SUMMARY:

EDITORIAL: Getting the movement for democracy back on the right track

1) INTERNAL POLITICS

a) The National Assembly

b) Mwando Nsimba consults opposition parties

c) The outcome of Mwando Nsimba’s consultations

d) The UDPS in difficulty

e) Towards a monolithic Assembly?

2) FEEDBACK ON THE NOVEMBER 2011 ELECTIONS

a) The report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office

b) The final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission

c) The report of the League of Voters

d) The petition of the Congolese Coalition for Civil Society

EDITORIAL: GETTING THE MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK

The European Union Election Observation Mission and the League of Voters have published their final reports on the elections of the 28th November. The observations and analyses were already known since the partial disclose of their first reports. Their conclusion is clear: the election results published by the Electoral Commission are not credible, because of the large number of irregularities and frauds committed during the course of the electoral process. Contrary to preceding reports, the following concrete proposals are formulated to avoid repeating, in the future, the errors committed, and to improve the procedure for the next elections. The United Nations Human Rights Committee (BCNUDH) has also published its report on the violations of human rights committed during the last elections. The informer Mwando Nsimba, responsible for identifying a more precise parliamentary majority, has completed his consultations with the different parties of the majority and of the opposition.

At the end of the informer’s mission, the DRC is directly confronted with three tendencies: 1) A government which is entirely controlled by the presidential majority, 2) a government of national unity led by a Prime Minister chosen from the opposition, 3) a transition government responsible for the organisation of new elections. Given these conclusions, the President of the Republic should name the next Prime Minister or, failing this, somebody to form the next government. During this time, the National Assembly will have to continue with the implementation of its definitive Bureau. After the approval of article 22 of the Interior Regulations, this bureau will be composed of seven members, of which five will be chosen by the majority and 2 by the opposition. In the light of recent reports, it appears clearly that the current majority, affected by a process marred with irregularities, electoral frauds and acts of violence, does not have sufficient legitimacy and cannot allow itself to wish to govern the country regardless, as if the elections had been carried out in the correct way. Consequently, it must provide a ‘corrective’ to the non-credibility of the election results, ‘compensating’ the opposition for the damages it has suffered. This does not mean a charitable concession to the opposition, or of a new ‘sharing of the cake’ of power, but an act of supreme ‘national co-responsibility’ to bring the movement for Congolese democracy back onto the track from which is has erred.

1. INTERNAL POLITICS

a) The National Assembly

16 March, the National Assembly adopted its Regulations of Interior Order, with a majority of 311 against 18. Sixty-three deputies abstained. This regulation was adopted in its totality, without examining more than 700 amendments which were brought by certain deputies. The plenary decided to entrust the examination of these to the Political, Administrative and Juridical Commission (PAJ) which will be set up after the final selection of the Bureau of the lower chamber of Parliament.

For deputy Delly Sessanga, the member of the commission responsible for the writing of the said interior regulation, “even if the vote seems hasty to some, it can be explained by bearing in mind the political issues of the time, the final bureau of the Assembly needing to be implemented as soon as possible”. The Interior Regulation stipulates, among other things, the participation of the Opposition in the final bureau of the lower chamber. According to this principle, the composition of the final bureau could be organised on the basis of the weight of each party, without reference to political allegiance.

29 March, the deputies adopted article 22 of the Interior regulation which had posed problems. This article now stipulates that “the final bureau is constituted with the aim of reproducing the political configuration of the National Assembly”. This is an innovation which opens the Bureau of the Assembly to independent and non-aligned deputies. The new formulation of article 22 was proposed by the Supreme Court of Justice after having rejected the initial proposal made by the deputies. The old version of the same article said “The bureau is constituted of members of the Majority and of the political Opposition of the National Assembly…” and seemed to exclude independent and non-aligned deputies.

5 April, the MP published the names of its candidates for the election of members of the final bureau of the National Assembly. These are:

President: Aubin Minaku of the PPRD

Vice-president : the post returns to the Palu

Rapporteur: Ezadri of the MSR

Quaestor: Elysée Minembwe of the ARC

Quaestor Ajoint : Kaboy of the AFDC

According to some sources, regarding the first vice-president, the Palu has designated Godefroid Mayobo, elected deputy of Bandundu and Permanent Secretary and spokesman for the party, but it is the candidature of the deputy Justin Kiluba that the MP accepted. It has also been said that the candidature of Mwando Nsimba was proposed.

