiers forcibly kidnapped them from a street cinema in the early evening, sometime around May 19. The soldiers, the young men said, gathered approximately 30 boys and young men who were watching a film and forced them into a truck.

 

The former FDLR combatants reported that “coordinators of the demobilisation” or other former combatants had invited them to participate in reunions for the demobilised combatants, which they had done in hopes of receiving financial support or finding a job.

 

In the Kinigi military camp, Rwandan soldiers provided arms and munitions to the new recruits before sending them off in groups of 40 to 75 men. Bearing arms and munitions, the recruits were then forced to march through the national park to the Congolese frontier, escorted by Rwandan soldiers. At the border, the Rwandan military escorts delivered the new recruits to Ntaganda’s forces, who awaited them and led them to Runyoni in DRCongo.

 

When the new recruits arrived in Runyoni, those who had received military training were immediately deployed to positions along the front line in order to fight the Congolese army. Some civilian recruits received basic military training, i.e., how to use a gun, and were then deployed to the front lines. Others received the order to build shelters, prepare food, search for water, or steal food and other goods from houses in the largely abandoned villages around Runyoni. In the majority of cases described to Human Rights Watch, the Rwandan soldiers returned to the Kinigi military camp after having handed over the new recruits to Ntaganda’s forces. Recruits told Human Rights Watch that on several occasions, however, the Rwandan soldiers accompanied them to Runyoni and participated in combat operations alongside Ntaganda’s forces, sometimes after having donned Congolese army uniforms.

 

Summary executions of recruits

Those who attempted to flee Ntaganda’s forces or refused to work or fight because of exhaustion were subjected to severe punishment. According to testimonies obtained by Human Rights Watch, some recruits were summarily executed.

 

A witness reported to Human Rights Watch that Colonel Makenga ordered him to kill three people who had been captured while trying to escape. “We killed them with an agapfuni, a small hammer. We first bound them before killing them. One was around 25 years old, another 18, and the third around 20 years. Four of us received the order to kill them. Then we buried them out there in Runyoni.”

 

Several of the officers who joined Ntaganda’s rebellion, including Colonels Makenga, Ngaruye, Innocent Zimurinda, and Innocent Kayna, have previously committed acts in violation of human rights in the east of the DRCongo. Human Rights Watch, UN human rights observers, and local human rights organizations have documented ethnic massacres, torture, kidnappings, generalized sexual violence, and the forcible recruitment of children, committed by these individuals while they were in command of rebel groups or officers of the Congolese army.

 

c. The Congolese government declaration

 

June 9, at a press conference in Goma following the conclusion of a governmental mission led by Prime Minister Matata Ponyo, the government’s spokesperson, Lambert Mende, read a declaration on the security situation in Kivu, of which the following are extracts:

 

“In a vain attempt to give a political character to what is, in fact, a flight from the grip of justice that started to tighten around Ntaganda for the crimes that he had committed under the UPC in Ituri, this band of criminal officers, re-baptised M23, have set themselves to formulating empty and fantastic claims. The bedrock of this agitation thus has nothing to do with the agreements entered into in 2009, and which the Congolese government would not have honoured.

 

Furthermore, information from a variety of sources suggests Rwandan support of Ntaganda’s band and a combatant recruitment network for Ntaganda based in Rwanda, a country that, like the DRCongo, is a member of the African Union (UA), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), and of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

 

The government of the republic, taking account of the gravity of the facts, has given itself the time to corroborate them with its own sources. Today, based on the conclusions of the investigations conducted by our services, we are in a position to confirm the following:

 

1) Among the militiamen of Ntaganda and Makenga’s band are some 200 to 300 elements recruited in Rwandan territory by an active network in this neighbouring country;

2) Several combatants thus recruited are Rwandan nationals. Upon entering the DRC, they underwent summary training before being deployed to front against the FARDC;

3) There are minors and youth among the these combatants;

4) While fleeing, the rebels abandoned all their armaments, some 38 tons recovered by the FARDC; however, a tenfold increase in firepower was noted in Ntaganda and Makenga’s band on its arrival in the Runyoni-Tshianzu-Mbuzu triangle, on the border between the DRC and Rwanda.

