CONTENTS

EDITORIAL: How to Destroy the Objectives and Strategies of an Occupation

1. MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ON THE GROUND

2. REGIONAL MEETINGS

3. DECLARATIONS MADE BY US GOVERNMENT AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL

4. KIVU: A WAR THAT COULD LAST A LONG TIME

5. RWANDA’S MODUS OPERANDI IN KIVU: ALLIES AND OTHER “COLLABORATORS”

6. WHY RWANDA DOES NOT WANT TO LET GO OF EASTERN DR CONGO

 

ÉDITORIAL: How to destroy the objectives and strategies of an occupation

 

For the umpteenth time, Kalashnikov gunshots and artillery fire are forcing the people of North Kivu, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) to flee. Humanitarian sources indicate that within a period of just ten days, from May 10 to 20, 40,000 people abandoned their homes and their fields to flee from the combat zone, where there is fighting between the regular army (FARDC) and the soldiers of the March 23 Movement (M23), a new armed group made up of rebel soldiers loyal to General Bosco Ntaganda, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

 

According to a MONUSCO internal report published by the BBC, a communiqué from Human Rights Watch, and statements made by the spokesperson of the Congolese government, the M23 soldiers who turned themselves in to either the UN mission in DR Congo or the FARDC claim to be of Rwandan nationality and to have been recruited in Rwanda, then sent to Kivu, to fight for M23.

 

Just like with the previous politico-military movements such as the AFDL, the RCD, and the CNDP, M23 also seems to have been created and supported by Rwanda.

 

The apparent objective of these armed groups that are closely linked to the Rwandan government is always the same: the disarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which is portrayed as a genocidal organization, a terrorist group, “negative forces” (just like the Ugandan LRA and ADF-Nalu soldiers as well as the various Mai-Mai armed groups), and a constant threat to the security of the Tutsi community in DR Congo and in Rwanda, even though it has been a long time since the last significant FDLR attack was reported on Rwandan soil.

 

The hidden but nonetheless real objective is military, political, and economic dominance in the two Kivu provinces, in order to control the very lucrative mineral resources trade in these two provinces (cassiterite, gold, coltan, oil). The military operations against the so-called “negative forces” (the FDLR in particular) are just a cover-up to hide a very well-thought-out plan: the occupation of Kivu by the Rwandan government.

 

The strategy is still the same: infiltrate the army as well as political and administrative institutions.

According to local sources, there are a lot of Rwandan soldiers within the ranks of the national army deployed in Kivu, and they occupy the highest command posts, although it is difficult to statistically quantify or approximate. They are Rwandan soldiers who stayed in Congo after the wars of 1996-97 (at the time of the AFDL) and 1998-2003 (at the time of the RCD) and who then enlisted in the CNDP under Laurent Nkunda (2005-2008). The “integration” of CNDP troops into the national army, following the agreements of March 23, 2009, was one of the last stages of the infiltration of Rwandan soldiers into the Congolese army. It was possible because the “integration” operation was carried out very quickly, in an unorganized manner, using very few technical resources, and often without verifying the soldiers’ identities.

 

There are two cases that exemplify this particularly well. In 1996-1997, James Kabarebe, a general in the Rwandan army (APR), commanded the Rwandan troops who fought with the AFDL in Congo, at the time of the attacks against the Rwandan Hutu refugee camps. After the capture of Kinshasa, on May 17, 1997, the same James Kabarebe was named Chief of General Staff of the Congolese army. Upon his return to Rwanda in 1998, he was named Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army and he is currently the Minister of Defense in Paul Kagame’s administration. Although Bosco Ntaganda is Rwandan, according to the warrant for his arrest issued by the ICC, he has also been named a general in the Congolese army and is the person most often cited in recent UN reports for his direct involvement in the smuggling of minerals between Kivu and Rwanda.