According to the interior regulation of the lower chamber of the parliament, of the seven members who sit on the Bureau, five will come from the presidential Majority and two from the opposition.

6 April, the deputy Serge Mayamba of the UDPS declared that the two opposition candidates elected as members of the final bureau of the National Assembly are Sami Badibanga, of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and Angélique Milemba Bukasa of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). The candidate of the UDPS will occupy the post of the second vice-president of the National Assembly and that of the MLC will take the post of Deputy Rapporteur.

b) Mwando Nsimba consults opposition parties

19 March, Mwando Nsimba, the informer appointed by President Joseph Kabila to assemble a coalition majority in the National Assembly in preparation for the formation of the government, has met with the representatives of the opposition.

After his interview with Charles Mwando Simba, Vital Kamerhe, president of the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC), declared: “We are looking for solutions to the problems of our countries. We did not go to see the informer to seek jobs… We are not in this process to allocate jobs.” Vital Kamerhe, who reached third place in the presidential elections, remarked that “the President of the Republic is in the process of looking for a new parliamentary majority. This tells us clearly that he has not recognised the majority as proclaimed by the CENI” and he confirmed that the meeting of opposition members with the informer was aimed at transmitting a message to President Kabila in order to end the “political crisis” born as a result of the presidential and legislative elections, which are contested because of the irregularities which marred them. To resolve what he considers a crisis of legitimacy as a result of these elections, he asks President Kabila “to invite everyone to discuss, so that everyone can give him their own reading of the situation and the route out of the crisis. The dialogue must lead to institutions with their legitimacy reinforced, rediscovered, with national cohesion re-established, but also with a programme for good governance and a detailed calendar for the rest of the electoral process.”

Vital Kamerhe also advocates the formation of a coalition government.

Léon Kengo wa Dondo, leader of the Union of Forces for Change, has asked Mwando Nsimba to go beyond the electoral Majority, beyond the East-West divisions, beyond the Majority-Opposition tandem, to create a new Majority with the aim of amassing a large consensus around a common and concerted programme of governance. This Majority should, in concrete terms, be reflected in the configuration of all the other institutions of the Republic. There would be benefits in terms of the competences brought together from all horizons, to build the country, thanks to the competition of all and a spirit of peace and reconciliation. It is true that this proposition does not appeal to everyone. Especially since it is likely to profoundly change the political order resulting from the elections of the 28 November 2011.

Mbusa Nyamwisi, president of the RCD/KML, has declared that his party could participate in a government which would take into account the social justice which has been lacking during the first legislature.

José Makila, former officer of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC and current leader of the Democratic Labour Alliance (ATD), his own party, says he is ready to bring his contribution to the building of the nation by entering in the new parliamentary majority, but on condition of an inclusive government and a large national union.

According to Thomas Luhaka, general secretary of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), his party is also ready to “contribute to the improvement of the quality of the electoral process”.

The general secreatary of the Christian Democracts, Freddy Kita Mukusu, has also met Charles Mwando Simba. “We went to meet him on his own request. We did nothing other than present him with a memorandum in which we renew our position, that is that we do not recognise the present institutions and that it was Etienne Tshisekedi who was elected President of the Republic. We proposed dialogue with him”, he declared. In the preceding days, the president of the party, Eugène Diomi Ndongala, had confirmed that there was no question of him going to see Mwando.

The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), of Etienne Tshisekedi, refused to meet with the informer. Albert Moleka, head of Etienne Tshisekedi’s cabinet and spokesman for the UDPS, reiterated his party’s position in a radio interview on Radio Lisanga TV (RLTV), emphasising that “given that the elections of the 28 November 2011 were marred with many irregularities, they have been cancelled by the national President Etienne Tshisekedi. As a result, the UDPS does not recognise any of the structures, institutions or people issuing from this electoral process. To do this, the party therefore declines the invitation offered to it for the purpose of consultations. Doing so would be in contradiction with itself.”

