Summary

EDITORIAL: When reconciliation moves become abusive

1. NEWS

2. THE TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND M23 IN KAMPALA

3. A QUESTION OF VIEWPOINTS

4. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR COMBATTING ARMED GROUPS

EDITORIAL: WHEN RECONCILIATION MOVES BECOME ABUSIVE

Evaluation of an Agreement.

On 6^th February, delegates from the Congolese government and 23 March Movement (M23) considered and adopted an evaluation report of the 2009 Goma peace agreement, according to a press release issued by the dialogue facilitator for the two delegations. The agreement was originally signed by Kinshasa and then the politico-military movement National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) on 23^rd March 2009. The release states that, of the 35 provisions in the Goma agreement, 15 have been fully implemented by the government, while eight have been partially implemented, and twelve either poorly implemented or not handled at all. The release is too short (one half page) to include the contents of this evaluation, the different parties’ responsibilities or the proposals made for completing the implementation of the 2009 agreement.

The dialogue facilitator, Ugandan defence minister Crispus Kiyonga, declared the signing of this document to be an important first step towards continuing negotiations. He stated that “the talks are going ahead with a mindset of reconciliation”, and that “the leaders of the two parties are committed to pursuing them”. Already, the dialogue facilitator has let slip, consciously or not, the fateful word “reconciliation”. It is a positive word but, in the context in which it was used, could have very dangerous consequences for DR Congo.

The Context

On 9 February, in an interview with radio station Voice of America, M23’s military leader Sultani Makenga stated that, for M23, a positive outcome from the Kampala talks would see the creation of its own political party. If this were to happen, then a politico-military movement appearing on the UN Sanctions Committee list could see itself magically transformed into a legally recognised political party.

In a letter dated 11 January and addressed to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Ugandan president Yoweri Kaguta Museveni wrote that “to resolve the problems in the east of DR Congo, there are three essential points that have to be taken into consideration: 1) the respect of Tutsi Banyaruandas’ right to Congolese nationality, 2) resolving the issue of negative forces which continue to use DR Congo as a platform to destabilise neighbouring countries, 3) making the pursuit of peace a priority over demands for justice”. It is undoubtedly this letter which blocked and then postponed the signing of a peace agreement in the east of DR Congo, originally planned for 24^th January at Addis-Abeba, during an African Union summit which the secretary general had been attending. The agreement also envisages the deployment of a neutral international force to combat and disarm all the armed groups active in the east of DR Congo, including M23.

One of the real reasons for putting back the signing of the agreement appears in an interview given by the former vice-president of the Rwandan Senate Prosper Higiro, to the French weekly Jeune Afrique on 31^st January. Higiro stated that, if an agreement were reached in Kampala before the neutral international force was deployed, then the force would not combat M23 as it would no longer be considered a negative force. Instead, the force would only tackle the other armed groups (FDLR, LRA and Mai-Mai).

The Consequences of the Evaluation.

Some members of the M23 delegation were quick to declare the Congolese government’s commitment to continuing talks a sign that it no longer thinks of M23 as a terrorist group. As if by magic, having taken up arms to defend its privileges and forced 500 000 people into exile, M23 has the audacity to claim to be a privileged partner of the government, working to end the war of which it is itself one of the main perpetrators. Classed as a negative force by the ICGLR, AU and UN, M23 is now putting itself forward as a positive force the government can count on to disarm and repatriate the foreign negative forces (FDLR, ADF-Nalu, LRA and FNL) and fight the armed national groups (Mai-Mai).

M23 also demands political integration at both provincial and national levels. It is therefore not inconceivable that, if the group were to be recognised as a political party, they would then call for a central government reshuffle and the granting of a ministerial position; that of defence, for example. And who would be the new minister? M23’s current political leader Jean-Marie Runiga perhaps, object of UN sanctions that have seen a freeze on his assets and ban on foreign travel.

M23 demands an amnesty on acts of war and insurrections committed since 7^th May 2009. As is known, until now there has never been a “declaration of war”, nor a “popular insurrection”. M23 is made up of solders who have deserted the national army to defend their military, economic and commercial interests with weapons stolen from the state. As a result, they should be arrested and prosecuted in accordance with the law. To give them a fresh amnesty would be to reinforce the practice of impunity. To reintegrate them with the army, giving them positions of responsibility, still in the name of “reconciliation”, would be to betray the expectations of the people and pave the way for future conflicts. On the other hand, who would be the head of state and major-general of the Congolese army? General Bosco Ntaganda perhaps, wanted by the International Criminal Court. And who would be the new head of state and major-general of the military region of North Kivu? Maybe General Sultans Makenga, the object of UN Security Council sanctions.