 

Another Rwandan infiltration operation in Kivu is underway: operation return of “Congolese refugees” from Rwanda. Upon returning home, they can’t remember the boundaries of their fields, they don’t recognize the roads and paths, they speak Kinyarwanda and English (languages spoken in Rwanda) and not a word of Kiswahili nor French (languages spoken in Kivu in addition to other dialects). Neighbors don’t remember one another and the village leaders don’t recognize the villagers. Some of them, the wealthy ones, buy cultivable land and pastures, others buy plots of land to build on. This infiltration is facilitated by the absence of a Congolese civil registry. Congolese citizens don’t have identification cards, but instead a simple electoral certificate that is also used as a form of identification.

 

Armed groups are created to stir up wars that force the native people to abandon their villages and their land, which are then replaced with people from other countries, like Rwanda.

 

By infiltrating the Congolese army, and by having part of the Rwandan population move to Kivu, the Rwandan government is maintaining its political and military influence over Kivu, in order to ensure its own economic development.

 

The consequences of this way of thinking are clear: six million Congolese killed, mass raping, group massacres, more than 1.5 million people displaced in the two Kivu provinces alone, the violation of the Congolese national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of DR Congo. The general public now realizes that the main cause of the cyclical wars and the constant threat of danger in Kivu lies beyond the Congolese boarder, in Rwanda. The UN Security Council and the international community will have to take their courage in both hands in order to finally be able to explicitly name this “neighboring country” that has been stirring up numerous recurring pseudo rebellions within DR Congo for more than fifteen years now and that, even at the present moment, is providing logistic and military support to Bosco Ntaganda’s M23.

 

Therefore, the Security Council and the international community should:

-Put pressure on the Rwandan government to hold an inclusive inter-Rwandan dialogue (government, internal opposition, and external opposition) that could lead to the democratization of the country and to a more authentic national reconciliation process. The conclusions of an inclusive inter-Rwandan dialogue could therefore facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees and the majority of the members of the FDLR still present in DR Congo.

 

-Impose the Security Council’s sanctions against Rwanda for violation of the embargo on weapons supplied to armed groups active in DR Congo.

 

-Demand that Rwanda immediately and unconditionally withdraw all Rwandans who could be hiding within the M23.

 

–Monitor the Rwandan mineral exportation routes more closely. Sometimes, minerals of Congolese origin are found on these routes, particularly cassiterite and coltan. They are imported without a certificate of origin and then exported by Rwanda as a Rwandan product. If Rwanda wants to invest in mining in Kivu, they are more than welcome to do so through the bilateral commercial agreements with the Congolese government, in accordance with international commercial standards, and respecting the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of DR Congo.

 

-Significantly reduce, or even suspend, for an unspecified amount of time, any international contribution to Rwanda’s national budget, which is still largely dependent on exterior aid.

 

The prospects of peace in Kivu depend heavily on these decisions.

 

 

1. MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ON THE GROUND

 

On June 11, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that in Kinshasa around 218,000 new displaced people were recorded between April 1 and May 31, 2012, following the deterioration of the security situation in North Kivu.

 

Since the evening of June 11, the inhabitants of five towns (Gikoro, Mutingo, Bunagana, Cheya et Rubona) of the Jomba grouping, in Rutshuru, lack drinkable water. Leaders in the region are accusing the M23 rebels of having destroyed the water pipe that supplies these towns. The Public Information Officer at MONUSCO in Goma says that the sabotage is an intolerable criminal act of war.

 

On June 14, M23 forces descended from the hills of Runyonyi and attacked the FARDC in Rutsiro, Ngonkwe, and Kanombe, in the Bweza and Kisigari groupings (North Kivu) at around 3 o’clock in the morning. The rebels are believed to have taken over the FARDC positions in Rutsiro and Ngonkwe, about 5 km from the Rumangabo military camp. According to one FARDC officer, their intention was clearly to capture the Rumangabo camp, a large military base. But, “the FARDC are currently regrouping to retake the positions that they lost,” added the same officer.