5) Unnatural alliances were established between Ntaganda and Makenga’s band on the one hand and the rebels on the other, the objective being to share the spoils of their pillaging;

6) The same applies for the FDLR, which the FARDC was on the way to depleting and which, paradoxically, became allied with Ntaganda and Makenga’s band, as is demonstrated by the presence at their sides, in Runyoni, of Colonel Mandevu of the FDLR and of FDLR combatants only just repatriated in good and due form to Rwanda by MONUSCO among M23 elements taken prisoner near Runyoni.

 

This information, precise, detailed, verified, and counter-verified, comes from sources within the government, which has committed itself to a patient collection of the facts. The information raises a serious problem, which requires urgent resolution, in the synergy among states of the Great Lakes region in their struggle against negative forces.

 

One thing is undeniable: Rwandan territory has served as a base for the preparation and perpetration of a conspiracy that, having begun as a simple rebellion, has evolved dangerously into a scheme that would rupture the peace between two countries of the Great Lakes region.

 

This deplorable development was at the centre of all the bilateral meetings between Congolese and Rwandan experts that have been held for several days.

 

The Congolese government denounces the passivity, or worse, of the Rwandan authorities, faced with these grave attacks on the peace and security of the DRC and originating in Rwandan territory.

The government reaffirms its determination to protect the lives of the Congolese, and all measures have been take to rid the Kivu provinces of the cancer of systematic violence that mortgages their economic lift-off.

 

The government does not anticipate negotiations with the armed groups, CNDP, M23, or FDLR, which are asked to surrender to the Congolese authorities or to MONUSCO in setting aside their arms, at the risk of being subject to the firepower of the FARDC. A national and republican army, the FARDC will never be organized on a communitarian basis.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo intends to pursue all diplomatic paths in the region in order to denounce and thwart this umpteenth adventure that threatens the peace and security of our country.

 

Convinced that a causal link exists between the insecurity in the east of the country and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the government, which plans to launch a mechanism for certifying and tracing mineral substances as recommended by the ICGLR, has decided to severely sanction all the counters and treatment and negotiating entities that would continue to purchase minerals from non-certified and invalid sites. Moreover, they will be subject to the revocation and annulment of all mining rights and titles, which will be frozen, in North Kivu. Furthermore, obligation is henceforth assigned to holders of valid mining research permits to rapidly replace them with exploitation permits, with the goal of constructing mineral processing factories in our country.”

3.  MESSAGE ON THE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU FROM PRIESTS OF THE PROVINCIAL EPISCOPALIAN ASSEMBLY OF BUKAVU

 

From May 28 to June 2, the priests of the ecclesiastical province of Bukavu gathered in an ordinary session at the end of which they published a message entitled, “Peace in the east of the DRCongo: When?”

The priests state:

 

“Among the objectives of our considerations, we noted a convergence of indications that evoke the spectre of a war whose substance and motivation remain hidden. In the past, signs that have initially appeared to be benign have degenerated into generalized conflicts. The ability to anticipate and prevent is essential.

 

In effect, structured armed conflicts are once again being observed in North and South Kivu, under varied denominations. It is necessary to note, in particular, the resumption of violence by armed groups in North Kivu, following the issuance of the arrest warrant for General Bosco Ntaganda by the International Criminal Court (ICC).  These hostilities have led to massive internal and external displacements of the population. These events are accompanied by an unprecedented rise in armed banditry, witnessed in the phenomenon of highway, river, and lake robbery.”

 

1. Different motives as distant causes of the war

The war has its roots in forgotten problems and biased solutions, like those of the Rwandan refugees.