Clément Kanku, president of the Movement for Renewal (MR) and coordinator of the Union for the Nation (UN), declared that the consultations led by the informer are a shortcut to “lay off” some members of the opposition in light of the formation of the government. According to him, “there must be serious consultations, not a head-hunter who is looking for people to complete a government.” He therefore hopes for a preliminary dialogue between Kabila and Tshisekedi, between the majority and the opposition.

The majority of political parties that are members of the Dynamique Tshisekedi Président (DTP) have fallen in behind the UDPS. Thus, the Ecidé Martin Faluyu, the PT Steve Mbikayi, the SET Roger Lumbala, have flatly refused to go to listen to the Informer.

c) The outcome of Mwando Nsimba’s Consultations

28 March, during the press conference regarding the outcome of his consultations with the political groups to identify a majority coalition in the National Assembly, with a view to the formation of the government, the Informer Charles Mwando Nsimba has declared that the propositions put forward by the opposition parties can be grouped into three tendencies.

– The first tendency is in favour of a compromise between the political groups of the majority and the opposition to develop the programme of the future government. This first group is in favour of the spirit of transparency advocated by the Head of State and proposes a consensus around the governmental programme.

– The second tendency is in favour of the organisation of consultations to put in place a government of national union, led by a Prime Minister selected from the opposition. But the informer immediately rejected this idea, stating that it was not possible to name a Prime Minister from the Opposition, because “it would be denying the existence of the majority”. Such a plan, he added, does not fit with the constitutional principle according to which the President of the Republic chooses his Prime Minister from within the parliamentary majority. It equally does not fit with the vision of inclusiveness advocated by the Head of State which excludes an eventual cohabitation, because there is already a definite majority around him.

– The last group of opposition parties is in favour of the organisation of a dialogue within the political class to defuse the current crisis and put new institutions in place responsible for the reorganisation of elections.

In addition, Charles Mwando Nsimba has stated that certain political opposition groups have decided to officially sign an act of adhesion “to a parliamentary majority which strengthens the National Assembly.” “The parliamentary majority is not to be confused with a presidential majority”, pointed out Charles Mwando, who also emphasised that the new adherents will be able to collaborate with the MP in the same way as Antoine Gizenga’s Palu has since 2006.

He added that the Presidential Majority, a political platform close to the Head of State, along with its allies, say they are capable of governing alone, even if the opposition must play its role of checks and balances. The MP however leaves the President of the Republic entirely free to decide on the inclusiveness or otherwise of his government towards the opposition.

At the end of his consultations, the informer Mwando Nsimba presented a categorisation of the parties of the Opposition according to three tendencies. These are split into those who were in favour of the President of the Republic’s appeal “for inclusiveness” and so to be part of the new majority with a minimal compromise on the Government’s programme (the case of the Kengo’s UFC, Makila’s ADT and Mbusa Nyamwisi’s RDC-KML, among others), those who demand consultations for a coalition government (UNC, MLC, DTP) and others who are not in favour of inclusiveness and who advocate a dialogue to put in place new institutions. In fact, in the first category there are the parties which seem to have accepted to simply adhere to the presidential Movement.

In the second category, there are those who, whilst still recognising the current institutions, place a republican dialogue aimed at reaching a consensus as a condition on the inclusiveness advocated by Jopseh Kabila. In the third category, there are the political parties which do not recognise the institutions of the Republic in any way, which support a complete fresh start and for whom the dialogue must instead generate new institutions. This is the camp of the UDPS and its allies.

The first category of the opposition outlined by Mwando Simba, that which has clearly crossed sides and responded to Joseph Kabila’s appeal by joining the majority, is therefore no longer part of the opposition.

At the end of the Informer’s mission, the RDCongo now finds itself in front of three cases: 1) a government entirely controlled by the Presidential Majority; 2) a government of national union led by a Prime Minister of the Opposition; 3) a Transition Government responsible for the organisation of new elections.

In the first case, the Presidential Majority forces itself into power and establishes an executive composed overwhelmingly of its affiliates and with a weak minority of opposition members who are ready to manage the ministerial purses without any conditions.

