SUMMARY:

1. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ONGOING ELECTORAL PROCESS

a. The collapse and fragmentation of political forces

b. One-round elections and a divided opposition

c. An inconsistent electoral campaign

d. Pre-election demonstrations as a prelude to the contestation of the election results

e. Congolese unity, a key issue in the presidential election on 28th November 2011

1. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ONGOING ELECTORAL PROCESS

a. The collapse and fragmentation of political forces

According to Jean-Claude Willame, judging by the initial information from the CENI website and recent political developments, it is already possible to draw some conclusions which, of course, will be unbiased by the final election results.

1. As in 2006, it is first and foremost the collapse and fragmentation of political forces which seems to prevail. Over 18,000 electoral candidates have officially registered for election to Parliament, compared with 10,000 in the previous elections. The majority of these candidates belong to some 417 political parties recognised by the Ministry of the Interior in August 2011, as opposed to 203 parties in 2006. Among the ten main groups, independent candidates are the most numerous (541); in 2006 there were as many as 702 independents. The fact that the political landscape is continuing to splinter and candidates continuing to multiply indicates that everyone is on standby, preparing for negotiations to decide the victor(s).

2. The largest group (494) are delegates from the party supporting Joseph Kabila’s candidature, who are standing for election all around the country, although Kabila is still standing as an “independent candidate.” Candidates from groups which have publicly declared their support for the current president (PALU: 466 candidates, and AFDC, the party created by Modeste Bahati following his eviction from his position as a Quaestor of the Senate: 383) should also be added to this alliance. Also, candidates from Pierre Lumbi’s MSR (Lumbi is the special advisor to the head of state since 2010) and Felix Kabange Numbi’s ECT (Numbi is the Katangan minister and close associate of President Kabila) and finally members of the mysterious PPPD party should also be counted. The official head of the PPPD is the Kinoan professor Ngoma Binda, and one of its candidates is Léonard She Okitundu, co-founder of the PPRD, former minister and one-time head of staff to President Kabila. It should not be ruled out that perhaps the presidential entourage were going for the strategy of encouraging a multitude of groups to register to give the president a comfortable majority in Parliament.

3. Note that the number of opposition candidates registered is almost half the number of candidates for the groups which, in principal, support the President of the Republic (1,169 compared to 2,507), excluding Vital Kamerhe’s UNC which comes in fourth position and has 445 candidates across the country, Etienne Tshisekedi’s UDPS and Kengo wa Dondo’s UFC count a total of 724 candidates. Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC is not featured on the list of the first ten groups in terms of candidate numbers.

4. As for the presidential election, there are only 11 candidates as opposed to 33 in 2006. One reason for this may be linked to the fact that the electoral deposit payable by presidential candidates rose from $50,000 to $100,000 (non-refundable). Four of the eleven candidates are newcomers, including a renegade Member of Parliament (Adam Bambole) from the MLC, which is neither presenting its own candidate nor endorsing anyone; a lawyer from the Kinshasa Bar Association (Jean Andeka); a veterinary surgeon from Lubumbashi working as a consultant in South Africa (François Nicéphore Kakese); a pastor and former administration delegate from the Congolese Maritime Company who is standing as a “messianic candidate” (Josué Alex Mukendi). In addition to President Kabila, three of the candidates also ran in the 2006 elections, amongst them Oscar Kashala who, since his defeat, had disappeared from the political circuit, Mbusa Nyamwisi, a Nande from North Kivu who was recently dismissed from his position as Minister of Decentralisation, and the son of ex-president Mobutu, who was also relieved of his duties as Vice-Prime Minister of the Muzito government in March 2011.