 

The wars equally feed off internal member dysfunction, which generates injustice, inequality, and rancour and ignites the infernal circle of vengeance. They are sustained by all manner of covetousness that has relays within the country and tentacles abroad.

 

In effect, the wars in DRCongo have often been and remain wars of internal and external predation. Their contours have been extensively studied by different panels, which have established macabre tallies in terms of the millions of Congolese sacrificed. They drive the populations into misery. But no measure of reparation has been applied.

 

2. Immediate causes of the resumption of hostilities: special interests and predation

When one examines certain motives advanced to explain the renewal of violence, on perceives that they are more akin to pretexts than to real motivations, which seem to us to be:

To escape justice for individual offences committed, somewhere, in the past;

To avoid integration into the armed forces;

To maintain a status quo that favours predation.

 

Meanwhile, the country continues to function somewhat like a kind of reserve, a no man’s land, a jungle where entire countries are abandoned, at the mercy of interest groups, and to the detriment of local populations that have already suffered too much from the state’s deficiency or, at least, from its manifest weakness.

 

3. Calamitous handling of Rwandan refugees by the international community

In 1994, following the Rwandan genocide and with a mandate from the UN, France undertook the turquoise operation and introduced into our country millions of refugees, including soldiers and armed militias. The HCR relayed and fed them for two years only to abandon them in our forests, without further administrative identification in their country of origin, in Congo, or at the UN.

 

There was a time when it had even been declared that not a single Rwandan refugee remained in DRCongo. But the facts are stubborn—refugees indeed remain! They remain without administrative status. They are not, from this point of view, citizens of their country, United Nations refugees, or refugees such as those welcomed by the DRCongo. No administration official could put names to their faces; and yet there is surprise that they have become uncontrollable.

 

For this reason it is necessary to consider clarifying the administrative status of this human group and that in this specific matter, the Congolese state assume its sovereign responsibilities and demand a solution whereby, as in all the other countries of the world, they will be under control.

 

As for the penal status of those among them suspected of genocide, may it conform to the general principal of law, according to which the infraction is personal and individual and linked to a legal age.

 

However, young people between 18 and 25 years of age will not be affected by the liability of their fathers. On the other hand, if these youth commit crimes in Congolese territory as, unfortunately, often happens, DRCongo jurisdictions have the power and the obligation to know about it in accordance with Congolese penal code.

 

4. A multitude of armed groups in the east of the DRCongo

The names assigned to the violent acts of former warlords change, but the motives and actors remain, essentially, the same. All efforts have been made to elude attempts to restructure the national army following the wars of 1996 and 1998. These attempts at reform have been made on a basis of poorly negotiated political compromise.

 

In effect, in a multicultural country like the DRCongo, when the authorities tolerate for too long the composition of important military units on the basis of tribal identity, other human groups develop a tendency to similarly constitute themselves in a multitude of small states. It is important to remember that the DRCongo is comprised of nearly 400 linguistic groups. Our country thus sees itself infested by a multitude of warlords. In 2009, the Goma Conference made an exhaustive inventory of these active militias. Today, many more continue to appear…

 

In any case, at the conclusion of the present crisis, we must put an end to the current state of affairs involving all the armed groups, be they of national or foreign origin. We will otherwise be helping to perpetuate the instability.

 

The mission of the forces of order, of the police, or of the army is to protect the entire nation and all its citizens, not one particular group. The forces of order are republican or they are not. There is no compromise to be made in intermingling and mixing. This is an error of the past that must be corrected as rapidly as possible. Quite simply, a unified republican army is essential to the life of the nation.

 

5. Credibility of the state

Visible advances have certainly been made with respect to good governance: currency is stable, payment of salaries has commenced, the police and the army are progressively better-equipped, infrastructure has been rehabilitated or even rebuilt, the struggle against corruption has been timidly undertaken.

 

The weak point in this dynamic remains, nevertheless, the security of people and their property. Given the prevalence of murder, assassination, rape, theft, and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and the frequent malfunctioning of the judicial apparatus, people are impatient to see the state pursue its mission and principal responsibilities.