Use of the Word “Reconciliation” is Inappropriate and Abusive.

In this context, the use of the word “reconciliation” is inappropriate, abusive, dangerous and illegitimate. The Congolese government delegation in Kampala cannot allow itself to make the slightest mistake or it will jeopardise the future of the nation.

1. NEWS

On 3^rd February the formation of a new coalition of around twelve armed groups was announced in a letter made public in Kinshasa. The coalition, which is based in Bukavu, capital of South Kivu in the east of DR Congo, aims to overturn the regime of President Joseph Kabila. The president was re-elected at the end of 2011 in elections whose results were contested. The Union of Revolutionary Forces of Congo (UFRC) defines itself as a “politico-military” movement, and first announced its formation in mid-January with a letter sent to the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon. In the letter dated 25^th January, the president of the coalition coordinating committee, Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, calls for the departure of President Kabila. He also calls for the creation of “national organs of transition”, the holding of “democratic elections” and lastly “reform of the defence and security system”. He also calls for “judicial proceedings (…) for high treason against Joseph Kabila”, who is accused of cheating during the elections fought on 28^th November 2011.

The UFRC promises to “immediately take over the running of” the province of South Kivu, “pending the effective resignation of the current regime”. The UFRC said they support, without further precision, “the cancellation of the sending of an outside force, however neutral it is, to ensure peace in the region”. The coalition is headed by Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, National Assembly candidate n° 154 for Bukavu in the November 2011 legislative elections. He, like so many hundreds of other candidates, was unsuccessful. However, he is the president of the Association for the Defence of the Interests of the city of Bukavu (ADIB). Should we conclude then that it is by taking up arms that he intends to defend the Bukavu’s interests? Or does he belong to that group of unscrupulous politicos who, in an attempt to justify their criminal undertakings, always found their claims on badly organised elections? Gustave Bagayamukwe was arrested by police on 10^th February at around 5am in Unvira. He was taken straight to Bukavu, capital of South-Kivu, where he was then transferred to Kinshasa.[1]

On 5^th February the heads of five armed groups operating in Masisi (North-Kivu) signed a non-aggression pact to put an end to ethnic conflicts in the province. The signatories of this non-aggression pact were: Forces pour la défense des droits humains (FDDH/ Nyatura), Mouvement d’action pour le changement (Mac), Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), Raia Mutomboki, and a branch of FARDC deserters. After signing this agreement, these militiamen put in place a coalition called the Alliance of Patriots against the Balkanisation of Congo (APCBCO). This aims to put an end to the war between the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo ethnic groups and the Hutu populations in the Masisi region. The APCBCO is led by Janvier Kalahiri, head of the APCLS. He is aided by Bwira, leader of Raia Mutomboki, and Kapoki, head of Nyatura. The provincial government of North Kivu and community leaders have welcomed this initiative and say they expect it to be successful and long-lasting.[2]

2. the Talks between the government and m23 IN Kampala

On 30^th January the delicate matter of the agenda was again the subject of a power struggle between Kinshasa and M23. Essentially, it always comes down to the same division: on one side the rebels, who want to tackle all political subjects, and on the other the government, who are avoiding becoming embroiled in this debate. From the government’s point of view, they have achieved what they set out to do (considering the 23^rd March 2009 Agreement); the rest should now be discussed in the country. M23 does not share that opinion. The Ugandan mediation has proposed splitting into two commissions to continue the negotiations: two joint commissions who would each work with an equal number of representatives from M23 and Kinshasa. One would work on questions surrounding security, the other on political, economic and social issues. But for Kinshasa, this is out of the question. For them, such an act would be tantamount to organising a debate on DR Congo’s politics overall. They believe the main focus should be on outlining the reasons M23 took up arms and working out ways to put an end to the rebellion, as well as establishing sustainable peace in North Kivu. The joint commission approach, which will be new for anyone who has been following the discussions closely, is a way for the facilitator to respond positively to those in M23 who have no intention of dropping their determination to challenge everything to do with Kinshasa. The Ugandan mediation will have to find a compromise between the two parties.[3]