Based on the results appearing on the CENI website, the only presidential candidates who could give J. Kabila cause for alarm are Vital Kamerhe and Etienne Tshisekedi. Kamerhe, one-time campaign manager for the president, but who left his services in December 2010, also has a large number of candidates running for parliament in all regions of Congo, not only in Kivu where he enjoys greater popularity. As for Etienne Tshisekedi, a long-standing figurehead of the opposition movement in Congo-Zaïre who did not stand in the 2006 elections, he is opting for the strategy of tension and ambivalence, following the example of Jean-Pierre Bemba, whose support he had attempted in vain to seek. His almost legendary name mobilised the masses, even groups of street children known as “pomba” (young people who practise martial arts) or “kuluna” (young bandits often armed with knives or machetes). Wholly rejecting the figures given by CENI regarding elector enrolment and deposition of candidatures, he has also presented candidates from all corners of the country, although slightly less than Vital Kamerhe.

b. One-round elections and a divided opposition

According to certain observers, Kabila’s preference for a one-round election comes from one sole conviction: “They (the opposition) will all be united in saying that I must go, but not in choosing my replacement.” This type of situation, quite common in Africa, leads to bundles of newspaper articles every year on the subject “the retiring president did not end up retiring and the divided opposition is to blame”.

In reality, this is all untrue. The final result is that this famous “divided opposition” serves to make the unacceptable acceptable. Because this division, described as a tactical error committed by those concerned, is presented as an intrinsic part of the opposition, a self-attributed feature. They created their own downfall… which conveniently detracts from anything else which might have helped this along. The “victory of President X over a divided opposition” prevents us from mentioning certain other details.

In terms of the DRC, we will not mention “JKK’s victory, a man who has completely politicized CENI, majority controlled by his own supporters, let them draw up electoral lists which, in the absence of a recent census, make absolutely no sense, modified the constitution to favour his victory, etc…”. The continuous insistence put on this “divided opposition” or – which also boils down to the same thing – on the “inability to agree on a common candidate” alludes to an unspoken and certainly never outwardly shown presupposition: the idea that the opposition should be united, if possible, and that only negative reasons prevent the achievement of this aim, that in fact it should be easy if it weren’t for the egos of the candidates.

In itself, the idea of a single presidential candidate representing the opposition is perfectly valid. But this can only happen if the candidate embodies an ideology, a government programme which is clearly in contrast to the current one. If there is no alternative programme, there is nothing to discuss, apart from the distribution of jobs once power has been won. In other words, if the ideology upon which the whole idea of unity was based is removed, all that remains are the individuals, separated by their differences. Indeed, Kamerhe, Tshisekedi and Kengo are divided by their many differences: age, social and educational background, migration, multiple wars, the influence of neighbouring countries… In these kinds of conditions, it becomes difficult to agree. The only one who benefits from the situation is Joseph Kabila. The outgoing president seems sure of his re-election, thanks to one major advantage: the one-round election which will no longer give the opposition time to reassemble for the second round. Insisting upon the divided nature of the opposition, therefore, only serves to prepare public opinion so that no one will be surprised when JKK is re-elected. However, in an election, nothing is a foregone conclusion.

Firstly, the one-round election could prove to be a double-edged sword. The description “JKK on the one hand, ten candidates on the other” rests on the erroneous idea that on the one side will be the supporters of the majority, who have always voted for Kabila, and on the other, the electorate of the opposition, who will be split up amongst the ten others. These ten others will in fact take votes from all over, including some of those who supported Kabila in 2006.

There will be three “heavyweight” opposition candidates on the 28th November challenging President Kabila for his seat: Etienne Tshisekedi, one step ahead of the others in terms of mobilising the people, Vital Kamerhe, who managed to break into the political scene of the opposition in just a few months, and Léon Kengo, who turned up to rock the boat at the last minute.

Kamerhe’s influence is based particularly on the notion that he will be supported by voters from the populous eastern regions, disillusioned by having voted for the “candidate for peace” in 2006, only to be repaid by continuing warfare, and, worst of all, an alliance with Rwanda, in their eyes a monstrous act verging on high treason.

