SUMMARY:
EDITORIAL: General Bosco Ntaganda must be arrested and transferred to the ICC
1. CONFLICTS WITHIN THE ARMY
a. Desertion of CNDP troops
b. Transfer of the 811th regiment
c. Confrontations between the FARDC and military deserters
2. A SERIES OF DECLARATIONS
a. The statement of CNDP
b. The statements of Bosco Ntaganda
c. The statements of Governor Julien Paluku
d. The recommendations of ASBL RENAISSANCE AFRICAINE/AETA SOUTH KIVU
3. TOWARD THE CREATION OF A NEW REBELLION
a. The suspension of military operations against deserters
b. The emergence of a new rebel movement called M23
4. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
a. Displaced persons and rising prices
5. A READING OF THE REALITY
a. The integration of CNDP troops into the FARDC was a grave error
b. The precariousness of the political and security situation
EDITORIAL: GENERAL BOSCO NTAGANDA MUST BE ARRESTED AND TRANSFERRED TO THE ICC
Kivu, North Kivu in particular, continues to struggle with the phenomenon of deserting troops, which, before their integration into the national army in 2009, belonged to the militia of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a political-military movement close to the current Rwandan regime. The military deserters are closest to General Bosco Ntaganda, the former chief of staff of the CNDP militia who is now integrated into the Congolese army as the second-ranked commander in the military operation Amani Leo (“Peace Today”), which is led, officially, against the Rwandan rebels Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
Like previous military operations (Umoja Wetu and Kimia II) against the FDLR, Amani Leo also constitutes, in reality, an effective platform for the illegal and clandestine trade in Kivu ores, which are exported abroad via Rwanda. According to different expert reports from the United Nations on the DRC, General Bosco Ntaganda and his officers are most implicated in a web of criminal activity that centers on the smuggling of minerals. The current Rwandan regime benefits considerably from this activity, for Rwanda has become the country through which Congolese ores are passed.
Bosco Ntaganda is, equally, one who could block an eventual alliance between the FDLR forces based in Kivu and certain general Rwandan dissidents currently exiled to South Africa, an alliance that could bring an end to the current dictatorship in Rwanda.
Furthermore, the current Rwandan regime has never disavowed its ambitions—hegemonic, economic, political, and military—with regard to Kivu, and in pursuing its aims, it has enlisted the Rwandophone Congolese and, in particular, the Tutsi community. The CNDP is the principal instrument in the regime’s efforts: at the military level, through the integration of CNDP troops into the national Congolese army, and at the political level, through the CNDP’s establishment of a parallel local administration.
At the political level, the situation is currently very confused; this is largely the result of the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) decision to confirm the annulment of the November 28 legislative elections in the Masisi territory, a CNDP stronghold and a political party member of the Presidential Majority (MP). Thus, at present, the CNDP is without a deputy to represent it at the National Assembly, at least until the holding of legislative elections (theoretically planned for two months after the CSJ ruling).
Bosco Ntaganda, as stated in the warrant for his arrest delivered by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2006 for crimes committed in Ituri in 2002-2003, is a Rwandan national who defends, exclusively, the interests of the Congolese Tutsi community and the Rwandan regime in Kivu. His eventual arrest and transfer to the ICC should deal a serious blow to the lucrative trade in “conflict” minerals and to Rwandan hegemony (economic, political, and military) in Kivu in particular and the DRC in general.
Amidst the uncertainty of the coming legislative elections in Masisi, the CNDP has resorted to armed force in order to assert its political will. Recent desertions may be a form of pressure on the local population and a factor in influencing the coming legislative elections in Masisi.
Moreover, recent reports from United Nations experts on the proven involvement of Bosco Ntaganda in the illegal exploitation of minerals, as well as the latest national and international pressures placed on President Kabila to arrest and transfer Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC, may be immediate causes of the current military desertions.
When the “myth of Ntaganda” as “an indispensable element in achieving peace” is melting like snow in the sun, the Matata government and President Katila have the obligation to assume their respective responsibilities in arresting and transferring Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC and, further, to do so without taking potentially dangerous and extremely risky shortcuts. This would be a strong and tangible sign of struggle against impunity and a concrete demonstration of a serious pursuit of justice.