In the second case, the majority and the opposition share the ministerial purses equally, under the direction of a Prime Minster selected from the ranks of the Opposition. An extra-constitutional adjustment would be necessary to overcome the constitutional clause that obliges the elected Head of State to select the Head of the Government from within the parliamentary majority. The third hypothesis would consist in reassessing the institutional order that is being established on the base of the presidential and legislative election results of the 28 November 2011, for a new round of elections for the stakeholders to negotiate a solution to the post-electoral crisis of legitimacy.

28 March, in a press release read in the name of the opposition, Vital Kamerhe, of the UNC, evaluated the post-electoral situation. He repeatedly returned to the word ‘dialogue’, which is now being repeated by all Congolese politicians, by those in the majority as much as those in the opposition. For Vital Kamerhe, this frank, immediate and inclusive dialogue is not aimed at sharing the cake of power, but rather at national cohesion and the interests of the Congolese population. In particular he noted that “all responsible politicians must sit together courageously, in an extra-institutional setting, and must mark out the future through the a restructuring of the CENI, the fixing of a realistic calendar for the holding of provincial and local elections, the setting up of a constitutional court, the reform of the CSAC, and a social politics which deals with the poverty that is wearing down the Congolese people.”

The president of the UNC co-hosted this press conference with the General Secretary of the MLC, Thomas Luhaka, as well as the national president of the Labour Party Steve Mbikayi. More than 30 deputies of the opposition took part in this meeting. They reiterated their determination to continue to “resolve the Congolese crisis by focusing on dialogue and the republican consensus regarding the major issues, so that the Congolese people are the principal beneficiaries”. And they added that the opposition would consult among itself to reach a joint decision on who will represent them in this dialogue.

Despite a campaign in which he was closely involved, Kabila has come out of it weakened, heavily weakened because of the substantial frauds which marred the ballot of the 28 November last year. His legitimacy is weak to such an extent that each member of his political family, well aware of this (even whilst pretending to be otherwise), wants to acquire from him a maximum of concessions in terms of posts. All of the key political players are honing their weapons in order to see themselves be given the profitable post of prime minister or that of President of the National Assembly.

Joseph Kabila, having received the conclusions of the informer, Charles Mwando Nsimba, realised the insatiable appetites of his own party, the PPRD, which swears by the tandem Evariste Boshab – Aubin Minaku for the posts of Prime Minister and President of the National Assembly. Under the fallacious pretext of democratic coherence, the big-wigs of the PPRD keep repeating that it is healthy for a democracy for all the important posts to belong to the majority party, which happen to be the PPRD and its satellite parties (with about 150 seats in the Chamber). However, the presidential party forgets one thing, that the general elections of 2011 are not credible in the eyes of the national community, nor in the eyes of the international community, according to the different reports already published.

The first group to have opposed this political gluttony of the PPRD is the Palu, which spoke with the moral authority of the presidential majority of its own claim to occupy the Speaker’s chair of the National Assembly in exchange for role of Prime Minister

There is not only the Palu-PPRD squabble which is worrying Kabila. In ambush, the last-minute converts, the false opponents, regrouped for the most part under the flag of Léon Kengo, are also speaking of their claims to occupy the post of Prime Minister. In this group there is José Makila Sumanda, the former governor of Ecuador, Busa Nyamwisi, former minister of Kabila and president of the RCD-KML, Delly Sesanga, etc. Faced with this group, the PPRD and its allies are standing in their way, arguing that there is not a political crisis in the RD-Congo to justify any kind of political inclusiveness. The leaders of the presidential majority have shown the inopportunity of a government of national union on many occasions.

In the meantime, the ARC of Olivier Kamitatu and the MSR of Pierre Lumbi, two important parties of the Presidential Majority, are not lacking in ambitions. They also want to play a more important role in this new legislature than in the preceding one.