 

On June 17, M23 rebels took control of the towns Tarika, Ruseke, and Murambi, near Tamungenga, in the Bweza grouping, about 17 km east of downtown Rutshuru (North Kivu). Sources on the ground say that it was the FARDC who made the first move, launching an attack on the rebels’ position near the hill of Rukaranga, in an attempt to retake the position that they had lost on June 14. According to two sources, the regular army was not able to dislodge the rebels from their position in the Rutsiro and Rwanguba region, in the Bweza grouping, about 20 km east of downtown Rutshuru, on the road to Bunagana.

 

Rwanda continues to deny that it had any involvement in the conflict between the Congolese regular army and the M23 rebels, entrenched near the Rwandan border. Meanwhile in DR Congo, however, the evidence pointing to Rwanda’s involvement is growing.

On May 27, the fleeing general Bosco Ntaganda was at the Rwandan military camp, Kinigi, near the border and near M23 bases, according to a Congolese source. He was allegedly seen with Rwandan general, Alex Kagamé, number three commander for the Rwandan defense forces. Moreover, the Rwandans recruited to join M23 were regrouped, before crossing the border, in a building belonging to the Rwanda Office of Tourism and National Parks, a State body. There is a joint Rwandan-Congolese committee of inquiry, but until now, the Rwandans have denied access to the sites where the regrouping and training of the young soldiers sent to the Congolese front have been taking place.

 

 

2. REGIONAL MEETINGS

 

On June 13, the twelve member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) launched the activities of the joint intelligence fusion center in Goma (North Kivu). The objective was to combine their intelligence information to fight against armed groups, terrorism, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the sub-region. This center is based in Goma. The chiefs of intelligence services, military representatives, and political leaders of these countries participated in the ceremonies.

 

Some observers did not hide their skepticism and wanted to know “who will really benefit from this intelligence fusion center? What is a neighboring country hostile to DR Congo doing in this center? Infiltrating even more and continuing its destabilizing operations in eastern DR Congo? Is it a way of officially giving Rwanda the opportunity to find out about all of the strategies carried out by DR Congo?”. According to others, in order for the center to be efficient, Rwanda should be excluded, since they contribute to the insecurity in the Great Lakes region. From their point of view, Rwanda is not sincere in its diplomatic relations.

 

DR Congo launched a diplomatic offensive in its neighboring countries, to indirectly denounce the support that Rwanda gives to the M23 rebels in the eastern part of the country. A press release from the Minister of Foreign Affairs does not explicitly mention Rwanda. Instead, it mentions a neighboring country, a country whose involvement has led to the deterioration of the security situation in eastern DR Congo. The chief of Congolese diplomacy, Raymond Tchibanda, has been making more and more visits to Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola to denounce Rwanda’s support of M23, the rebellion that was launched at the beginning of April by former CNDP soldiers, and a movement that finds its origins in DR Congo’s former pro-Rwandan rebellion.

 

 

3. DECLARATIONS MADE BY US GOVERNMENT AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL

 

On June 11, during a visit to Goma (North Kivu), ambassador James F. Entwistle expressed the US government’s willingness to support the FARDC in the fighting against the M23 rebels.

 

“We support the efforts [of the Congolese government and its partners] against M23. All governments everywhere have a responsibility to bring down the rebels,” said the American diplomat in his address to the Congolese leaders.

 

The words of James Entwistle confirm the position that his government took in a communiqué dated June 7, 2012, in Washington. “We support the efforts of the Congolese government aiming to discourage additional desertions and to bring before court those rebels presumed to have violated human rights, including Bosco Ntaganda,” stated the communiqué published by the office of the White House spokesperson.

 

 

The UN Security Council condemned the M23 rebellion, claiming to be extremely worried by the deterioration of the security and humanitarian conditions that has resulted in large numbers of displaced people and refugees, and would like to launch an investigation on the support that the armed groups in eastern DR Congo are receiving from the exterior. The text adopted by the UN Security Council is a message to Rwanda. Rwanda is not mentioned by name, but the members of the Security Council deem the information indicating that exterior countries are providing support to the armed groups in the Kivu region to be “credible”.