1. CONFLICTS WITHIN THE ARMY
a. Desertion of CNDP troops
The weekend of April 22, three officers deserted the ranks of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) in North Kivu, despite recent warnings by the military authorities. Among the deserters was Colonel Mutoni, commander of the first battalion of the 812th regiment based in Ngungu, to the southeast of central Masisi. He defected April 22 with his men and travelled to Kitshanga, to the west of Goma in Masisi territory, where the majority of deserters are concentrated.
The second deserting officer, Baudouin Ngaruye, commanded the 3rd operational sector deployed in South Kivu. According to military sources, Colonel Ngaruye was scheduled to return to his newly assigned post in Mwenga on Saturday, April 21 but never arrived. It is alleged that he turned up in Kitshanga carrying approximately 40,000 USD intended for his own installation and the payment of his troops.
Friday, April 20, Colonel Innocent Nzimulinda, former commander of the 811th regiment, joined his fellow deserters in Masisi.
A source in Masisi accuses deserters of engaging in atrocious acts against civilians.
On the night of April 21-22, three soldiers and two civilians were wounded in Kalungu, in the South Kivu territory of Kalehe, during an exchange of fire between two groups of FARDC soldiers. The exchange occurred when a first group of soldiers, on patrol along the Nyabibwe-Kalungu axis, attempted to block the passage of a second group, bound for Goma, through the area. Sources close to the 10th military region confirm that patrollers of the 103rd regiment exchanged shots with the escort of an officer of the 10th region, en route to Goma. Before its passage was blocked mid-way, the second group of soldiers violated the area’s security barriers.
April 23, fourteen FARDC soldiers recently of the former rebel faction of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and detained since their defection, returned to Bukavu (South Kivu) from North Kivu. They are to be tried before a military panel of justice, and the trial will take place in Uvira, Baraka, and Nyabibwe (South Kivu). Ten of the fourteen soldiers are being prosecuted for having deserted the ranks of the FARDC.
The remaining four are implicated in the exchange of fire between two groups of soldiers in Nyabibwe and Kalungu, in Kalehe, the night of April 21-April 22.
Three of the four soldiers implicated in this exchange are officers. They include:
- Colonel Bernard Byamungu, ex-commander of the 9th sector in Uvira,
- Colonel Sabimana Samuel, ex-commander of the 105th regiment in Baraka,
- Colonel Biyoyo Josué, ex-commander of the 103rd regiment in Nyabibwe.
According to the military spokesperson for North and South Kivu, each soldier will be tried in the place where the acts of which he is accused were committed.
April 23, over 100 mutineers who were commanded by colonels Byamungu and Nsabimana in the plateaus that overhang the city of Uvira, in the province of South Kivu, rejoined the ranks of the 10th region military command of the FARDC, in Bukavu.
The instigators of the mutiny will be transferred to the military justice courts and tried according to the law and military regulations. Mutineers who are who are not condemned will be conducted to a training centre in Luberizi for re-education. Already, 162 mutineers who arrived in Bukavu last week have declared that they are willing to re-integrate into the ranks of the regular army.
The mutinous soldiers were under the command of Colonel Bernard Byamungu Maheshe, who led the 9th sector of the FARDC in Uvira. He was arrested April 15, 2012 by the specialized services of the regular army. Known by the sobriquet Tigre (Tiger One), Colonel Byamungu had defected April 8 with two superior officers, Colonel Samuel Nsabimana, commander of the 105th regiment based in Baraka, and his adjunct, Lieutenant Colonel Toussaint Muhindo Mayanga.
In taking off, the three officers succeeded in bringing with them three hundred seventy-one (371) items. According to military sources cited by the ACP, officers Edmond and Zaïrois Moïse are still on the loose.
Sources allege that three hundred FARDC deserters have rallied to the support of Sheka, chief rebel of the group Maï-Maï Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC), which is operating in the North Kivu territory of Walikale. The deserters from the Congolese army and the Maï-Maï Cheka operate in the Luvungi, Bynyampuli and Kibua regions along the Goma-Walikale axis. The security services of the province affirm that the alliance between Sheka and Ntaganda, who is being pursued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, is intended to ensure control of the mining zones for purposes of exploiting the region’s reserves of gold and cassiterite.