M23 also handed the facilitators a document relating to the second item on the agenda, to do with security matters. In this document, signed in Kampala on 27^th January 2013 by François Ruchogoza, M23’s executive secretary and leader of the rebel delegation, M23 says it wants to combat negative forces alongside the government and the Congolese army. The group, which is itself classed as a negative force by the ICGLR, AU and UN, therefore absolves itself of responsibility and places itself above the other opposition groups. To restore security in DRC, M23 proposes the creation of a National Security and Intelligence Office (SNSR), which would merge the ANR and the DGM, and its integration into FARDC. Regarding the army and police, M23 calls for formal recognition of its military grades. It also calls for its integration at the heart of regional army headquarters and the creation of autonomous brigades. The group wants to fight side-by-side with FARDC, with a view to eradicating and repatriating the negative forces FDLR, ADF-NALU, LRA, FNL, and national armed groups. It demands that the logistics are dealt with by the government. To this effect, it wants the creation of a Joint Intelligence Team with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, which would be limited to the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Orientale, and to North Katanga. According to several sources, the government delegation has already rejected this document and will only keep a few points from it.[4]

4 February Discussions began on the third and penultimate item on the agenda, relating to political, social and economic matters.

Delegates from M23 presented their grievances on the violation of the constitution and proposed the voiding of the election held on 28^th November 2011, the dissolution of the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies, and the setting up of a Congolese National Transitional Council (transitional government). They also proposed the creation of an Independent Human Rights Commission and of a minister in charge reconciliation matters, and the passing of a law to crack down on xenophobia and assure the protection of minorities. They recommended an amnesty law for acts of war and insurrection committed since 7^th May 2009. In addition, M23 proposed the revocation of the Ordonnance-loi banning the illegal mining and fraudulent export of precious substances in the east of DRC, and the creation of a Joint Special Commission which would swiftly begin the process of integrating DRC into the East African Community (EAC) and put in place a pact for peace, security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region. Finally, the group proposed the creation of a Reconstruction and Development Programme, which could facilitate favourable security and socio-economic conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and those displaced within the country, and the full and prompt reinstatement of the honourable Roger Lumbala as an MP.

The Kinshasa government delegation met in the evening to consider and respond to these proposals.[5]

On 5^th February Government delegates declared the majority of the work to have been accomplished, and stated that the number of delegates should be reduced from thirty to twelve each for the government and M23. “What remains to be done is technical work and a group of experts will stay for that”, stated Konde Vila Kikanda, MP for North Kivu. “It is up to the Ugandan mediator to draw up the report”, said another MP, Oscar Nasamane, “The Rebels have put forward their demands and proposals; the government has responded. Now the facilitator will have to weigh up the point of view of both the rebels and the government and draw his conclusions”. But for M23, this reduction in the number of delegates “should be decided by both parties around a table”. Since the negotiations had stalled and were now at a standstill, Kinshasa made the decision to recall their political representatives, leaving only a few experts to continue work in committees and discussions with the M23 delegates. Other reasons could also explain the Congolese government’s latest decision. From a practical point of view, it is Kinshasa who has been in charge of everything in Kampala, including looking after the M23 delegates.[6]

6^th February. According to a press release from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Congolese government and M23 considered and adopted an evaluation report of the peace agreement signed on 23^rd March 2009 by Kinshasa and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). The two parties, the ICGLR release continues, expressed their thoughts on the implementation of this agreement, article by article.

The facilitator, Uganda’s defence minister Cripsus Kiyonga, organised the agreement’s provisions into three categories. These were provisions fully implemented, provisions partially implemented and provisions which had not been dealt with at all.