 

Congolese champion of human rights, Dimas Kitenge, thinks that the Security Council should explicitly condemn Rwanda: “The more proof we have indicating that Rwandan soldiers are there, it is very important for the international community to have a clear and firm voice with regard to these countries, including Rwanda, who is still seeking to disturb the peace.” The investigation on the support given to the armed groups should be led by the UN agencies in DR Congo, because a few dozen soldiers turned themselves in to the UN stabilization mission in DR Congo, MONUSCO, in Goma. But Roger Meece, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, has not yet stated whether or not they are Rwandan: “It’s not up to me to confirm it. We’re still waiting for the results of the verifications. But I can tell you that some of them did turn themselves in to MONUSCO and the FARDC claiming to be Rwandan.”

 

On June 16, in an official declaration made in New York, the members of the UN Security Council expressed “their great worry regarding the latest developments in the Kivu region and the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation that has led to the significant movement of displaced people and refugees.” Over a span of ten days, between May 10 and 20, 2012, the violence in North Kivu caused more than 40,000 civilians to flee their homes.

 

“We firmly condemn the rebellion of the officers and soldiers who were formally integrated into the armed forces of DR Congo and who are currently operating in the province of North Kivu as an armed group named M23,” they stated in a document read by China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Li Baodong, whose country holds the Security Council presidency for the month of June. The members of the Security Council also condemn “the killing and abuse of civilians (…) by the armed groups, including the FDLR” as well as “all acts of sexual violence.” In their declaration, the members of the Security Council “support the efforts of the Congolese government to demobilize the armed groups, discourage new defections, and stop and send to court those who violate human rights, including Bosco Ntaganda.”

 

Furthermore, they are calling on the countries in the region to “actively cooperate” with DR Congo to demobilize all of the armed groups, including M23, and “prevent them from receiving exterior support against the UN sanctions measures, including the arms embargo.”

 

The rebellion, launched by the renegade general Bosco Ntaganda and his men, is supported by Rwanda. The type of support that they are giving is not important. Be it logistic support, as in sending men, or passive support, as in not intervening to stop the recruitments and thus facilitating the infiltrations on Congolese soil…it is all considered aggression. And that is the reason for the recurring instability in eastern DR Congo.

 

On the question of instability in eastern DR Congo, there is a minimum consensus among the people: the repeated attacks against Kivu are organized and planned in Rwanda.

 

Everyone knows that the Rwandan government’s strategy for maintenance and economic prosperity is to ensure permanent instability in DR Congo. Why then limit oneself, like Minister Raymond Tshibanda and the Security Council, to saying that Bosco Ntaganda’s rebellion is supported by “a neighboring country” and forbid oneself from explicitly naming Rwanda as the aggressor country and accepting the consequences? Rwanda needs to be named and considered as DR Congo’s aggressor. It’s up to the Congolese people to stand up and shout it out for all to hear.

 

 

4. KIVU: A WAR THAT COULD LAST A LONG TIME

 

The major actors leading the M23 rebellion are senior officers of the FARDC named by Head of State Joseph KABILA in the March 23, 2009 peace agreements. They are:

 

1. Colonel MAKENGA SULTANI, M23 Coordinator

2. Colonel Innocent ZIMURINDA

3. Colonel Innocent KAHIMA

4. Colonel MBONEZU

5. Colonel Baudouin NGARUYE

 

All of them have been cited by local human rights NGOs for having violated human rights well before their current crime. There are many causes for the recurring insecurity in North and South Kivu, such as the disappointment generated by the March 23, 2009 agreement signed by the DR Congo government and the CNDP. Another agreement had also been signed in March 2009, between the DR Congo government and other armed groups. The leaders of these groups did not receive any promotions in rank nor in command post. The soldiers from the CNDP were the only ones who were generously rewarded.

 

The table below indicating where each of the senior officers came from, reveals the uneasiness felt by the armed groups, excluding the CNDP.