May 3, Colonel Sultani Makenga and Lieutenant Colonel Masozera were among some 80 soldiers from the Congolese army who defected to Goma (North Kivu). Colonel Makenga was the number two in the military operations of Amani Léo (“Peace Today,” in Swahili) in the neighbouring province of South Kivu. Lieutenant Colonel Masozera is currently aide-de-camp of General Ntaganda.
b. Transfer of the 811th regiment
April 23, approximately one thousand soldiers departed Goma (North Kivu) for Kananga, in Western Kasaï. The soldiers were members of the 811th regiment that was based in Mwesso and Nyanzale, to the west of Goma, in the territory of Masisi.
This transfer, ordered by the Chief of the General Staff of the FARDC, aims to put an end to the phenomenon of “community soldiers and officers,” inclined to defend only the interests of their own ethnic communities.
According to the high military hierarchy of the FARDC, this initial transfer of troops is part of a larger operation, and additional, similar transfers are to come. For some time, a chorus of voices has demanded that soldiers issuing from former rebel groups go far from their zones of operation. However, certain interests arising from the illegal and clandestine trade in ores have been stronger than disciplinary measures. Well, better late than never.
The troops of the 806th regiment, which arrived as replacements for the FARDC units reassigned to Kananga (Western Kanaï), have endeavoured for a week to deploy themselves throughout the Bashali Mokoto groups in the Masisi territory (North Kivu), as deserters from the 8th military region have tried to occupy the terrain. The soldiers of the 806th FARDC regiment are deployed across a distance of 10 km, from the locality of Mwesso to Muhongozi.
Notably, the mutinous soldiers occupy the localities of Kabati, Kirolirwe, Muhongozi and Kitshanga. The situation is concerning to one local source, who fears confrontations between the FARDC and the deserters.
Positions abandoned by the 811th regiment troops in Pinga and Kashuga are now occupied by militias of the APCLS and rebels of the FDLR.
Since the start of the week, this situation has led to the displacement of populations from the Bashali Mokoto toward Saké and Goma.
c. Confrontations between the FARDC and military deserters
April 29, ex-CNDP soldiers who had defected from the Congolese army at the start of April attacked the FARDC at Mweso and Mushaki, in the territory of Masisi, in the southern region of North Kivu. Military sources report that the clashes left six deserters dead and three FARDC members wounded. Since April 30, military deserters have controlled several localities in Masisi territory, including Karuba, Muheto, Mushaki, Buku, Kitshanga, Bwiza, Nyamitaba, Kirolirwe, Kabate, Mukambi, Murambi, Misumbala, Luhunga and Mwesso.
According to local sources, the deserters are allied with Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi’s self-defence militia Maï Maï and, with the militia, have seized control of Luvungi, Bunyampuli and Mpofi along the Walikale-Masisi axis. FARDC spokesperson Sylvain Ekenge maintains that the situation is under control.
April 30, the governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, rejected information according to which the insurgents seized control of several localities. He insisted that the military deserters are, first and foremost, undisciplined soldiers. He then asserted that they “were already deployed as FARC units in the villages in question. And when, at a given moment, they consider themselves as members of a particular wing, one can hardly say that they have seized these localities, for they were already there.”
The vice president of the civil society of North Kivu, Omar Kavota, maintained that these localities are henceforth to be controlled by rebel troops, as they no longer respect the FARDC hierarchy. He affirmed: “There are localities that are currently controlled by ex-CNDP elements loyal to General Bosco Ntaganda. There are also other localities in Masisi that are controlled by other armed groups like the APLCS.”
The provincial spokesperson, Adele Bazizane, indicated that “the situation remains under control by the FARDC.” A crisis committee has been assembled in order to rapidly elaborate a contingency plan.
April 30, the FARDC launched a counter-offensive and regained control of several localities in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu, which the deserters had occupied for two days. The locality of Bwiza, near Kitshanga and about 100 km west of Goma in the Rutshuru territory, is under the control of the regular army. The FARDC has also recovered the villages of Kautu, Kabaya, Karuba and Kilongo, near Mushaki and about 50 km northwest of Goma, according to local sources in the Masisi region. The regular army’s current objective is to retake the main centres, like Mushaki northwest of Goma, along the route from central Masisi to Kitchanga, which lies 80 km west of Goma in Masisi.