Mr Kiyonga found that of the thirty-five points in the Goma agreement, the government had fully implemented fifteen. He cited, for example, the integration of ex-CNDP soldiers at the heart of FARDC, the transformation of the CNDP, formerly a politico-military movement, into a political party, and the creation of local, permanent arbitration committees. Eight of the agreement’s points had been partially implemented, and twelve had never been implemented. Amongst these, the facilitator named the failure to create a local police force or to return refugees to their homeland.  The ICGLR press release makes clear that the two parties recognised the continuing relevance of the 23^rd March 2009 agreement. The two delegations therefore recommended the putting in place of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

According to the honourable Mashako Mamba, former director of the humanitarian section of the now defunct Amani programme, endless wars brought about by the same people had not allowed the implementation of the whole Goma agreement. The Ugandan defence minister Crispus Kiyonga stated his optimism, saying that this initial signing was an important step for the rest of the negotiations. “These talks are going ahead with a mindset of reconciliation”, he said, adding that “the leaders of the two parties are committed to their continuation”. In the days and weeks to come, the two delegations will have to confront each other over political, social and security issues, and the economy. And that is the Achilles’ heel in the talks. Speaking for Kinshasa, Senator Mulaila said “We are not going to react positively to claims which disregard the Constitution”.[7]

In the document signed in Kampala at the end of last week, several elements indicated that some points will be difficult to apply. Take, for example, the integration of M23 soldiers into the regular army. According to the text, all the rebel soldiers should be integrated into the national army then redeployed over the whole of the country. This point has been the main block on agreements since 2009: the rebels refuse to leave Kivu, where they claim to be defending their threatened (Tutsi) community. Another stumbling block has been the rebel leaders. The Congolese authorities propose simply to arrest those commanders who are sought by national or international warrants. This is a solution which would certainly resolve the problem of returning the chief rebels to the army, but which would doubtless be rejected by the parties involved. It is difficult to imagine Bosco Ntaganda, Sultani Makenga, Innocent Zimurinda or Baudouin Ngaruye handing themselves over to be judged by the Congolese courts. It therefore seems unlikely that the negotiations in Kampala can reach an agreement which will be satisfactory for everyone. At best, the two parties will sign a mini-agreement in Kampala without any substance, which will be buried with the breakout of the country’s next military conflict. At worst, nothing will be signed and the weapons will soon do the talking around Goma; M23 is positioned just a few kilometres from the centre of North Kivu’s capital, ready to take the city again.[8]

The African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO) says it is concerned by the announcement of an eventual reconciliation between M23 and the DR Congo government.
Although emphasising that no one would oppose a Congolese reconciliation, ASADHO believes that all the M23 rebels and soldiers from the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) who are guilty of serious human rights violations (international crimes, assassinations, murders, summary executions, rape of women and young girls, looting of public and private property etc) before, during and after the capture of the city of Goma on 20^th November 2012, should answer for their actions before the courts.
For ASADHO, reconciliation should not mean impunity for people guilty of serious human rights violations. The association therefore recommends that the DR Congo government abstain from any engagement with M23 which would grant impunity for all those implicated in violation of human rights, before, during and after the capture of the Goma by M23 rebels. The NGO calls on the International Criminal Court to open investigations into the international crimes committed in the east of DR Congo.[9]

3. a QUESTION OF VIEWPOINTS

Speaking about the security situation in the eastern part of DR Congo in an interview printed in the French weekly Jeune Afrique, the secretary general of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Parliamentary Forum (ICGLR-PF) and former vice-president of the Rwandan Senate, Prosper Higiro, argues in favour of “strengthened cooperation” to better manage the present consequences of how borders were drawn in 1886.

According to Mr Higiro, the two current approaches (the discussions in Kampala, and the current dynamic in the African Union and the United Nations, who plan to deploy a neutral international force – or an intervention brigade – to track all the armed groups in Kivu, including M23) are not in fact contradictory, but complementary. The neutral international force will attack not only M23 rebels but also other armed groups judged to be negative forces. So if an agreement can be reached in Kampala before the deployment of this force, it will no longer be necessary for it to target M23. In this case, the neutral force would track only the other armed groups. We can presume that the two delegations representing the Congolese government and M23 will seek to finalise an agreement before the deployment of the international neutral force.

In order to resolve this recurrent crisis in the Great Lakes region, we must reflect on the deep causes of the region’s security situation. We should look for the causes in historical factors linked to the drawing up of borders, but also the area’s governance. Colonisation has left the region with some problematic situations.

That is not to say that we will need go back to Berlin to redraw the borders, but today we do need to manage the consequences of how they were drawn. In other words, we have to seriously take care of the areas where we find the same populations on both sides of the border. Strengthened cooperation is therefore needed between the countries concerned to be able to manage the risks and eventual consequences left by these historical factors. [10]

In a letter dated 11^th January 2013 and addressed to the UN secretary general, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, writes “With regard to the set of proposals you sent to me in December 2012 for building peace and security in DRC and the Great Lakes Region, I agree with the proposals you have made concerning the principles of commitment and obligation, which should be followed by the RDC government, the Great Lakes Region and the international community.