 

No.	Name, Last name and first name	Rank obtained	Date	Posting	Origin
1	ALBERT KAHASHA	Colonel	January 12	Beni	Mundundu 40
2	SERAPHIN MIRINDI	Colonel	January 12	Goma	CNDP
3	GAHIMANA	Colonel	April 12	Rutshuru	CNDP
4	NDAYISABA	Colonel	April 12	Rutshuru	CNDP
5	MUHIRE	Colonel	April 12	Rutshuru	CNDP
6	MUTONI	Colonel	April 12	Masisi	CNDP
7	NTAMBWE	Colonel	April 12	Masisi	CNDP
8	NZABANITA	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
9	BERNARD BYAMUNGU	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
10	SAMUEL NSABIMANA	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
11	SADDAM RINGO	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
12	TOUSSAINT MUHINDO	Lt Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
13	NGABO	Lt Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
14	BAUDOUIN NGARUYE	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP
15	INNOCENT ZIMULINDA	Colonel	April 12	South Kivu	CNDP

 

The list above only contains lieutenant-colonels, but what can we say about majors and lower-ranking officers? Of the senior officers listed above, some have already been arrested and brought before the military justice system (Col. Bernard Byamungu, Samuel Nsabimana, and Lt Col Toussaint Muhindo).

 

For over two months now, there has been violent fighting between the Congolese army, and General Bosco Ntaganda’s rebels and the rebel group, M23, in eastern DR Congo. The UN, Human Rights Watch, and Congolese authorities accuse Rwanda of giving aid to the rebels. According to Alphonse Maindo, political science professor at the University of Kisangani and specialist of the region, “Rwanda is trying to find a new strongman in the region” and neither the Congolese army, nor the UN mission have been able to restore peace. He thinks that “the conflict in North and South Kivu will last a long time.” In an interview, he said that the reports from MONUSCO and Human Rights Watch accusing Rwanda of supporting Bosco Ntaganda’s rebels and M23 are just a confirmation of what people have already been saying for a while now in North and South Kivu.

 

– Behind Rwanda’s support of the M23 rebels, is perhaps the search for a new strongman, as was the case with Laurent Nkunda (out of the running ever since his arrest in 2009 by Rwanda, editor’s note). Bosco Ntaganda has now become someone not to associate with (he is wanted by the ICC, editor’s note). He lost the protection of the Congolese government, under pressure from the international community following the disputes over the elections, and now DR Congo has to do something to appease the international community. Rwanda now needs to find another strongman to replace Bosco Ntaganda. That’s the reason behind the emergence of the M23 rebellion, led by Colonel Makenga, who will likely take over Ntaganda’s place. Rwanda needs to hold onto its allies in the region (for security reasons, and most importantly for economic reasons, editor’s note), as it fans the flames while at the same time trying to act like the fireman who is coming to the rescue.

 

– The Congolese regular army (FARDC) has not yet been able to overcome these few hundred men (some claim that there are 500 rebels in all) mainly due to technical problems. There are soldiers in the Congolese regular army who are not familiar with the land, which is not very accessible. Several troops are from Kindu, in the Maniema province (several hundred kilometers from the combat zones, editor’s note) and they are unfamiliar with the terrain. The rebels, on the other hand, are very familiar with the region. They have also had more time to prepare for the conflict. The rebels occupy the hills, and it is very difficult to dislodge them. They also receive support from their allies in the region. The M23 has also found refuge “straddling” the boarders between DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda, giving it easy access to aid, weapons, and food. Last month, Congolese soldiers would have refused to go fight on the front for one of the following reasons: several weeks ago, Congolese soldiers had surrounded Bosco Ntaganda’s farm in the Masisi and were waiting for the order from their superiors to launch the final assault and capture the rebel general. And clearly, they were told to stop the offensive, which explains their disappointment. According to the soldiers, that wasn’t the first time that a counter-order like that has been given, including during Laurent Nkunda’s rebellion (in 2008, editor’s note).