 

Thus, a great number of Congolese doubt the credibility of their state and its capacity to accomplish its sovereign mission in matters of civilian protection. The hesitations and failures are too numerous for the new, relatively limited, initiatives to be convincing.

 

In order to address this situation, public services must be restored to efficiency.

The state must harshly condemn author, co-author, and accomplice with regard to any infraction committed against society.

 

Yet to achieve the best results, profound reform of the administration must be pursued: administrative records and ethics must hold agents responsible for their civil and penal acts when the latter may infringe on the state or the private sector.

 

6. Reasons for hope

We recently passed through a difficult period, that of the 2011 elections. Numerous observers predicted the explosion of the country; we maintained unity. We congratulate our people on this sense of patriotism. A new government was installed. It manifested a certain national consensus. We can now provide it with opportunities to succeed and advance the country. Hopefully, in turn, it will continue to listen to the population and implement the amendments sought in the administration, reforms of the security sector, foreign policy, and sustainable development of the country.

 

Conclusion

At the term of this rapid reading of current events, we express once again our commitment to the unity, integrity, and sovereignty of our country, and we exhort our political class and our population to persevere in this regard.

 

We need to coordinate our efforts in order to avoid seeing our country torn apart by centrifugal forces generated by numerous internal and external predators.

 

We exhort the political authorities of our country to remain vigilant vis-à-vis these centrifugal forces, be they internal or external, which would balkanize our country, the DRCongo.”

 

 

4. THE HOLOCAUST CONTINUES

 

May 28, the post chief of the administrative organisation of Kalonge, in the Kalehe territory (South Kivu), affirmed that an attack the prior week by Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda on the village of Chaminunu left five dead. Among the victims were a woman and a child. Additionally, the assailants carried off a number of cows into the forest. Other sources indicated that, several days before this attack, FARDC soldiers had been confronted by FDLR rebels. The latter returned the next day while the regular army’s position was already cleared.

 

May 30, the vice president of the civil society of North Kivu, Omar Kavota, announced a massive displacement of the Tutsi population from the locality of Kitshanga, in the Masisi territory, near Goma. According to Kavota, the displaced were in the process of fleeing their homes in fear of an eventual attack on their locality by rebels of the March 23 movement. Kavota affirmed: “The latter are in the process of planning a return to Kitshanga, following losses that they are suffering at the hands of the regular army in Jomba and Bueza, in the Rutshuru territory. The members of M23 are even organising killings in order to justify an eventual genocide, which would be attributed to loyalist forces.”

 

May 30, the military spokesperson of MONUSCO (UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DRCongo), Colonel Mactar Diop, declared to the press that, according to collected testimonies, 98 civilians were killed in eleven villages in the area of Ufamandu I and II (in Masisi territory) between May 9-25, 2012, by adherents of Maï-Maï, Rahiya Mutomboki, and Kifuafa, as well as by members of the Congolese Defence Force (FDC) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). These killings occurred in reaction to attacks led by Maï-Maï Rahiya Mutomboki against the FDLR on May 14, 2012.

 

Witnesses interrogated by the UN mission affirmed that a number of killings were committed by men armed with machetes, lances, and knives, who declared their alignment with the militia of Rahiya Mutomboki, a popular self-defence group that claims to fight the Rwandan rebels of the FDLR. The majority of the victims were Hutu. According to the witnesses, the assailants chanted messages calling on the victims to return home to Rwanda.

 

The latest available estimates indicate that more than 100,000 people were displaced between April 1^st and May 18, of whom nearly 74,000 were in the Lubero, Masisi, and Rutshuru territories.

 

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Thanks to the PerMondo initiative, the translation agency Mondo Agit and the voluntary translator Emily Macaux, this document could be translated from French into English. This initiative carries out free translations of texts or websites for NGOs.

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