“However, there are three important issues, in my opinion, which could be integrated into the proposals if we want to resolve the problem of DRC in the long term.

1.         “Rights of citizenship for certain Congolese ethnic groups should be respected and guaranteed. To do otherwise would be to say that these groups will continue to fight intermittently for recognition of their rights as DRC citizens. Under Mobutu, some Tutsi groups were declared non-Congolese. The present government (President Joseph Kabila) has not reiterated President Mobutu’s position on the non-Congolese citizenship of the Banyarwanda. Nevertheless the Congolese Banyarwanda complain of hate campaigns tolerated by the government. This should be discussed and resolved.

2.         “The question of negative forces who continue to use DRC territory as a refuge to destabilise its neighbours.

3.         “The unbalanced use and application of criminal justice institutions and their powers, particularly the International Criminal Court and the UN sanctions regime. Although tackling impunity is acceptable and the ideal, the search for peace should take priority over justice, and should be applied to all parties in equal measure.

“Consequently within the framework of work proposed, the issues highlighted above in points (1) and (2) should be included as DRC obligations, and point (3) should be added to the obligations of the international community.”

The opinion held by the population seems to be altogether very different.

In Bukavu, South Kivu, the war hasn’t stopped the everyday to-ings and fro-ings between the two countries. For many Congolese, their Rwandan neighbours are brothers.

The border between Rwanda and DR Congo, close to Bukavu, stayed open while M23 threatened to take the South Kivu capital, as well as throughout the rebel group’s occupation of Goma. The exchanges between the two countries continued as normal. “In any case, we have no problems with Rwandans as people, they are our brothers, our neighbours”, explains one Congolese teacher who works in Rwanda and still travels there every day. “If there are some Rwandans who want our country, then that’s no reason to generalise about all the others”, agrees Guy-Noël, humanitarian and resident of Bukavu. Their thoughts are echoed by another young man, crossing the border with his friends to go for a drink at La Petite Colline in Kamembe on the Rwandan side. “We are and will remain eternal neighbours,” he says. “Just as there are Rwandans who work here, our compatriots live and work in Rwanda. So it would be pointless to view us with suspicion. This isn’t a problem between two peoples, but between politicians who are writing their legacies”

This does not stop the people of Bukavu from holding opinions on the M23 rebels, fearing their actions to be no different to those of Laurent Nkunda’s troops when they invaded the city in June 2004. The Congolese fear the armed group, as they have suffered the effects of war many times, and do not want any more. “The problem with M23 is they took up arms,” another Bukavu teacher tells us. “We teachers are very unhappy, ignored for years, so should we also take up arms to make ourselves heard? We don’t want any more war.”

Sitting astride his motorbike, Sylvestre, a biker from Gisenyi (Rwanda), exclaims “I think that the situation is political, we mere citizens aren’t anything to do with it. The politicians should leave us be.” Among his most loyal customers are many Congolese who regularly commute between the two countries. “The tendency of the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities is to defend and favour one community, that’s what I hate the most about them”, says one young student.

“When you look at how people live, no one can know that Rwandan and Congolese politics are so different”, says Musa Nzamu, a Congolese student at the University of the Free Land of the Great Lakes (ULPGL) in Goma. She has crossed Rwanda without any difficulty to go home to Uvira in South Kivu.[11]

There is a question that observers of life in the DR Congo often ask themselves: “Why do all of Congo’s large-scale wars begin in the east of the country?”

1.         According to the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the former advisor to the American Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Herman Cohen, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a vast country, rich in natural resources and with a low population density. By contrast, Rwanda is small, poor in natural resources and with a high population density. To resolve its problems of space and resource shortages, Rwanda has adopted an expansionist policy towards Congo and a military and demographic occupation strategy for the two Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu. The war exists to chase the native population from their land and progressively replace them with the Rwandan population surplus. Under the pretext of fighting the “genocidal Hutu” who fled to Congo in 1994 and who would threaten the survival of the “Banyarunada Tutsis”, Rwanda continually creates “so-called Congolese rebellions”, which have a declared objective of defending the Tutsi population, but also a hidden aim of infiltrating Congolese soldiers and civilian Rwandan populations into Congolese territory. The tactic of triggering war to force the government to negotiate then serves to infiltrate the national army, security services and political institutions of DR Congo, with the aim of weakening the country and taking over control.