The elections have complicated the situation because of the frauds and irregularities. Joseph Kabila must try to maintain cohesion within his political family but also within the Congolese nation, all whilst maintaining governmental efficiency.

d) L’UDPS in difficulty

22 March, in a press release addressed to members of the UDPS who have been declared ‘elected national deputies’ by the CENI, the presidency of the party has invited each of them to tell them, in writing and within 72 hours, their personal decision as regards their participation or otherwise in the forum wrongly called the ‘National Assembly’. The presidency of the party is keen to point out that unless they receive a resignation letter from this much spoken of ‘National Assembly’, it will be obliged to consider this as a decision to participate in this forum and will draw the political consequences which arise from it. The press release ignores Timothée Kombo, the current president of the provisional bureau of the National Assembly, who is from now on considered “removed from the list of members of the UDPS”.

“You cannot reside in the Palace of the People at the same time as recognising the victory of the leader of the UDPS in the last presidential election”, pointed out Valentin Mubake, political advisor to Etienne Tshisekedi. In his view, it is unacceptable for deputies who have been elected under the UDPS banner to take a seat in the Chamber whilst their leader continues to challenge the results of the legislative elections he himself declared invalid.

6 April, the president of the RDC/N and president of the Support for Etienne Tshisekedi (SET) platform, Roger Lumbala, finally decided to take part in the plenaries of the National Assembly.

This deputy from the constituency of Mbuji-Mayi (Kasai-Oriental) explains that he is against refusing to sit in the Parliament, an ‘empty chair policy’, and that the vast majority of the opposition in the RDC is in favour of taking their places in it.

In Limete, at the residence of Etienne Tshisekedi, a list was put up of political figures of the Opposition, members of the ‘Forces acquises au changement’ platform, who were no longer able to approach the leader of the UDPS. Despite these political figures having whole-heartedly supported the candidature of Etienne Tshisekedi during the last presidential elections, the leadership of the UNDPS reproaches these nationally elected deputies for their participation in the work of the National Assembly. On the list of opposition members now branded persona non grata, appear the names of Roger Lumbala (Support for Etienne Tshisekedi – SET), Steve Mbikayi (Labour Party, PT), Martin Fayulu (Ecidé), Franck Diongo (Progressist Lumumbist Movement – MLP), Lisanga Bonganga (Moderator of the pro-Tshisekedi opposition), Olongo, known as Ndeko Basile (Support for Etienne Tshisekedi – SET). The list is not exhaustive. Only Eugène Diomi Ndongala who, despite his election to the constituency of Funa, in Kinshasa, refused to take his seat in the Palace of the People, has access to Tshisekedi.

After the 72-hour ultimatum given to the elected deputies of the UDPS to make their choice between sitting in the National Assembly or observing the line given by Etienne Tshisekedi, the party, according to Kahungu, its assistant general secretary, took the decision to expel all the recalcitrant members from its ranks. Already, besides Timothée Kombo, who had been expelled from the UDPS for having taken his seat and accepted the post of president of the provisional bureau of the National Assembly, two other important figures in the party have suffered the same fate. They are the deputies Remy Massamba and Samy Badibanga. Both are criticised in Limète for having met with Didier Reynders, the vice Prime Minister and Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs who recently visited the RDC. The accused deputies defend themselves today by stating that “empty chair politics has never worked”, and arguing that their “participation in the work of the National Assembly only aims at re-establishing the truth of the polls, at guaranteeing the right consequences of the aftermath of the electoral process, and at obtaining the unconditional resignation of the bureau of the Independent National Electoral Commission as well as a complete restructuring of this body.” According to many sources, of the 42 deputies elected on the list of the UDPS, 40 are sitting in the Palace of the People. Only Félix Tshisekedi and Mulumba, the son of the leader of the UDPS and sister of Etienne Tshisekedi respectively, have boycotted the work of the National Assembly, despite their mandates having been validated.

The first of the RDC’s opposition parties, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), has openly declared the divisions among its “participationists” who have decided to take their seats within the National Assembly regardless, and its “hard-liners”, limited to those close to the president of the party, Etienne Tshisekedi, self-proclaimed president of the Republic, rejecting the official election results.

Within the party, the most intransigent are precisely those who were not elected and who therefore have nothing to lose, as well as the members of the immediate family of the old leader who is increasingly isolated in waging his last battle.

e) Towards a monolithic Assembly?

It was known that there was a definite majority at the end of the legislative elections of 28 November 2011. But after Mwando Nsimba’s consultations, and without saying it openly, there is now a ‘new parliamentary majority’.