 

– Unlike to the FARDC, the Blue Berets have the means to fight. The MONUSCO soldiers are well equipped, well paid, which is not the case for the Congolese army. Deploying MONUSCO soldiers would probably make the difference on the ground. Why haven’t they done so? First of all, the rules of engagement are too complicated to apply. Like all peacekeeping operations, numerous authorizations must be obtained before opening fire. These authorizations come from New York, then from orders from the countries engaged on the ground…it’s too complicated. And then, we can’t forget that these are troops from developing countries. The soldiers from these countries enlist to make a little money, and they would prefer to return from their mission alive rather than dead…which is totally normal! All of this is kept in mind when deciding to deploy troops on the ground. The headquarters also want to minimize the loss of human lives within their ranks, and that explains why MONUSCO is engaging as little as possible against the armed groups. MONUSCO’s mandate could, of course, be changed, but nobody can think of anything else to add to it. They already have everything. The MONUSCO brigades in Kivu and Ituri have the legal tools to enable a real military engagement to impose peace.

 

– The fear is that all of this could drag on for a very long time. It will be difficult to dislodge the rebels from the hills of North Kivu. The strategy of M23 and Bosco Ntaganda is to hang in there for as long as possible. Some also think that they are currently regrouping to launch an offensive, to recover materials and weapons. And seeing that they are positioned along the Rwandan border, where there is all sorts of arms trafficking…they will be able to hold on for a long time.

 

– Two things could change the situation. First of all, strong pressure from the international community. And this pressure should aim right for the jugular. In Rwanda and DR Congo, the two major actors in this conflict, international aid makes up 50% of what they live off of. If a clear warning is given: “Stop! Or else we’ll stop sending you food,” the governments will probably think twice before letting the situation degrade. Second, someone needs to get the attention of the international community, and only the Congolese people themselves are capable of doing that. They must all rise up and say: “we want peace!”. That could be enough to get the attention of the international community.

 

 

5. RWANDA’S MODUS OPERANDI IN KIVU: ALLIES AND OTHER “COLLABORATORS”

 

Ever since 1996 (and even a bit earlier than that), Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi have all been bases for destabilizing DR Congo. These countries harbor, train, and arm “the negative forces” that are tearing apart our country. Rwanda used the mass killings of Tutsis and Hutus within its own borders in 1994 as an excuse to actively take part in the low-intensity war against DR Congo.

 

Once the death squads led by the “master of Kigali” cross the border into DR Congo, they rid themselves of their army uniform and even their Rwandan identity. They replace them with a Congolese army uniform and a Congolese identity. Besides the army, they infiltrate the police forces, government, public companies, and several other Congolese institutions. Once they have infiltrated these institutions and public companies, the next step in furthering the occupation of DR Congo is to foment and support rebellions. That enables them to acquire weapons and money to help further the occupation even more.

 

These death squads are organizing a crime that allows them to get rich without costing them much, so that they can enrich their sponsors (Western countries) via multinationals, the board of directors of which they control, and further occupy the country.

 

Already at the beginning of December 2004, Joseph Kabila made a public declaration regarding Rwanda’s aggression on Congolese soil. He said: “For the past few days, Rwandan armed forces have ravished our land, crossing the border into DR Congo from several points of entry in the province of North Kivu. To justify their criminal adventure, the Rwandan leaders claim that they are hunting down Rwandan armed groups in DR Congo. My dear compatriots, let me remind you that this problem regarding armed groups, which was not created by the Congolese people, has served as a pretext for the war that Rwanda has been waging against our country since 1998 and has contributed to dangerously destabilizing the Great Lakes region” (C. ONANA, Ces tueurs tutsi. Au cœur de la tragédie congolaise, Paris, Duboiris, 2009, p. 162). Curiously, this declaration has not been followed by any legal action against the aggressor country!

 

Bringing the modus operandi of Rwanda and it’s allies in our country under control should drive the organized and active Congolese minorities, each in their own region, to break away, in the short, medium, and long term, from the death system of the l’AFDL-PPRD and RCD-CNDP-M23 in place in our country.

 

There is a great amount of irrefutable evidence indicating a covert occupation of Kivu.