May 2, FARDC soldiers recovered the city of Kitshanga, formerly occupied by the insurgents. According to community leaders, the insurgents directed themselves toward the locality of Burungu, a city some 7 km from Kitshanga.
May 4, the Congolese army regained control of the locality of Mushaki, where General Bosco Ntaganda had previously been based. Mutinous soldiers indicated that Ntaganda is “in the process of leaving his farm. He intends to pass through the Virunga National Park in order to rejoin Runyonyi in (the neighbouring territory of) Rutshuru,” on the border of Rwanda and Uganda and traditionally a bastion of the CNDP. He plans to rejoin Colonel Makenga, his adjunct in the former rebellion and a fellow deserter.
Though it may, at present, be difficult to know his whereabouts, he is likely preparing to cross the border into Rwanda in order to seek refuge and shelter from prosecution.
This is especially probable given that the country of Paul Kagamé is not a signatory of the Accord that implicates him vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court. Considered thus, the adventures of Bosco Ntaganda, a Rwandan solder who became a FARDC general, risks ending in the manner of Laurent Nkunda Batware’s escapades. Batware, a Tutsi officer, today lives tranquilly in Rwanda after having mocked 60 million Congolese. Such humiliation is intolerable. The time has more than come for the Congolese to acknowledge this and to counter those who sponsor this treason.
2. A SERIES OF DECLARATIONS
a. The statement of the CNDP
April 29, in a communiqué signed by Senator Edouard Mwangachuchu Hizi, National President of the CNDP, the political director of this political party, a member of the presidential majority, seeks to call national and international attention to the following details regarding the security situation that currently prevails in the provinces of North and South Kivu.
1. Entire FARDC units are presently in a state of mutiny in the provinces of North and South Kivu. They have evaded the chain of command and withdrawn from their respective positions for security reasons. This retreat has been carried out in order to avoid any possibility of a violent confrontation with colleagues and comrades-in-arms. Unfortunately, these forces are now being subjected to military attacks that require them to defend themselves.
2. This state of mutiny has frequently been described in both the national and the international media as a self-defense movement initiated by a FARDC general threatened by an international arrest warrant. This interpretation is utterly incorrect and misleading, for the mid-rank official cited continues to serve under the command of the FARDC hierarchy.
3. The political leadership of the CNDP would like to emphasize that the resurgence currently underway has its roots in the evident failure of processes intended to integrate former members of other political-military movements into the FARDC.
4. The DRC government is entirely responsible for the present situation, owing to its non-respect for the Peace Accords of January 16 and March 23, 2009, signed in Goma.
In consideration of the above, the CNDP recommends that the government:
-Order the immediate cessation of hostilities within the army in the interest of population security.
-Return to a strict application of the Peace Accords of January 16 and March 23, 2009.
b. The statements of Bosco Ntaganda
May 1, General Jean-Bosco Ntaganda states that he is not implicated in the violent confrontations in the eastern region the DRC, where the regular army is combating mutinous ex-members of the rebellion of the CNDP, of which he was the chief of staff. He also denies any responsibility for the recent defection of several army officers and soldiers. Questioned by telephone, he declares: “I am on my farm near Mushaki. My military hierarchy knows that I am there and has authorized me to remain there.” He further emphasizes, “Even the Head of State (Joseph Kabila) knows it,” adding: “the mutineers have claims that prompt them to desert the ranks of the FARDC,” but “I do not have the power to fight them, as I do not currently have a command function.”
Ntaganda, the ex-chief of staff of the CNDP now sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC), is generally based in Goma, the North Kivu capital. He has been the “number 2” (in reality, the number 1) in the command of the Amani Leo operation, led officially against national (Maï Maï) and foreign (FDLR) armed groups. However, he has retained in his service troops from the CNDP that are not integrated into the FARDC and obey a parallel chain of command.