2.         Although Rwanda and Uganda play a prominent role in Congo’s destabilisation, the two countries are only pawns in the hands of the great western powers and multinational companies after the minerals and oil so rich in Congo’s soil. Despite OECD directives and the American Dodd-Frank Act, there is no longer any shared international legislation on the trading of minerals and as a result, in the east of Congo the exploitation of natural resources is controlled by a Mafia network. This network is made up of merchants, brokers, politicians and soldiers who use contraband minerals to evade tax, smuggling them via neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

3. If the DR Congo wants to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, then it should not negotiate with M23, last link in the chain of the country’s destabilisation. Instead, they should deal directly with western countries, notably the United States and Great Britain, so that they can:

a.         exert their influence on Rwanda and Uganda, to prevent the two countries involving themselves in the political and economic life of DR Congo and destabilising the east of the country by creating and supporting armed groups in the east of Congo, including M23.

b.         promote international legislation on the traceability of minerals, in order to prevent western multinationals indulging in the illegal trade of Congolese minerals, source of armed conflicts in DR Congo.

4. AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR COMBATTING ARMED GROUPS

30^th January. During the weekly UN conference in Kinshasa, the spokesperson for MONUSCO, Lt. Col. Felix Bass, stated that the rapid intervention force to be deployed in the east of DRC, would not be drawn from troops involved in the UN mission in DRC (MONUSCO). According to Lt. Col. Bass this force, which is an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiative, would be composed of elements taken from a SADC brigade.

The officer explained that this force would be made up of two thousand five hundred men, of which some would come from a “SADC standby brigade”, which was already “prepositioned”, he said. He added that Tanzania and South Africa were also committed to contributing to the intervention force. However Lt. Col. Bass indicated that a battalion of South African blue berets from MONUSCO would be attached to this force.

“As usual, MONUSCO will be present on the sidelines and could integrate its forces [into the intervention force] once the framework agreement, which should have been signed at Addis-Abeba, has been signed”, he said. The signing of this peace agreement for the east of DRC, meant to have taken place last 24^th January at Addis-Abeba, on the fringes of the African Union summit, had been postponed following a disagreement between the heads of state in the sub region on the composition of this rapid intervention force.[12]

6^th February. At the close of a UN Security Council meeting in New York, the deputy secretary general responsible for peace-keeping operations, Hervé Ladsous, expressed his hope that the framework peace agreement for the east of DRC would be signed in the next few weeks. This agreement, which should have been signed last 24^th January at Addis-Abeba, envisages that the countries in the region will each be held to respecting the sovereignty of its neighbours and to strengthening regional cooperation with a view to resolving the security issues. It also forbids these countries from supporting armed groups and orders the end be brought to the granting of impunity for war criminals.

For Hervé Ladsous “such an agreement would clarify DRC’s commitments with a view to reforming the security sector and the army, and reaffirming the State’s authority in the eastern provinces”.

Initially negotiated by eight states: DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, South Africa and Tanzania, the framework agreement should now be signed at the end of February by eleven countries. The Central African Republic, Zambia, and South Sudan are also due to sign. Assuming the agreement goes ahead, Hervé Ladsous has again evoked the idea of a the creation of an international brigade at the heart of MONUSCO to join the neutral international force responsible for imposing peace in the two Kivus. This brigade would be made up of 2500 men responsible for combating armed groups in the east of DR Congo.[13]

8 February At the close of an extraordinary summit in Maputo (Mozambique) attended by the Congolese president Joseph Kabila, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) approved the sending of a peace-keeping force to DR Congo, authorised to combat armed groups in the east of the country. This decision was expected to facilitate the creation of a regional peace plan proposed by the United Nations to put an end to the conflict. SADC’s leaders decided that this 4000 man force would have its own command structure and its own rules of engagement, even if hierarchically it would answer to the United Nations.

It was also decided that, unlike MONUSCO, which is not authorised to fight, the neutral international force would have a new sort of mandate and would be able to combat any attempt to destabilise the situation in the eastern part of Congo. However, no timetable was drawn up for its deployment. SADC’s secretary general, Tomaz Salomao, indicated that Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe had promised troops.[14]