Tshisekedi has been around for a long time, and his triumphal campaigns have shown that he does enjoy success, even outside of Kinshasa and Kasaï, and even with young people. Is this a novelty effect or successful political strategy? No one will know until the votes have been cast. However, he will be faced with a challenge in the east of the DRC: how to mobilise the population in an area which has not yet been won over by the UDPS? Originally from Kasaï, Etienne Tshisekedi is not a “man of the East” and will have to battle it out with Vital Kamerhe, who is also extremely well established in the north and in South Kivu. However, he is counting on two advantages to draw crowds in the East. The head of the UDPS firstly hopes to “surf” on the wave of discontent swelling in the region since 2008. For many inhabitants of the region, Kabila’s track record regarding security has mainly been unpopular, and Tshisekedi is hoping to capitalise on the exasperation experienced by the population. There is one problem however: in the past he has spoken favourably about Rwanda and pro-Rwandan “rebellions,” even making official visits to the country.

Kengo wa Dondo, a former member of the Mobutu administration, could find followers amongst those who still maintain a certain nostalgia for this era, for example in Équateur Province, where he will not be in direct competition with Bemba.

With that, we return to the theory sometimes referred to as the “nuclear triangle” or the “magic square” if you add a fourth candidate, whereby these candidates could between them take so many votes from Kabila that he comes second, and therefore loses the race.

c. An inconsistent electoral campaign

If we make a pre-assessment of the current electoral campaign, it is necessary to admit that the politicians involved are leading inconsistent electoral campaigns. It is an undeniable fact that this electoral campaign began under a huge amount of pressure and in a climate of political intolerance.

So far, there has been provocation, insults thrown at one or more candidates, sterile controversies, hollow campaign slogans boasting of “miracle men,” “messianic personalities,” vague, identikit “programmes” and adverts for exterior consumption. All of the hype is nothing more than an empty shell. Unfortunately, the point of the whole exercise is being passed by, as the true issues of the 2011 elections which could make the DR Congo a united, strong and prosperous nation, are being avoided.

The first real issue of the elections is creating a true rule of law. A state in which the individual freedoms and associations of its citizens are recognised and respected, and the right to be different is accepted. The way to achieve rule of law is to establish republican, depersonalised national institutions. Any country can claim it is democratic but until “depersonalised institutions” are set up, it will remain a demagogy. The battle against impunity and corruption depends on this principle.

The second issue at stake is to decide how to transform an economy which already possesses all the major assets to make this country an emerging country. It is all well and good to talk in theory, but it is time to go into details so that we know exactly what resources people are alluding to when it comes to making “miracles.” The illegal trafficking of our mineral resources is no dinner party anecdote, it is a reality. But how to staunch the financial haemorrhage from the mining industry? And what about agriculture, the foundation of every national economy? Today, this sector is reduced to little more than a “philanthropic domain” where relying on charity is seen as revolutionary, a destabilising approach which only brings about despair. Yes, the Congolese are sitting on top of “a treasure trove” but there is no political will to help them work the earth to discover what treasure is hidden below. This question must be tackled during this electoral campaign to encourage the Congolese people to leave their fantasy world behind and enter the real world. Camper vans, distributing t-shirts, insignificant little gifts being handed out left, right and centre – all the electoral fuss is detracting from the real subject at hand, namely the running of a modern country. The fundamental reasons which provoked the “war of aggression” in the DRC are still unknown, although their motivation seemed to be to control Congolese riches; up until now, the political classes in Congo have shown nothing but incompetence and the country has been transformed into a veritable El Dorado. The economy is out of Kinshasa’s control.

The third issue is the fact that the “legitimacy” of any authority coming from “primary sovereignty,” that is to say directly from the people, places one man firmly at the centre of all the state’s actions, deserving consideration, respect and dignity. As a candidate in the 2011 elections, one must face up to the pitiful IDH index rating (Human Development Index) placing the DRC 187th out of 187 countries in terms of its human development record. What is the country’s social policy? What is the wage policy in the DRC, something that is usually a pillar of every national development strategy? What is “Social Security?” These are all pertinent questions which should lead to a lively debate during this electoral campaign.