 

Infiltration of armed Rwandans in the FARDC. Parallel command of troops on the eastern DR Congo front. Refusal to deploy individuals from the CNDP outside of Kivu. They occupy all of the command posts in the eastern part of the country. Elaborately planned rebellions. Joint Congolo-Rwandan military operations that never resolved the FDLR issue. Transplantation of Rwandans under the guise of the return of Tutsi refugees. Rapes, massacres, pillaging, and forced displacements of local people.

 

The Rwandan government’s approach, encouraged and both financially and materially supported by secret Western forces, aims to create a no-man’s-land where predation can take place undisturbed. All of the attacks in eastern DR Congo strive to accomplish a one goal: the step-by-step balkanization of the country, no matter how many Congolese victims and internal displacements they cause.

 

It’s a continuous expedition of economic conquest.

 

Ever since the invasion of Zaire in 1996 and the rise to power of the AFDL in 1997, there have been no systematic FDLR incursions on Rwandan soil. Therefore, it is surprising that often, every couple of years or so, the Rwandan army (APR) demands the right to pursue the diffuse rebellion of Rwandan Hutus committing crimes in DR Congo. According to the international treaties, the right to pursue does not apply unless a country is victim of a military attack and reacts in retaliation, chasing the assailants beyond its borders. Despite all of that, the Rwandan troops often return to operate within our borders.

 

The APR intervenes in DR Congo either directly or by means of insurrectional movements such as RCD, CNDP, and M23. The APR also organizes and equips Hutu soldiers and sends them to spread desolation and misfortune in DR Congo, in order to facilitate the displacement of the native people and clear the way for miners to pillage the Congolese land. Indeed, Rwanda’s mineral production and transportation statistics make it hard to believe that all of the minerals actually come from Rwanda, given the country’s small size.

 

DR Congo is the victim of three major phenomena: internal complicity, jealously of its neighbors, and internal Mafia networks.

First of all, there are internal complicities that give rise to worry and that are protected by their international sponsors. DR Congo is also a victim of its own riches, which make its neighbors to the east jealous, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. These international Mafia networks “intend to continue to pillage the mineral and forest riches.” On the other hand, a certain number of countries to the east of us are currently in the process of setting up their “common market” in which they are trying at all costs to include the eastern part of our country in order to benefit from its mineral riches. To succeed in this project, these countries must pour out as many of their countrymen as possible into this part of the country, disguised as “refugees” to remove them from Kinshasa’s sphere of power. This progressive occupation of our land therefore constitutes the beginnings of the very likely future requirement of self-determination.

 

It’s a bitter observation made by Jacquemain Shabani Lukoo, Secretary General of UDPS, and one that translates Rwanda’s hegemonic objectives in eastern DR Congo, according to a Machiavellian plan hatched before the very eyes of the international community, particularly the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Remember, these countries supported AFDL’s invasion of DR Congo in 1996, which today turns out to have been a Rwandan invention. Rwanda had initially reported it to be a Congolo-Congolese affair, before admitting, six months later, when palpable evidence surfaced of the presence of its regular troops on the field of military operations, that they were hunting down Hutu rebels who had fled to Kivu after the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

 

According to UDPS, the Congolese people must not be distracted, because the politico-military movements, such as AFDL, RCD, CNDP and M23 share a common history: destabilizing DR Congo and pillaging its riches. They reveal the strategy for taking over power in DR Congo:  the manipulation and instrumentation of armed groups that they eventually integrate into the Congolese national army in order to weaken and neutralize it. These so-called politico-military movements employ all means possible to exploit well-established, influential politicians in order to accomplish their goal, which is still to control DR Congo’s mineral and forest riches, said Me Shabani Lukoo.

 

Why have none of these politico-military movements that intentionally operate in these territories of Grand Kivu been able to eradicate neither the Interahamwe phenomenon nor the individuals threatening Rwanda’s internal security? In reality, the brewing and mixing operations within the FARDC and the joint military operations “Umoja wetu”, “Kimya I and II”, and “Amani leo” led against the FDLR allowed for thousands of individuals in the Rwandan regular army to be integrated into the FARDC and to occupy strategic posts at all levels. And it’s thanks to the ICC that the public realized that Bosco Ntaganda, for example, is Rwandan…glaring proof of Rwanda’s Machiavellian plan to destabilize eastern DR Congo.