If it is true that the Opposition parties are free to adhere to the New Parliamentary Majority, the dismissal of opposition members marks a hard blow to the Parliament. There is the risk of having a monolithic Chamber, which would only be a sounding box for the political family in power.

The danger is that there is the risk of a monochrome National Assembly, dominated from top to bottom by parties claiming to be in the Majority. If the parties, until then identified as being part of the Opposition, join the ranks of the Parliamentary Majority, the National Assembly does indeed promise to be monolithic. There will eventually be a National Assembly which only speaks with one voice, where one single political ideology prevails, that of the majority.

And this is the great danger which is threatening the young Congolese democracy. It is the whole democracy which would suffer from the shock. The people included. There would thus be a weakened, fragile opposition, unable to act as a counterbalance, as a real opposition. From this moment, there would be no more conflicting debates. And thus no effectiveness. Short of an exceptional flash of pride – which is by no means evident. One can already begin to guess the development of the political process.

The same danger can affect the composition of the team of the National Executive itself. In effect, there is talk in the MP of a government of inclusiveness (not of national union), which would allow entry to some handpicked and entirely individual elements of the opposition. According to certain sources, some ineffectual, trapped ministers will be distributed among certain figures of the opposition to give a certain image for both national and international audiences, before demanding their resignation or revocation in the light of poor results regarding their objectives. For Jean-Claude Vuemba, elected deputy for Kasangulu, an inclusive Government advocated by the political class, “is a trap for the opposition set by Joseph Kabila”.

2. FEEDBACK ON THE ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 2011

20 March, The United Nations Human Rights Committee (BCNUDH) published a report, according to which at least thirty-three people were killed, of which 22 by bullets, eighty-three injured, of which 61 by bullets, and sixteen gone missing during the electoral period between the 26 November and 25 December 2011. This report notes that the perpetrators of these human rights violations were members of the Republican Guard (GR), the National Information Agency (ANR), the National Congolese Police (PNC) and its special units such as the National Legion of Intervention (LENI), the brigade of criminal investigations, and the Mobile Group of Intervention (GMI). The United Nations also deplore the violations committed “in the slightest way”, by “soldiers of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).

The United Nations investigators have also documented the arrest of at least 265 civilians, “of which the majority are said to have been detained illegally and or arbitrarily, for the most part because of their affiliation, real or presumed, to an opposition party or because of their living in the home province of the candidate Etienne Tshisekedi, or in provinces in which he enjoyed significant support.”

Monusco (The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo) and the United Nations Joint Committee recommend the Congolese authorities to launch a judicial investigation and say they are ready to give their support to bring the people involved in these violations of justice.

The government contests all these figures because of a lack of proof and brands the report “incoherent, spurious, exaggerated and partisan”. The Minister for Justice, Luzolo Bambi, indicated that the National Congolese Police (PNC) “registered 20 deaths” and asked the BCNUDH “to justify the difference” between the two figures “with credible and corroborated evidence”.

29 March, The European Union’s Electoral Observation Mission (MOE-UE) published its final report on the presidential and legislative elections of the 29 November.

The mission “considers the results published by the National Independent Electoral Committee (Céni) to not be credible in the light of the numerous irregularities and frauds noticed during the electoral process”.

The Observation Mission of the EU especially cites the absence of an audit of the electoral roll, the “lack of transparency” during the clean-up of this roll, the voting of 3.2 million voters (17% of voters) on the mere presentation of the polling card, the “multiple cases of fraud and the ballot stuffing”, the lack of transparency in the procedures for compiling results, and also the publication of results which was “characterised by a deep lack of transparency”.

The mission regrets that “the legal framework for the election was not adhered to in its entirety”, meaning the legal delays for the publishing of the list of voters and their display by polling station, the banning of propaganda on public buildings, the participation of functionaries in the campaign and the use of State resources for the campaign. The mission “emphasises that neither the Ceni, nor the prosecution initiated any moves to prevent these violations of the law”, despite this last point being punished by the expulsion of the candidature of the person responsible.