c. The statements of Governor Julien Paluku
May 2, Julien Paluku, the governor of the province of North Kivu, announced to the press from his residence that the Congolese government holds Bosco Ntaganda responsible for the fighting currently taking place in North Kivu and demands that he be apprehended: “The Congolese government has charged me with communicating to you the following: everything taking place today in Masisi is the responsibility of General Bosco Ntaganda, and for this reason he must be pursued.” He adds, “If our units apprehend him, he will account for his acts before the Congolese courts. If indiscipline requires us to make war, we will do so.” Finally, he concludes, “Bosco Ntaganda must be arrested, and he must be brought before the Congolese court and held to account for his acts.” According to certain observers, the reference to judicial Congolese authorities is not incidental, which suggests a disinclination to deliver Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC.
d. Recommendations of ASBL Renaissance Africaine/AETA South Kivu
May 3, ASBL Renaissance Africaine, RENAF and the focal point of the platform “Action for Transparent and Peaceful Elections,” AETA/South Kivu, concerned by a lack of security that prevails in the eastern regions of the DRC and particularly in North and South Kivu, recommends that:
1. MONUSCO:
-Take preventative measures in order to avoid propagating the waves of insecurity being experienced in North and South Kivu and in the rest of the country, specifically by assuring the control of the Kavumu and Goma airports and other strategic places that could be infiltrated by aggressors from neighbouring countries (Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda).
-Protect the civilian population during confrontations between loyalist forces and the rebels/deserters.
2. The government of the DRC:
-Take appropriate measures to ensure the security of individuals and their property;
-Be prepared to accelerate the formation of a Republican army;
-Establish mechanisms that would serve to discourage impunity within the army;
-Expedite an independent and rigorous investigation into allegations of high treason in the army (or at the state summit), in order to determine responsibility for the killing of civilians by the regular army and the rebels, and the execution of Congolese soldiers;
-Rapidly re-establish the abruptly shattered constitutional order by arresting mutinous rebels;
-Rehabilitate and reinforce the operational capacities of the military command of the Kivu region;
-Enlist the CPI, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and other competent judiciary authorities in order to ensure that perpetrators of crimes and serious violations of human rights in North and South Kivu are called to account for their actions.
3. The head of state, president of the Republic and guarantor of the Nation, supreme leader of the FARDC:
-Immediately and unconditionally restructure the National Army and create a new military staff composed of Congolese nationalists;
-Launch a serious and aggressive counter-offensive against exterior aggressors.
4. The chief of general staff of the FARDC:
-Accurately report the exact number of nationalist Congolese soldiers operating in Kivu;
-Put an end to the mono-ethnic character of certain military battalions/commands/regiments in North and South Kivu.
5. The population:
-Block any attempt to balkanize the country;
-Continue to mobilize as a single community, through word and action and without violence, for the popular surveillance of the peace process, in order to bring about the holding of provincial and local elections within the period specified by the Constitution;
-Refuse to partake in any act of vandalism or pillaging that would destroy the modest economic infrastructure that exists;
-Maintain vigilance in the towns of Bukavu and Goma and in the territories by denouncing all violations of human rights during this crucial period.
3. TOWARD THE CREATION OF A NEW REBELLION
a. The suspension of military operations against deserters
May 5, the FARDC suspended neutralization operations being led against military deserters, asserting that they had “mastered” the situation and affirming that it was under their control.
“The situation that has lately prevailed in North Kivu is the doing of certain undisciplined officers who have sought to enlist several soldiers,” explains General Etumba, the general chief of staff of the army, who called on the deserters to “immediately rejoin, within five days, the ranks of the national army.” He exhorted the unit commanders to “create conditions favourable” for the re-integration of the repentant. He did not specify, however, what measures would be taken with regard to those deserters who persist in their “indiscipline.”
Upon the conclusion of military operations executed over a four-day period in North Kivu, more than seventy military deserters rejoined the ranks of the FARDC. Several sources in the Masisi territory affirm that other mutinous soldiers are currently fleeing and that many of them are headed toward Virunga National Park.
b. The appearance of a new rebel movement called M23
Mutinous soldiers loyal to General Bosco Ntaganda have created a new rebel movement called M23, in reference to the peace accord signed March 23, 2009 that authorized the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) to integrate the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). Its military branch is the National Army of Congo (ANC/CNDP). Its chief is Colonel Sultani Makenga, who defected May 4.