The problem is not how to get elected at all costs, but knowing how to “hold onto the crown with dignity.” To get to this stage, it is important to recognise the important issues at stake in the 2011 elections. The contrary will lead the Congolese people to catastrophe.

d. Pre-election demonstrations: a prelude to the contestation of the election results

The current climate in the DR Congo heading towards the elections, expected to take place on November 28th, leads us to fear the worst. The electoral campaign has already been tainted by several violations of human rights: demonstrations by the opposition being harshly repressed, opponents arrested, journalists being put under pressure, the appearance of what resembles a militia made up of young, newly recruited partisans… and all of this in an atmosphere of impunity, giving us cause for alarm. The DR Congo has only just emerged from two wars (1996-1197, 1998-2003) which caused between 2.5 and 5.4 million deaths according to estimates, and could fall into another cycle of violence following the legislative and presidential elections. “A situation like the one in the Ivory Coast is not implausible,” warns Pascal Kambale, member of the NGO Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA). Out of the 11 presidential candidates, two have been monopolising the electoral campaign which officially began on October 28th, to the point that it seems to be turning into a duel between the incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, 40, and his old rival Etienne Tshisekedi from the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), 78. Both seem convinced of their victory. When Etienne Tshisekedi declared that he was “sure to win 100%” of the vote in the elections, Joseph Kabila retorted: “I don’t know if anyone will win 100% of the vote, but I do know one thing, and that is that I am not going to lose.” This type of exchange only aggravates fears. “If we continue like this, the election results will probably be contested and political confrontation will turn violent, with violent demonstrations in the street like in the Ivory Coast,” predicts Pascal Kambale.

The general opinion in Africa and particularly in the DR Congo is that incumbent presidents will normally go to any lengths to rig the elections and get themselves re-elected. Experience has shown that rarely do African presidents organise transparent elections in which they could lose power. Also, many Congolese realise that the country could not be governed by someone who did not have the backing of the “international community,” which often pushes “its own men” to the leadership of African countries.

As a consequence, if the presidential election leads to the re-election of Kabila for another term, there will only be a small minority of people in the world, and fewer still in Congo itself who attribute it to “free, transparent and democratic” elections.

It is not a question of scepticism, but of how this scepticism will be expressed. Violent demonstrations and equally violent reprisals are to be anticipated.

Then there is the election which is only rarely mentioned: the legislative elections, which will not necessarily mirror the result of the presidential election. In particular, it is altogether possible that a victory for Kabila in the presidential election could be accompanied by a defeat in the legislative elections. He would then be faced with a majority opposition and therefore a government hostile towards him. This would also lead to the risk of a series of crises which could generate serious trouble.

Conscious of the way things are, the Congolese opposition may prepare themselves a safety net by contesting the results of the forthcoming elections. The strategy is simple: unveil all attempts at trickery and make public all the blunders made by the authorities and by CENI. Multiply street demonstrations and back the president into a corner, with a view to discredit him both within the country and before the outside world. Up until now, this strategy seems to be working well for the Congolese opposition who have been increasing the number of street demonstrations, especially in Kinshasa, preparing people for the possibility of contesting the results.

It is in the opposition’s best interests to present themselves to the Congolese public as victims – even as martyrs: the idea that “blood was spilt” by the executive power and by CENI is frequently emphasised. The opposition seems to be developing an emotional argument serving to incite hatred amongst the population against the current leadership rather than a real argument.

The situation may become extremely complicated after the next presidential election. If Joseph Kabila wins, the storm of protest that follows may be uncontainable. The Congolese opposition has already proved its ability to mobilise the people in the towns of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Goma, Bukavu, Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga will not hesitate to support any political uprising on the part of the opposition. One order from the opposition and many Congolese could take to the streets and paralyse government action. This could force the executive to take a harsher stance in reply, thus making way for political confrontation with potentially dangerous consequences.