It also mentioned the numerous difficulties arising as a result of insufficient infrastructure and a very tight calendar. Such a case is the delayed communication of the electoral cartography to the political parties, as well as the detailed list of polling stations.

A chapter of the report is devoted to the analysis of the results of the presidential election in Katanga (South-East), Kabila’s stronghold where he obtained nearly 90% of the vote, and the Bandundu (West) where he leapt from 39.4% in 2006 to 73.4% in 2011, thus achieving “dazzling advances that rational political analysis has some difficulties in explaining”.

If the division of the opposition has been given as an explanation for the official fail of Tshisekedi, “one is obliged to note that the addition of the scores attributed by the Ceni to the three main opposition candidates (32.3% + 7.7% + 4.9%, so 44.9%), do not allow such a conclusion to be drawn.

The recommendations of the MOE-UE are:

For the President of the Republic:

• The publication of the organic law regarding organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court

• The implementation of an independent Constitutional Court, responsible for the resolution of electoral contentions and for the proclamation of the definitive election results. Its role is currently devolved to the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), whose independence has often been questioned.

For the Ceni :

• The audit of the electoral roll by an independent body, to guarantee its transparency and credibility.

• The revision of the electoral roll, with a view to its correction (suppression of double entries) and its updating.

• The respect of delays in publication and display of electoral lists and the cartography of polling stations, during the next election days, in order to avoid contested results.

• The simplification of the ballot paper for the legislative elections, and the abolition of those omitted

• The display of results on the level of the BVs. Distribution of copies to party delegates, candidates and national observers.

• The systematic uploading of digitized copies of the PVs of results of each polling station, with a view to securing the transparency of the ballot.

For the Parliament:

• The restructuring of the CENI, in order to make it truly impartial, to guarantee a good representation of Civil Society, to take the new political reality into consideration, and to contribute to “its transparency, its independence and its reliability”.

• The adoption of an organic law clearly distinguishing the domains of the Ministry of Communication and the Superior Audio-visual and Communication Council (CSAC).

• The enforcement of the law regarding the financing of parties and the adoption of a law regarding campaign spending.

• The reinforcement of the freedom of public demonstration

• The reinforcement of powers of sanctions against campaigning outside of the legal period, the use of State resources, the attacks on public freedoms during the election campaign and all irregularities in the voting and vote counting operations.

• The introduction, in the electoral law, of certain clauses by which the CENI should announce partial results only if they are the result of a provisional compilation of results in the PV of the CLCRs that have already been announced in accordance with the law.

For the judiciary:

• The pursuit of those responsible for the violations of human rights committed during the election campaign, during and after the ballots, especially by the forces of public order, in order to make progress in zero tolerance politics and to reinforce the fight against impunity.

“A large task is now awaiting the Congolese authorities and civil society in order to improve the election process to guarantee the transparency and reliability of the Congolese democracy”, declared the Bulgarian deputy Mariya Nedelcheva, head of the MOE-UE, during the presentation of the report.

30 March, the League of Electors (LE), with the support of the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), published a report which considers the presidential and legislative elections of the 28 November 2011.

Sylvian Lumu Mbaya, executive secretary of the LE, declared that “the electoral process of the 28 November was characterised by violence, insecurity, attacks on the freedoms of expression and of association, frauds, ballot stuffing, cheating, falsification of statements, bribing, intimidation, many violations which affected the free choice of voters and prevented any credible validation of the results.”

This report also provides about forty recommendations that the LE hopes will be implemented for the organisation of the next elections and especially the provincial and local ballots, the date for which still remains to be fixed.

The League of Electors recommends

The Government of the Republic, to:

• Guarantee the security of individuals and the protection of those who defend human rights

• Take the necessary measures to bring those responsible for the violence during the electoral process to justice

• Respect the freedoms of association, expression and assembly

• Call on the Head of State to enact a law regarding the establishment of the Constitutional Court

• Organise a general census of the population before continuing with the future voting operations

• Cut down the financing of the elections to the State’s budget and make the necessary funds available from the first year of the legislature.

The Parliament, to:

• Take the initiative in revising the constitution, as regards particularly the election of the president of the Republic with an absolute majority of votes cast and, if need be, a second round if this majority is not clear.