The goal of the M23 movement, according to its founders, is to reinvigorate the peace accord signed in 2009 between the Congolese government and the CNDP. The founders of M23 maintain that the peace accord, negotiated with the government on March 23, 2009, failed. It is therefore necessary, according to a communiqué dated May 6, to “reinvigorate the application” of the accord.
According to members of the civil society of North Kivu, this vaguely defined rebel movement has been created by the mutinous general Bosco Ntaganda and his allies with the aim of repositioning themselves on the political scene at the moment when institutions issuing from the elections are being established. Moreover, M23 sees an opportunity as the FARDC has announced a five-day truce during which mutinous soldiers may return to their barracks.
The opinion of many observers is that General Bosco Ntaganda, pursued by the CPI for war crimes and crimes against humanity, is in the process of preparing a comeback that will enable him to reassert his influence on the Congolese political stage.
In creating this movement, General Bosco Ntaganda wishes to prove that he remains a figure of consequence with whom the Congolese government must negotiate and collaborate.
As a result, Congolese authorities will find themselves unable to deliver him to the CPI. The calculations of the former number 2 of the CNDP are further reinforced by the links that, for several years, he has maintained with a number of political and military Congolese leaders.
Bosco Ntaganda himself and many of his acolytes have become powerful, for they are involved in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern regions of the DRC. This illegal commerce supports a great number of armed groups and warlords who make the law in the eastern regions of the country.
For observers, the truce initiated by the FARDC allowing deserters to return to their barracks is inopportune, for Ntaganda’s men, shaped by a culture of violence and terror, are not inclined to return to their posts. Further, the truce may be exploited by Bosco Ntaganda as an ideal opportunity to organize and re-arm.
The sole means of suppressing this nascent rebel movement is to proceed in launching a vast air-ground military operation, involving the FARDC and the ONU mission, in order to stabilize the DRC (MONUSCO) and pursue and track General Bosco Ntaganda and his men in their latest retrenchment. The operation must receive support from neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, so that these countries do not become bases of operation for the rebels.
4. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
a. Displaced persons and rising prices
April 29-May 2, the High Commission for Refugees registered approximately 16,000 displaced persons who had newly arrived in the camps of Mugunga and Keshero, in the extreme west of the town of Goma (North Kivu). Seeking humanitarian aid, the lack water and food and live in fear of new attacks. Among the displaced are members of the Hunde, Hutu, Tembo and Nianga tribes; the Tutsi have headed toward Rwanda and some 3,500 of their tribe have arrived at the transit centre of Nkamira.
According to a report from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the ONU, in Kinshasa the number of displaced persons “has increased by 241,000 persons in the course of the first quarter of the year, growing from 1.7 million on December 31, 2011 to more than 2 million on March 21 of the current year.”
The two Kivus, OCHA notes, “shelter more than 1.4 million displaced persons, or 70% of the entire displaced population,” who primarily flee the insecurity created by local and foreign armed groups. South Kivu shelters the greater number, with an increase of 35% from 634,598 displaced persons in December to 856,162 today. In North Kivu, new statistics bring to 514,000 the number of internally displaced persons, who are divided among 31 camps.
With regard to the eastern province, the ONU noted that despite the presence of elements from the Lord’s Resistance Army, the region has seen a slight drop from 471,000 displaced at the end of 2011 to 466,000 at the end of March.
The confrontations between the FARDC and the deserters have caused a rise in prices for foodstuffs in Goma, which is cut off from Masisi, its sole supply source for foodstuffs.
A 100 kg bag of potatoes currently costs 55 USD in Goma (North Kivu), where it previously sold for 30-35 USD. The price of beans has risen from 55 to 80 and sometimes 130 USD, depending on the quality. The cost of a 100 kg bag of cassava has increased from 32 to 50 USD. The bowl of beans that formerly sold for 600 CDF now costs between 800 and 1200 CDF the bowl of cassava flour that was purchased for 400 CDF now sells for over 800 CDF.
5. A READING OF THE REALITY
a. The integration of CNDP troops into the FARDC was a grave error.