 

 

6. WHY RWANDA DOES NOT WANT TO LET GO OF EASTERN DR CONGO

 

The question remains: why is Rwanda trying to intervene in this troubled region of DR Congo?

 

Making off with the Congolese gems

Rwanda cannot develop if it cannot cross the border into eastern DR Congo.

 

Former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, even proposed, in January 2009, that the Congolese precious stones in Kivu be mined by both Rwanda and DR Congo. Several United Nations reports have already stated: “Rwanda is the hub of the illegal trade of Congolese gems.” In 2011, according to the Rwandan Central Bank, mining exports brought in 68 million US dollars to Rwanda, thus making mining exports the country’s biggest source of revenue, surpassing for the first time tea exports, which until then had always been the sector that exported the most. Officially, Rwanda doesn’t have enough mineral deposits to produce as many gems as they claim to be exporting. So where are all of these minerals coming from? Back in 2009, an observer noticed an explosion in the creation of mining cooperatives – over 300 of them.

 

The Rwandan mining sector employs some 35,000 people, mainly in artisan mines and in some industrial mines. However, the proportion of Rwandan mineral exports that are actually produced in Rwanda remains unknown. “We have asked those in charge of Rwandan mines to send us the statistics of local production, mine by mine, and we haven’t received any information yet. Just empty promises,” says Sophia Pikles of the British NGO, Global Witness.

 

Minerals from Congo are exported as Rwandan products.

These cooperatives “send Congolese minerals across the border into Rwanda where they are given a Rwandan label and then sold on the international markets,”  says an expat with connections in the region’s business milieu.

 

More proof, this time from a report from the British NGO: Rwanda is procrastinating in applying due diligence for monitoring the production chain of the minerals that it exports. “The Rwandan government forbids the importation of minerals that are not certified and labeled by competent authorities. The only exception is for minerals that are just being shipped through our country, en route to another country, and that are packaged in sealed containers, even though they are from Kivu, where they are not given labels.” Rwanda wants to maintain its control in Kivu in order to enlarge its zone of influence beyond its borders, to include a region rich in minerals, and that can also receive Rwandans searching for land and pastures.

 

General Ntaganda, the backbone of illegal trade

According to the most recent report from UN experts, General Bosco Ntaganda has set up an extremely lucrative network of smuggling in the zone along the Rwando-Congolese border. The minerals enter Rwanda via his properties. The general earns up to 15,000 US dollars in profit per week.

 

Complicity of the Congolese government

Congolese minerals never cross the border into Rwanda without the Congolese security service’s knowing.

 

Several reports from UN experts have mentioned the involvement of Congolese politicians at all levels. These politicians have never been brought to justice. So, it’s absolutely normal that these practices continue. A source from the milieu of international affairs describes the following incredible scene:

 

“On November 3, 2011, Rwandan authorities returned 68 tons of smuggled minerals that had been confiscated by Rwandan security agents throughout the course of the year to DR Congo. The stock was placed in a warehouse in Goma, belonging to a former Congolese general, Bora, who by the way was cited in the assassination of the former Congolese president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. But on November 14, at dawn, in the presence of provincial officials, one of whom was a former provincial minister in charge of mines, the minerals were illegally sent to Rwanda and sold to international buyers.”

 

So far, no investigation has been opened by the Congolese government.

 

British deputy, Eric Joyce, suspects President Kabila himself of having sold off natural resources that cost his country over 5 billion dollars in losses. Congolese resources are being stolen and sold off by people at the highest levels of government, the lowest levels of government, and even by members of the security services.

 

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Thanks to the translator Holden Ferry, the PerMondo initiative and the translation agency Mondo Agit, this translation from French into English could be arranged for free. PerMondo offers free translation of websites and texts for NGOs.

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