In the middle of the country, in the West and in Kinshasa, resistance is rather of a political nature, whereas in the east, there are still many armed groups and militia. Due to this, some rumours have begun to spread that the current executive is already organising an initiative to stamp out the first signs of armed resistance in the east. The presence of Colonel Kakolele and a core group of ex CNDP soldiers in the North Kivu region might fit in with the role of a police squad, there to prevent any military uprising in the region.

e. Congolese unity, a key issue in the presidential election on 28th November 2011

The outgoing president does not have a perfect track record. The main five targets where he pledged to make improvements during his 2006 electoral campaign (infrastructure, access to drinking water and electricity, education, health) are far from accomplished. Congolese democracy is still in its infancy and during the last five years – to narrow it down to this one aspect of public life – there have been many serious infringements against public freedom, including the murder of numerous journalists and NGO representatives (the assassination of Felix Chebeya has gone, as yet, unpunished).

The rights to exploit Congo’s natural resources continue, as in the past, either to be entrusted to (or rather flogged to) multinational companies or reserved for a small circle of friends, which only contributes in a very small way to improving the public finances of the country. National, food-producing agricultural systems are largely inexistent, the protection of the Congo Basin Forest has never been taken seriously and peace is far from being restored in Kivu, due to the weakness of the Congolese state. In any case, it is difficult to know how to answer the question on how daily life of the Congolese has improved since 2006.

There is great concern over the situation in Kivu: as well as recurring problems (overpopulation, territorial disputes, lack of assertiveness from the state) there are the tensions provoked by Kagame’s recent refusal to recognise Rwandan refugees who do not return to the country by the end of 2011 as nationals. Amongst them are FDLR forces, former CNDP soldiers of Nkunda who the untrustworthy Congolese army failed to wipe out.

However, since the constitutional amendment of January 2011 allowing the election of a president by simple majority after just one round of voting, there is every reason to imagine that Joseph Kabila, supported by the administration and backed by eleven governors of the provinces, all PPRD politicians, as well as the discreet support of the “international community,” may be elected for another term, facing a crumbling opposition composed of ten candidates. All the same, it is not certain that the provinces which secured him his victory in 2006 (Katanga, Maniema, the two Kivus) will support him once again this time.

Amongst his opponents, Tshisekedi, the old warrior, does not have much of a future, neither personally, nor as leader of his country. As for Vital Kamerhe, honest and competent, and Kongo wa Dondo, respected president of the Senate, neither of them have a strong base of supporters to change the outcome of the presidential election.

If he is re-elected, Kabila will have won with less than 50% of the vote, and the same is true for his competition. This poses the question of legitimacy, as he will be forced to seek a parliamentary majority, which could pose him some problems. Even worse is that we would then see the opposition in a coalition against him, reinforced by the system of proportional representation which remains the basis of the legislative elections, a potential source of permanent conflict between the legislative and executive powers. In this case, there is concern that the state institutions could be paralysed and unable to function normally, as well as the risk that the opposition may refuse the verdict of the election.

The doubts of the opposition, already voiced, regarding the regularity of the electoral proceedings, added to the feeling of frustration which may result, quite naturally, from defeat at the polls, could act as a detonator. If politicians do not call for calm before the vote, but continue a violent approach as seen until now, clashes could intensify once the results of the election have been announced, and the risk of unrest is all too real.

There is a high risk that Kinshasa and a certain number of provinces may boil over after the elections, especially Kasaï, a UDPS stronghold, possibly also the extremely fragmented region of Kivu, and even Katanga, still an irredentist region despite its highly esteemed and efficient governor, Moïse Katumbi Chapwe. It would be extremely irresponsible on the part of the opposition to stir up hatred with the sole aim of discrediting Joseph Kabila in the eyes of the population and abroad. By playing this game, it would be the DR Congo which lost out, victim to riots and ruled by a president who would be incapable of forming a government for a long time. It would then be impossible for him to continue the reconstruction of the country, already very slow, and to ensure the preservation of Congolese unity, unable to rely on the security forces composed of ex CNDP rebels who were never fully integrated into the army, especially in Kivu. We can only imagine that such a catastrophic scenario may be in the offing, and could become a reality after these elections.

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This English translation has been possible thanks to the project Mondo Lingua: Free translation of websites for NGOs and non-profit-making organisations. A project managed by Mondo Services. Translator: Philippa Criddle – www.mondo-lingua.org