• Initiate the revision of the Electoral Law in particular to allow voters to play a role in the contesting of candidates and/or the results before or after their announcement

• Initiate without delay debates on the structuring of CENI as regards the evolution of the political space and the failings of the current bureau, also envisaging the involvement of independent civil society in its composition, with a view to arriving at a real balance of power relations and the conciliation of the divergences between Majority and Opposition.

• Only adopt a law on the distribution of seats after assuring the electoral roll has been updated.

The National Independent Electoral Commission, to:

• Learn the lessons of serious irregularities observed during the preparation, organisation and holding of the ballots of the 28 November 2011 and resign.

The future body organising elections, to

• Accept access to the central server as well as the audit of the electoral roll prior to continuing the process

• Initiate the revision of articles 10 and 12 of the Organic Law n°10/013 of 28 July 2011 regarding the organisation and functioning of the CENI.

• Ensure the electoral law is respected and observed in all phases of the electoral operations.

• Make the electoral kits available and ensure their maintenance, in order to avoid recurring break downs during the voting operations.

• Make the revision of the electoral roll an ordinary and permanent activity.

• Propose a new map of voter registration centres, centres and polling stations in order to reduce distances to them.

“This report is both an account and a roadmap which must allow lessons to be learnt from past elections and future ballots to be successful, so that elections in the DRC will no longer be a moment of tension, but an opportunity to build democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights in the DRC” declared Souhayr Belhassen, president of the FIDH.

The member organisations of the Coalition for Civil Congolese Society, say they are worried by the deficient role played by the leadership of the bureau of the CENI in the organisation of the elections of 28th November 2011, marred by many irregularities, such as:

• The tampering with of election lists

• The lack of transparency in the compilation of results

• The refusing to audit the central server

• The absence of contradictory statements in the majority of polling booths

• The intentional relocation of certain polling booths

• The unexplained loss of sensitive electoral material (ballot papers and statements), etc

As a result, they demand unconditionally:

1) The immediate resignation of the office of the CENI

2) The audit of the CENI by an external organisation

3) The revision of the law regarding the organisation and functioning of the CENI

4) The restructuring of its bureau and the imperative integration of the Civil Society in this.

All the reports of the Electoral Observation Missions all in the end reach the same conclusions: the presidential elections of 28/11/11, organised in unlikely conditions, have given results that, in reality, are still unknown. And it is certain that the most important frauds took place on the level of the compilation centres. The “truth of the polls”, however, could still have been deduced by referring to the statements of the polling booths, the last operation that was public and verified by witnesses.

But the figures published by the CENI would not fit with these statements and their credibility is null. The figures published by the UDPS would not fit with these statements and their credibility is null.

The Church has never published the results its observers noted, because they were partial.

The legislative elections took place in the same conditions as the presidential ones, if not worse.

The CSJ has however ratified the results of the presidential elections and is in the process of doing so even with the disagreements over the legislative ones. Its credibility is null.

Time has passed, tropical rain has fallen on the ballots abandoned in the open, and there has been a fire at the CENI. All that one can say is that the results of the elections will remain forever unknown. All claimed authority now only arises from force, intimidation… In fact, it stems from a coup d’Etat – a civil one.

One can note the great sobriety of the means of the civil ‘Coup d’Etat’ in comparison with its military equivalent. There is no question of entire regiments. It was enough to have control of a reduced group, comprised of only about thirty people: the CENI and the CSJ. Controlling the CSJ was child’s play, since it’s the President which names its members.

As far as the CENI is concerned, the trick consisted in politicising it from top to bottom in its composition, which is 3 members selected by the opposition and 4 by the majority. From then on, it could only ever be dominated by the presidential, majority, camp.

The voting in only one round was also approved without question by a docile parliamentary majority.

The shambles after the vote thus guaranteed, it was enough to use the two small organs of the CENI and the CSJ to “cut out” of the unknown results a supposed custom-built “victory”. The job was in the bag. The coup had already taken place when the armoured vehicles were brought out to “maintain order”.

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This English translation has been carried out within the initiative PerMondo (free document and website translations for non-profit-making organisations). It was managed by Mondo Agit and the translator Zosia Krasodomska-Jones

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