According to certain observers, the integration of CNDP troops into the FARDC was a grave error, the consequences of which are being felt today. This integration, instituted January 23, 2008 upon the conclusion of the Goma conference on peace and development, has yet to bring peace. Rather, the present leadership has accorded resources and favours to the ex-rebels, notably in the form of arms, logistical support, and communications. It seems that, in contrast with the rest of the army, the CNDP elements have been pampered. They have been assigned to Kivu, as they have continued to refuse appointments in different military units throughout the country, outside Kivu. They have been promoted and even attained the rank of general, as seen in the case of Bosco Ntaganda. This favouritism is at the source of the confrontations now being decried. The rebellion’s limits now exposed, the solution cannot be that which the CNDP’s political branch proposes. To continue to build a republican army with perpetrators of rape, theft, and the vilest of killings would be criminal. It would be a proof of wilful blindness, political and military, to invest one’s confidence in individuals who respect only a clan hierarchy and behave like Trojan horses in the service of the Rwandan regime.
In an interview granted to the weekly Young Africa dated April 29-May 5, the Rwandan president Paul Kagame—he who elevated the lie to the ranks of modern art—asserted without laughing that the instability provoked in North Kivu by the eventual transfer of Ntaganda to the Hague “is an affair that concerns Congo and not Rwanda.” In subliminal language, the Rwandan satrap communicated in full his condemnation of the transfer of Ntaganda to the ICC: “(…) my reservations with regard to the functioning and impartiality of the ICC, which I have already expressed several times, remain intact.” What business is it of this Kigali strongman, since, according to him, it is a Congolese affair? In reality, Paul Kagame is the one calling the shots. It is Kagame who, via armed groups built from scratch, stirs instability in the Kivu provinces. According to an article published April 27, 2004 under the name MMC, the editorial branch of the site DigitalCongo.net, “the Kigali authorities have never abandoned their dream of dictating Kinshasa affairs through their henchmen, whom they would propel to the forefront through a seizure of power.”
Through cowardice—and why not through collaboration with the Rwandan regime?—Joseph Kabila has done nothing. Since January 2009, Kagame and Kabila have been reconciled. Reconciliation has not improved the security situation in the provinces, despite the operations “Umoja Wetu” and “Kimya.” The situation has become worse. The FARDC has been infiltrated by Rwandan soldiers, camouflaged by the banner of the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People), which seeks to guarantee the security of members of the Tutsi community. The FARDC is undermined from within by “invisible enemies” who are deployed not only at the level of military regions but also at the level of the chief of general staff of the FARDC in Kinshasa. In Goma, Mbuji-Mayi and Bukavu, the army is commanded by officers of dubious loyalty.
b. The precariousness of the political and security situation
The desertion of soldiers loyal to General Bosco Ntaganda has shed light on the precariousness of the political and security situation confronting the DRC since the fraudulent elections of last November.
The army is a conglomerate of militias that, oftentimes, are suspected of being led by war criminals. Presented as a pledge of peace in 2009, the integration of the CNDP into the army paved the way for a silent seizure of control of a large part of the Kivus, a seizure at once military (parallel commands, refusal to be deployed outside the Kivus) and economic (preying on local populations, smuggling of raw materials, land grabbing).
Through the process of integration, rather than the Congolese army absorbing the militias, the militias absorbed the Congolese army.
The instability within the army reflects that which characterizes the Congolese political class.
In North Kivu, beyond the individual case of Bosco Ntaganda, what is in play is the political representation of the CNDP and Congolese Tutsi community. The 2011 elections, intended to facilitate the integration of the CNDP into national and provincial political structures, were annulled in Masisi as a result of fraud. This decision entirely neglected the question of the role of this movement and of the political inter-communal equilibrium in North Kivu. Only new elections can resolve the question of political control in this province.
For western donors, the mutiny of Bosco Ntaganda, aka “Terminator,” in North Kivu should serve as an opportunity to rethink certain policies and to react to growing problems, such as:
1. The failure of army reforms, despite the investment of donor funds.
2. The inopportunity of certain short-term individual arrangements with militia chiefs, who weaken the governance of Congolese security institutions.
3. The exploitation of ICC arrest warrants by the Congolese government, which funds the arrest of war criminals in exchange for the political support of western nations.
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Thanks to the PerMondo initiative, the translation agency Mondo Agit and the voluntary translator Emily Macaux, this document could be translated from French into English. This initiative carries out free translations of texts or websites for NGOs.
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